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The open access (commons) versus private control debate is 
raging. The debate takes place in a number of fields, including 
the intellectual property and cyberlaw literatures, as well as in 
broader public debates concerning propertization, privatization, 
deregulation, and commercialization of areas as diverse as 
communication networks, government services, national for-
ests, and scientific research. On the private control side, there 
is robust economic theory supporting the market mechanism 
with minimal government regulation. In contrast, advocates of 
open access frequently call for protecting the commons. The 
theoretical support for this prescriptive call, however, is under-
developed from an economics perspective. In fact, many who 
oppose propertization, privatization, deregulation, and com-
mercialization view the field of economics with sincere suspi-
cion and doubt. 
This Article embraces economics and develops a theory of 
infrastructure that better explains why, for some classes of im-
portant resources, there are strong economic arguments for 
managing and sustaining the resources in an openly accessible 
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manner. This approach differs from conventional analyses by 
focusing extensively on demand-side considerations and fully 
exploring how infrastructure resources generate value for con-
sumers. 
Three key insights emerge from this demand-side, value-
creation-focused analysis. First, infrastructure resources are 
fundamental resources that generate value when used as in-
puts into a wide range of productive processes. Second, the out-
puts from these processes are often public and nonmarket 
goods that generate positive externalities that benefit society. 
Third, managing infrastructure resources in an openly accessi-
ble manner may be socially desirable when it facilitates these 
downstream activities. 
Part I provides an overview of this Article, situating the 
analysis within existing scholarship and explaining the connec-
tion between infrastructure and commons management. Sec-
tion A explains that traditional infrastructure resources are 
generally managed in an openly accessible manner because 
such resources present a comedy of the commons rather than 
a tragedy of the commons. Section B then explains how com-
mons can best be understood as a resource management princi-
plecommons managementthat can be implemented through 
a variety of institutions. 
Part II explores economic characteristics of infrastructure, 
focusing first on the traditional economic concepts used in wel-
fare analyses of infrastructure resources and then delving 
deeper to better understand societal demand for these re-
sources. This Part develops a new theory of infrastructure. 
Putting theory into context, Part III illustrates how, eco-
nomically, certain environmental and informational resources 
behave as infrastructure. This Part focuses specifically on lakes 
and basic research to explain how these resources are funda-
mental inputs into a wide range of productive activities that 
yield positive externalities that benefit society. Granting pri-
vate ownership of such resources may lead to social costs that 
evade observation or appreciation in conventional economic 
analysis. The basic problem with relying on the market mecha-
nism to allocate access to such resources is that the mechanism 
has an inherent bias for outputs that generate observable and 
appropriable returns. Part III also discusses briefly how envi-
ronmental regulation and intellectual property law reflect soci-
etys desire to sustain common access to environmental and in-
tellectual infrastructure resources. 
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Finally, Part IV applies this framework to the debate over 
network neutrality and the future of the Internets end-to-end 
architecture. At the heart of this debate is whether the Internet 
should retain its current end-to-end design and thereby con-
tinue to be managed as a commons. Ultimately, the outcome of 
this debate will determine whether the Internet will continue 
to operate as a mixed infrastructure, or whether it will evolve 
into a commercial infrastructure optimized for a particular 
class of outputsthe delivery of commercial content for con-
sumption. This Part argues that the current debate is skewed 
because it focuses myopically on neutrality, competition theory, 
and innovation. Because much more is at stake than the cur-
rent debate reflects, a new lens is needed. 
The Internet is a fundamental public and social infrastruc-
ture that is [t]ransforming [o]ur [s]ociety.1 The transforma-
tion is similar to transformations that we have experienced in 
the past with other infrastructure,2 yet it is occurring in a more 
rapid, widespread, and dramatic fashion.3 The Internet is 
quickly becoming integral to the lives, affairs, and relationships 
of individuals, companies, universities, organizations, and gov-
ernments worldwide, and it is having significant effects on fun-
damental social processes and resource systems that generate 
value for society. Commerce, community, culture, education, 
government, health, politics, and science are all information-
and communications-intensive systems that the Internet is 
transforming. The transformation is taking place at the ends, 
where people are empowered to participate and are engaged in 
socially valuable activities. Applying the demand-side theory of 
infrastructure to the network neutrality debate does not solve 
the problem or provide a definitive answer to the tough choices 
that lie ahead. The theory, however, brings into focus the social 
value of sustaining Internet infrastructure in an openly acces-
 
 1. PRESIDENTS INFO. TECH. ADVISORY COMM., INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH: INVESTING IN OUR FUTURE 11 (1999) [hereinafter 
INVESTING IN OUR FUTURE], available at http://www.itrd.gov/pitac/report/ 
pitac_report.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 1120. 
 3. Id. at 11 (As we approach the new millennium, it is clear that the in-
formation infrastructurethe interconnected networks of computers, devices, 
and softwaremay have a greater impact on worldwide social and economic 
structures than all networks that have preceded them.); id. at 35 (Within the 
next two decades, the Internet will have penetrated more deeply into our soci-
ety than the telephone, radio, television, transportation, and electric power 
distribution networks have today. For many of us, the Internet has already 
become an integral part of our daily lives.). 
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sible manner, and strongly suggests that the benefits of open 
access (costs of restricted access) are significantly greater than 
the current debate reflects. 
I. FROM INFRASTRUCTURE TO COMMONS 
MANAGEMENT 
Scholars in a number of fields have been struggling to de-
termine whether particular resources should be managed as 
commons, which, for purposes of this Article, means that the 
resource is openly accessible to all within a community regard-
less of the entitys identity or intended use.4 Perceived as the 
antithesis of private property and an alternative to government 
ownership or control,5 commons have become the centerpiece of 
a broader debate over public access to and private control over 
various resources.6 While there is significant interest in the 
concept of managing resources as commons, there is considera-
bly less explanation of how to decide whether doing so would be 
normatively attractive in particular cases with respect to par-
ticular resources. 
In The Future of Ideas, for example, Lawrence Lessig made 
clear his belief that American society must make difficult deci-
sions between freedom and control.7 We must decide, Lessig 
reminds us, between freedom and control, between open access 
and restricted access.8 These choices must be made with respect 
to resourcesthe environment, information, culture, the Inter-
net, and so on. Lessig recognizes that these questions do not 
have simple answers. Rather, the choice is difficult because it is 
 
 4. See infra Part I.B (defining commons and explaining my approach). 
 5. See Yochai Benkler, The Commons as a Neglected Factor of Informa-
tion Policy 2 (Sept. 1998) (working draft) (analyzing the commons as a third, 
neglected, institutional approach, distinct from direct government interven-
tion and privatization), at http://www.benkler.org/commons.pdf. 
 6. See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integra-
tion, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regu-
lation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 88 (2003) (The open ac-
cess question is even more ubiquitous than it may first appear, as 
policymakers and commentators often use different terms to describe the is-
sue. Antitrust commentators discuss the primary (or bottleneck) market and 
the secondary (or complementary) market. In telecommunications, partici-
pants talk of conduits and content. ). 
 7. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE 
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 1116 (2001) [hereinafter LESSIG, THE 
FUTURE OF IDEAS]. 
 8.  Id. at 1415. 
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not really a dichotomous choice.9 We need both freedom and 
control. For example, some types of information should be con-
trolled, other types of information should be free for public use, 
and still other types should be somewhat controlled and some-
what openly accessible, depending upon how the information is 
used. The tricky question, then, is to figure out how to deter-
mine whether particular resources should be managed in an 
openly accessible manner, and if so, to what degree. 
Throughout his book, Lessig details numerous examples of 
free common resources that benefit society and also illus-
trates the ongoing enclosure of many of these resources.10 He 
demonstrates how the Internet has altered the landscape and 
enabled freedom, and offers a number of proposals for stem-
ming the rising tide of enclosure. The book is a wonderful call 
to arms and is intellectually rich with theory, applications, and 
illustrative examples. Yet it remains unclear how to make the 
choices Lessig asks us to make, not only from a procedural 
standpoint (as voters or consumers, for example) but also from 
a normative standpoint. This Article takes a step in that direc-
tion.11 
Utilizing an economic approach,12 I define a set of impor-
tant resources that are particularly attractive candidates for 
commons management, specifically infrastructure.13 My thesis 
 
 9. Id. at 14 (The choice is not between all or none.). 
 10. Id. passim. On the enclosure of public resources, see DAVID BOLLIER, 
PUBLIC ASSETS, PRIVATE PROFITS: RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN COMMONS IN 
AN AGE OF MARKET ENCLOSURE (2001), available at http://www.bollier.org/ 
pdf/PA_Report.pdf. 
 11. Lessig certainly points in the direction I am heading: What has de-
termined the commons, then, is not the simple test of rivalrousness. What 
has determined the commons is the character of the resource and how it relates 
to a community. . . . [T]he question a society must ask is which resources 
should be, and for those resources, how. LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra 
note 7, at 21; see infra Part II.BC (analyzing infrastructure in terms of nonri-
valrousness and the manner in which the resource is used to create value). 
 12. In terms of figuring out what is normatively attractive, I adopt an 
economic approach focused on maximizing social welfare. I recognize that such 
an approach has its limits and that alternative approaches exist. For a paper 
that focuses on freedom and expressly adopts the First Amendment as its 
guiding normative principle, see Yochai Benkler, Property, Commons, and the 
First Amendment: Towards a Core Common Infrastructure 26 (Mar. 2001) 
(White Paper for the First Amendment Program, Brennan Center for Justice 
at NYU Law School) [hereinafter Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure], 
available at http://www.benkler.org/WhitePaper.pdf. 
 13. Prominent scholars, such as Yochai Benkler and Lawrence Lessig, 
have relied on analogies to traditional infrastructure such as highways in 
support of their prescriptive call for managing other resources in an openly 
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is that if a resource can be classified as infrastructure accord-
ing to the economic criteria set forth in Part II of this Article, 
then there are strong economic arguments that the resource 
should be managed in an openly accessible manner.14 Before 
developing these arguments, however, it is necessary to explain 
briefly what I mean by infrastructure and commons man-
agement, and why I focus on these concepts. 
A. INFRASTRUCTURE 
The term infrastructure15 generally conjures up the no-
tion of physical resource systems made by humans for public 
consumption.16 A list of familiar examples includes: (1) trans-
 
accessible manner. See, e.g., LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 
77, 87, 244; Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons 
of the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 38889 
(1998) [hereinafter Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia]. Both Benkler and Les-
sig have focused on resources associated with our networked information 
economy. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Lecture, Freedom in the Commons: To-
wards a Political Economy of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1251 (2003) 
[hereinafter Benkler, Freedom in the Commons]. 
 14. In a series of publications, Benkler has advanced a powerful set of ar-
guments in favor of developing a core common infrastructurea set of re-
sources necessary to the production and exchange of information, which will 
be available as commons. Benkler, Freedom in the Commons, supra note 13, 
at 1273 (emphasis omitted); see also Yochai Benkler, Coases Penguin, or, 
Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) [hereinafter 
Benkler, Coases Penguin]; Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting 
the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User 
Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561 (2000) [hereinafter Benkler, From Consumers 
to Users]; Yochai Benkler, The Battle over the Institutional Ecosystem in the 
Digital Environment, COMM. ACM, Jan. 2001, at 84 [hereinafter Benkler, Bat-
tle over the Institutional Ecosystem]; Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure, 
supra note 12. As discussed below, many of the arguments advanced in this 
Article are complementary to those advanced by Benkler. 
 15. See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 784 (7th ed. 1999) (Infrastructure: The 
underlying framework of a system; esp., public services and facilities (such as 
highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water systems) needed to support 
commerce as well as economic and residential development.); WEBSTERS 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
UNABRIDGED 1161 (1993) (Infrastructure: [T]he underlying foundation or ba-
sic framework (as of an organization or a system) : substructure; esp : the 
permanent installations required for military purposes.) (emphasis omitted); 
see also WILLIAM MORRIS & MARY MORRIS, MORRIS DICTIONARY OF WORD AND 
PHRASE ORIGINS 309 (2d ed. 1988) (providing a historical account of how the 
terms meaning has evolved). 
 16. As I discuss below, seeing some natural resources as infrastructure 
helps explain intuitive connections between these resources and resources we 
commonly perceive as infrastructure. This classification also sets forth a nor-
mative basis for managing these resources in an openly accessible manner. See 
infra Part III. 
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portation systems, such as highway systems, railways, airline 
systems, and ports; (2) communication systems, such as tele-
phone networks and postal services; (3) governance systems, 
such as court systems; and (4) basic public services and facili-
ties, such as schools, sewers, and water systems. I refer to these 
resources as traditional infrastructure.17 
The economics of traditional infrastructure are quite com-
plex.18 This is reflected perhaps in the fact that economists 
sometimes refer to infrastructure opaquely as social over-
head capital.19 As W. Edward Steinmueller observed: 
Both traditional and modern uses of the term infrastructure are re-
lated to synergies, what economists call positive externalities, that 
are incompletely appropriated by the suppliers of goods and services 
within an economic system. The traditional idea of infrastructure was 
derived from the observation that the private gains from the construc-
tion and extension of transportation and communication networks, 
while very large, were also accompanied by additional large social 
gains. . . . Over the past century, publicly regulated and promoted in-
vestments in these types of infrastructure have been so large, and the 
resulting spread of competing transportation and communications 
modalities have become so pervasive, that they have come to be taken 
as a defining characteristic of industrialized nations.20 
Not surprisingly, in addition to the study of the economics 
of regulation and natural monopolies in general, economists 
have focused their attention on the economics of infrastructure 
resources in these particular industries.21 Further, economists 
have examined the role that infrastructure investment has on  
 
 
 17. I consider the traditional economics of infrastructure below, and then 
develop an economic model of infrastructure that fits both traditional and non-
traditional infrastructure. This model better explains why traditional infra-
structure is generally managed in an openly accessible manner, and why non-
traditional infrastructure should be treated similarly. See infra Part II. 
 18. A survey of the entire field of infrastructure economics is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 19. Kenneth Button, Ownership, Investment and Pricing of Transport and 
Communications Infrastructure, in INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE COMPLEXITY OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 147, 148 (David F. Batten & Charlie Karlsson eds., 
1996). 
 20. W. Edward Steinmueller, Technological Infrastructure in Information 
Technology Industries, in TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY: AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 117, 117 (Morris Teubal et al. eds., 1996). Stein-
mueller explains that economists have come to recognize the importance of in-
formation-based infrastructure. See id. 
 21. See W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND 
ANTITRUST chs. 1115 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the economics of various infra-
structure resources). 
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economic development, particularly in the context of developing 
nations and their economic policies.22 
Two generalizations about traditional infrastructure are 
worth noting.23 First, the government has played and continues 
to play a significant and widely-accepted role in ensuring the 
provision of many traditional infrastructures. While private 
parties and markets play an increasingly important role in pro-
viding many types of traditional infrastructure (due to a wave 
of privatization as well as cooperative ventures between indus-
try and government),24 the governments position as provider, 
coordinator, or regulator of traditional infrastructure provision 
remains intact in most communities.25 
Second, traditional infrastructures are generally managed 
in an openly accessible manner. They are managed in a manner 
whereby all members of a community who wish to use the re-
sources may do so.26 As Mark Cooper has noted, [r]oads and 
highways, canals, railroads, the mail, telegraph, and telephone, 
some owned by public entities, most owned by private corpora-
tions, have always been operated as common carriers that are 
required to interconnect and serve the public on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis.27 This does not mean, however, that access is 
free. We pay tolls to access highways, we buy stamps to send 
letters, we pay telephone companies to route our calls across 
 
 22. See generally, e.g., INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE COMPLEXITY OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT supra note 19; SIDNEY M. LEVY, BUILD, OPERATE, 
TRANSFER: PAVING THE WAY FOR TOMORROWS INFRASTRUCTURE (1996). 
 23. Of course, there are exceptions to these generalizations. 
 24. See LEVY, supra note 22, at 1, 1617. 
 25. The rebuilding of Iraq brings this point into stark relief. The task of 
reconstructing and rebuilding a countrys traditional infrastructureits 
transportation, communication, governance, and basic service systemsis a 
tremendous task requiring centralized coordination and substantial invest-
ment. Note that building these infrastructure systems is a necessary precursor 
to many other productive activities. 
 26. See LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 1925; Carol Rose, 
The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Prop-
erty, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 752 (1986) [hereinafter Rose, The Comedy of the 
Commons]; Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 2223, 
4748. See generally Rose, supra, at 72349 (discussing the history of public 
access rights to various infrastructure resources such as roadways and water-
ways). 
 27. Mark Cooper, Making the Network Connection: Using Network The-
ory to Explain the Link Between Open Digital Platforms and Innovation 14
15 (working draft), at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blogs/cooper/archives/ 
network%20theory.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2005). 
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their lines, and so on.28 Users must pay for access to some 
(though not all) of these resources. Nor does it mean that access 
to the resource is unregulated. Transportation of hazardous 
substances by highway or mail, for example, is heavily regu-
lated. The key point is that the resource is openly accessible to 
all within a community regardless of the identity of the end-
user or the end-use.29 
As discussed below, managing traditional infrastructure in 
an openly accessible fashion makes economic sense.30 Most 
economists agree that traditional infrastructure resources gen-
erate significant positive externalities31 that result in large so-
 
 28. LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 244 (The government 
has funded the construction of highways and local roads; these highways are 
then used either for free or with the payment of a toll. In either case, the 
highway functions as a commons.). Of course, as taxpayers, we ultimately foot 
the bill for the provision of many infrastructure resources. See CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 39 (2003), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4916/Report.pdf; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FEDERAL SPENDING ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
OTHER INVESTMENTS (1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/ 
doc601/fedspend.pdf; Andrea Bassanini & Stefano Scarpetta, The Driving 
Forces of Economic Growth: Panel Data Evidence for the OECD Countries, in 
OECD ECON. STUD. NO. 33, at 9, 19 (2001). 
 29. In some industries, however, access to an infrastructure resource is 
priced at different rates for different classes of users. See Andrew Odlyzko, 
The Evolution of Price Discrimination in Transportation and Its Implications 
for the Internet, 3 REV. NETWORK ECON. 323 (2004). For example, telecommu-
nications companies historically have treated businesses and individuals dif-
ferently without much concern. See id. at 33637. Others have noted that price 
discrimination may, at times, be justified since it provides producers greater 
flexibility to recoup their costs than do mandatory universal service regimes. 
See generally Christopher Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local 
Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 1623 (2003). For other resources (e.g., a lake), 
a particular type of use (e.g., pollution) is regulated in order to preserve open 
access for other types of uses (e.g., swimming, fishing, boating, and drinking 
water source, to name a few). See infra Part III.A. 
 30. See infra Part II.A (discussing the economics of traditional infrastruc-
ture). 
 31. The term externality means many things and has been a contested 
concept in economics for many years. See ANDREAS A. PAPANDREOU, 
EXTERNALITY AND INSTITUTIONS 1368 (1994) (providing a detailed historical 
account of the term); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 
AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 347, 348 (1967) (Externality is an ambigu-
ous concept.). Basically, positive (negative) externalities are benefits (costs) 
realized by one person as a result of another persons activity without payment 
(compensation). Externalities generally are not fully factored into a persons 
decision to engage in the activity. See JAMES E. MEADE, THE THEORY OF 
ECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES: THE CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION 
AND SIMILAR SOCIAL COSTS 15 (1973) (An external economy (diseconomy) is 
an event which confers an appreciable benefit (inflicts an appreciable damage) 
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cial gains.32 
Understanding how traditional infrastructures generate 
positive externalities and why such resources are managed in 
an openly accessible manner is an important first step in un-
derstanding why other resources should be managed in a simi-
lar fashion. The same rationale for managing traditional infra-
structure in an openly accessible manner applies to other 
resources that behave in the same economic fashion as tradi-
tional infrastructure, even though they generally are not con-
sidered infrastructure.33 I refer to such resources as nontradi-
 
on some person or persons who were not fully consenting parties in reaching 
the decision or decisions which led directly or indirectly to the event in ques-
tion.), discussed in RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF 
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 39 (1996); Kenneth J. Ar-
row, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of 
Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND POLICY 
ANALYSIS 59, 67 (Robert H. Haveman & Julius Margolis eds., 1970) (defining 
externality as the absence of a functioning market), discussed in CORNES & 
SANDLER, supra, at 4043. Arrow made clear the importance of understanding 
that the existence or nonexistence of externalities is a function of the relevant 
institutional setting, incentive structure, information, and other constraints 
on the decision making and exchange possibilities of relevant actors. See 
CORNES & SANDLER, supra, at 3943. 
 32. Steinmueller, supra note 20, at 117. 
 33. This is the analytic step in much of the scholarship concerning com-
mons that requires further development. Lessig considers a number of ration-
ales for managing a resource in an openly accessible manner, see LESSIG, THE 
FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 8399, but he does not fully explore how 
open access to infrastructure resources generates social value. For example, 
relying on Carol Rose, Lessig explains first that the reason a road is kept in 
the commons is that the opportunity for holdouts would be too great if the 
road were private. Id. at 87. As a second example, he discusses a town square 
and suggests that, in both cases, the resources are managed in an openly ac-
cessible manner because it would be unfair to allow a private owner to capture 
these resources value since their value increases as the number of users in-
creases. Id. at 8788. Private control in these situations is problematic for sev-
eral reasons. First, private control might be inefficient if the owner decides to 
restrict access due to holdouts (strategic behavior). Id. Second, even without 
holdouts, private control might be inequitable because the owner would cap-
ture social surplus that ought to be distributed among the consumers who con-
tributed to the value-creation. Id. Both of these points reflect valid concerns. 
The former, I think, is more problematic, although for various reasons in addi-
tion to complications arising from potential holdouts. See infra Part II. Lessig 
goes even further than Rose, suggesting that the argument for managing a re-
source in an openly accessible manner depends, in part, on the degree of un-
certainty as to how the resource will be used. See id. at 8889; see also Brett 
Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. 
Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347 (2000) [hereinafter Frisch-
mann, Innovation and Institutions] (making the same argument with respect 
to basic and applied research). I further develop this argument in this Article 
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tional infrastructure. A few examples of such resources include 
(1) environmental resources, such as lakes, the atmosphere, and 
ecosystems; (2) information resources, such as basic research, 
abstract ideas, and operating systems; and (3) Internet re-
sources, such as interconnected computer networks and proto-
cols that enable interconnection, interoperability, and data 
transfer. These resources also generate (or have the potential to 
generate) significant positive externalities that result in large 
social gains. 
Carol Rose was the first to draw an explicit, causal connec-
tion between open access and these positive externalities.34 In 
her path-breaking article, The Comedy of the Commons: Cus-
tom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, Rose explained 
that a comedy of the commons arises where open access to a 
resource leads to scale returnsgreater social value with 
greater use of the resource.35 With respect to road systems, for 
example, Rose considered commerce to be an 
interactive practice whose exponential returns to increasing partici-
pation run on without limit. . . . Through ever-expanding commerce, 
the nation becomes ever-wealthier, and hence trade and commerce 
routes must be held open to the public, even if contrary to private in-
terest. Instead of worrying that too many people will engage in com-
merce, we worry that too few will undertake the effort.36 
Critically, as Rose recognized, managing road systems in 
an openly accessible manner is the key to sustaining and in-
creasing participation in commerce, and commerce is itself a 
 
with respect to both the type of use and the variance of possible uses. See infra 
Part II. 
 34. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 26, at 723, 77581. 
Harold Demsetz, however, came close. Demsetz suggested that [c]ommunal 
property results in great externalities. The full costs of the activities of an 
owner of a communal property right are not borne directly by him, nor can 
they be called to his attention easily by the willingness of others to pay him an 
appropriate sum. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, supra note 
31, at 355. Demsetz focused exclusively on negative externalities (external 
costs) and failed to appreciate that communal property can result in great 
positive externalities (external benefits) and that such a result can be socially 
desirable. See id. passim; Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and 
Free Riding, 82 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 1725), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=582602. 
 35. Rose, supra note 25, at 76870. 
 36. Id. at 76970; see also Louis P. Cain, A Canal and Its City: A Selective 
Business History of Chicago, 11 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 125, 14243 (1998) ([A]s 
long as Lake Michigan remained a fixed fact, every railroad or town that was 
built and every farm that was settled north and west of the city would only 
increase the trade and prosperity of Chicago. (quoting 1 A.T. ANDREAS, 
HISTORY OF CHICAGO FROM THE EARLIEST TIME TO THE PRESENT 40 (1884))). 
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productive activity that generates significant positive external-
ities.37 Commerce is an excellent example of a productive use of 
roads that generates positive externalities and social surplus, 
but there are many others, such as visits to relatives or to state 
parks.38 This Article builds upon Roses importantbut since 
underdevelopedinsight that certain resources ought to be 
managed in an openly accessible manner because doing so in-
creases participation in activities, such as commerce, that yield 
scale returns. 
This Article develops an economic model of infrastructure 
that fits both traditional infrastructure and nontraditional in-
frastructure.39 This model better explains several key aspects of 
infrastructures, including the relationships between infrastruc-
ture resources and various downstream activities, how infra-
structure resources generate value for society, why traditional 
infrastructure resources are managed in an openly accessible 
manner, and why certain nontraditional infrastructure should 
be managed in an openly accessible manner. This model serves 
both descriptive and normative purposes. 
Errors of resource classification often infect analysis of le-
gal and social institutions.40 Too often, analysts classify an in-
frastructure resource as a public good, network good, or natural 
monopoly,41 acknowledge that it is well understood that mar-
kets may fail to efficiently supply such goods, and then proceed 
to analyze the form of institutional intervention by the gov-
ernment to correct the failure, typically assuming that the de-
 
 37. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 25, at 723, 774818. 
 38. Cf. Lewis M. Branscomb & James H. Keller, Introduction to 
CONVERGING INFRASTRUCTURES: INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION AND THE 
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 1 (Lewis M. Branscomb & James 
H. Keller eds., 1996) (Over the past half century, the U.S. highway system 
has advanced regional and national economic development by enhancing ac-
cess to markets for goods, services, and people. It has also provided direct 
quality-of-life benefits, by providing easier access to both work and leisure.). 
 39. I should note that I am not developing a formal mathematical model 
in this Article, although I may pursue such a model in separate work. My cen-
tral objective is to develop a conceptual model firmly grounded in economic 
theory that sheds light on how infrastructure commons generate social value. I 
spell out my objectives in more detail in the text that follows. 
 40. Cf. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, supra 
note 34 (manuscript at 23, 1748) (arguing that real property rhetoric, the-
ory, and rationale have infected intellectual property law and have placed too 
much emphasis on free riding). 
 41. See infra notes 7785 and accompanying text; infra Part II.A (discuss-
ing these classifications). 
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gree of intervention should be minimal.42 Market failure for in-
frastructure, however, is more complex than these classifica-
tions suggest. To understand and grapple with the additional 
demand-side complexity, it is necessary to reconceptualize in-
frastructure. 
For both traditional and nontraditional infrastructure re-
sources, analysts emphasize supply-side issues, typically cost 
recovery, and assume that the market mechanism will best 
generate and process demand information.43 Economists (and 
regulators) generally focus on three types of supply-side issues: 
(1) excludability, (2) natural monopoly, and (3) anticompetitive 
behavior. Excludability relates to the costs of excluding nonpay-
ing users. If these costs are high, then producers may under-
supply because they are unable to prevent free riding.44 The 
concept of a natural monopoly recognizes that for certain mar-
kets, it may be socially desirable to have a single producer, in 
which case government regulation may be necessary for a vari-
ety of reasons (e.g., to constrain monopoly pricing).45 Anticom-
petitive behavior relates to industry structure and the risk of 
anticompetitive behavior by dominant firms.46 These issues 
 
 42. Elsewhere, I have argued that the traditional government interven-
tion into the market analysis is incomplete and perhaps biased towards mar-
ket-oriented solutions to public goods, governance, and other social problems. 
See Brett Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet 
Infrastructure: Rethinking Market Intervention into Government and Govern-
ment Intervention into the Market, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 26 
(2001) [hereinafter Frischmann, Internet Infrastructure], available at 
http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=2&article=1; see also Shubha Ghosh, De-
privatizing Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 397 (2003) (exploring the 
limits of the market baseline and its assumption that private interest work-
ing through market transactions will lead to public good); Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 30611 
(1996) (critiquing market theory in copyright law). See generally Richard R. 
Nelson, Roles of Government in a Mixed Economy, 6 J. POLY ANALYSIS & 
MGMT. 541 (1987) (explaining the limits of market failure analysis). 
 43. See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: 
Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 919, 921, 
926 (2003) (assuming that if competitive markets can form, then market 
prices [will] continue to be an accurate measure of value.). But see Patricia A. 
Champ, Collecting Survey Data for Nonmarket Valuation, in A PRIMER ON 
NONMARKET VALUATION 59, 59 (Patricia A. Champ et al. eds., 2003) (The 
unique nature of environmental and natural resource amenities makes valua-
tion a challenge in many respects. Prices reflect aggregate societal values for 
market goods but nonmarket goods lack an analogous indicator of value.). 
 44. See infra Part II.A (discussing nonexcludability). 
 45. See infra note 81 (discussing natural monopolies). 
 46. See infra Part II.D (discussing industry structure and the risk of anti-
competitive behavior). 
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(and other related supply-side issues) are important but tell 
only half of the story. 
In contrast to these supply-side concepts, this Article fo-
cuses on the demand-side issues. How and to what extent in-
frastructure resources generate value for society remain under-
explored areas that warrant further attention. When econo-
mists and other observers focus on supply-side issues with re-
spect to infrastructure resources, they fail to account for many 
critical demand-side considerations. Consequently, there is an 
incomplete evaluation of true social demand for infrastructure 
resources.47 This problem distorts institutional analyses by dis-
counting the social benefits (costs) of open access (restricted ac-
cess) to infrastructure resources. As Judge Boudin reflected in 
Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.: 
Of course, the argument for protection is undiminished, perhaps even 
enhanced, by utility: if we want more of an intellectual product, a 
temporary monopoly for the creator provides incentives for others to 
create other, different items in this class. But the cost side of the 
equation may be different where one places a very high value on public 
access to a useful innovation . . . . Thus, the argument for extending 
protection may be the same; but the stakes on the other side are much 
higher.48 
Infrastructure resources, in particular, constitute an im-
portant class of resources on which society should place a very 
high value on public access.49 Yet conventional economic 
analysis of many infrastructure resources fails to fully account 
for how the resources are used as inputs to create social bene-
fits; thus, the analysis fails to fully account for the social de-
mand for the resources.50 Economistsas well as regulators 
 
 47. See Frischmann, Internet Infrastructure, supra note 42, at 6, 54, 57
58, 69 (explaining that market demand for Internet infrastructure is but a 
fraction of social demand, even assuming that the market functioned at near 
perfection); see also Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. 
L. REV. 1799, 180914 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Perfect Curve] (making the 
same point in the copyright context); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: 
The New Economic Orthodoxy of Rights Management, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 
539 (1998) [hereinafter Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace] (Many of these [posi-
tive externalities] are experienced as public goods and likely would be under-
produced under a private-law regime of rights in digital works.). Cohens ob-
servation reverberates throughout this Article; many infrastructure resources 
generate large positive externalities that are not captured fully by infrastruc-
ture suppliers or users and thus constitute social surplus. 
 48. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(Boudin, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 49. See id. 
 50. The economics discipline certainly has the tools to analyze these de-
mand-side issues, tools which I will use throughout this Article. My point is 
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and politiciansrecognize that there is a tremendous demand 
for public infrastructure and that infrastructure plays a critical 
role in economic development, but exactly why there is demand, 
how it manifests, how it should be measured, and how it con-
tributes to economic growth are not well understood.51 Criti-
cally, many infrastructure resources act as inputs into a wide 
variance of socially valuable activities, including the production 
of public goods and nonmarket goods.52 These activities gener-
ate significant social welfare gains that are generally associ-
ated with traditional infrastructure, yet underappreciated with 
respect to nontraditional infrastructure.53 
The importance of this project may best be understood by 
way of comparison with network effects. There is a strong par-
allel between the objectives of this project and those of scholars 
analyzing network effects and their implications for economic, 
legal, and policy analysis. As Mark Lemley and David 
McGowan explained, network effects refers to a group of theo-
ries clustered around the question whether and to what extent 
standard economic theory must be altered in cases in which 
the utility that a user derives from consumption of a good in-
creases with the number of other agents consuming the 
good.54 
 
that economists have not employed these tools thus far. 
 51. See generally, e.g., INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE COMPLEXITY OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 19; cf. Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van 
Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 
543 (2001) ([T]he governments problem of determining rewards is made more 
difficult when the value of an innovation is in part that it leads to subsequent 
innovations.); John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual 
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 53 (2004) ([I]t may be a much simpler matter 
to tell how many cars cross a bridge or how much electricity is consumed than 
to determine how often an idea is used.). 
 52. See infra Part II.A (defining and discussing public goods and nonmar-
ket goods). 
 53. I recognize that this is a very strong claim that requires empirical 
support to verify. Yet there are significant difficulties in capturing the positive 
externalities generated by the downstream production of public goods and 
nonmarket goods in an empirical study. Economists have attempted to meas-
ure the social surplus generated by infrastructure resources, such as the Na-
tional Highway System. Such studies, however, generally are limited in scope 
to macroeconomic measures, such as economic growth or increases in produc-
tivity within industrial sectors. See, e.g., M. ISHAQ NADIRI & THEOFANIS P. 
MAMUNEAS, U.S. DEPT OF TRANSP., CONTRIBUTION OF HIGHWAY CAPITAL TO 
OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE US ECONOMY AND INDUSTRIES 
(1998), available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/gro98cvr.htm. 
 54. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network 
Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 483 (1998). 
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Like resources that exhibit network effects, infrastructure 
resources perform economically in a manner that challenges 
conventional economics and warrants special consideration.55 
The impact of infrastructure theory may be even more profound 
than network theory because it is more far-reaching and 
touches more fundamental sets of resources that serve as the 
very foundation of most economies. 
B. COMMONS AS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
This Article uses open access and commons inter-
changeably to refer to the situation in which a resource is 
openly accessible to all users regardless of the users identity or 
intended use of the resource.56 This may be troublesome to 
property scholars accustomed to the important distinction 
maintained between open access and commons within property 
scholarship: Open access typically implies absolutely no owner-
ship rights or property rights. No entity possesses the right to 
exclude others from the resource; all who want access can get 
access.57 Commons, on the other hand, typically involves com-
munal ownership (community property rights, public property 
rights, joint ownership rights, etc.), such that members of the 
relevant community obtain open access under rules that may 
range from anything goes to quite crisply articulated formal 
rules that are effectively enforced and nonmembers can be ex-
cluded.58 Recent scholarship has analyzed hybrid regimes, such 
 
 55. Infrastructure effects are distinct from network effects, however. See 
infra Part II.D. Both types of economic effects have the potential to generate 
demand-side externalities, but the externalities attributable to network effects 
are more likely to be internalized by network providers than the externalities 
attributable to infrastructure effects. 
 56. Cf. LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 1920 (adopting a 
similar definition); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE 
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 17 (1990) (same); Jo-
anna Burger et al., Introduction to PROTECTING THE COMMONS: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS 1, 16 (Joanna 
Burger et al. eds., 2001) (same); BOLLIER, supra note 10, at 23 (same); see 
also Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214 
(11th Cir. 1999) (employing a nearly identical definition of a general publica-
tion in U.S. copyright law: General publication occurs when a work was 
made available to members of the public at large without regard to their iden-
tity or what they intended to do with the work). 
 57. Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: In-
formation as a Common-Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 121
22 (2003). 
 58. Yochai Benkler, The Political Economy of Commons, UPGRADE, June 
2003, at 6, 67. As Benkler explains: 
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as semicommons, which have attributes of both private and 
common property.59 
For now, put aside these distinctions between property re-
gimes and simply focus on the accessibility rulethat the re-
source is open to users regardless of the users identity or in-
tended use. In other words, put aside considerations of 
ownership and regulation, and view open access (or common 
access or public access) as a resource management decision, 
which might be made privately or publicly, politically or eco-
nomically, through property rights, regulation, or some hybrid 
regime, depending on the context.60 
I intentionally abstract from the institutional form (prop-
erty rights, regulations, norms, etc.) to focus on a particular in-
stitutional function (opening or restricting access). Tying form 
and function together obscures the fact that access can be pro-
vided for or restricted by a variety of institutional forms, which 
are often mixed (property and regulation, private and commu-
nal property, etc.), and not necessarily through one particular 
form of property rights.61 For example, as Parts III and IV will 
demonstrate, environmental, information, and Internet com-
mons are sustained through very different sets of institutional 
 
Commons are a particular type of institutional arrangement for gov-
erning the use and disposition of resources. Their salient characteris-
tic, which defines them in contradistinction to property, is that no 
single person has exclusive control over the use and disposition of any 
particular resource. Instead, resources governed by commons may be 
used or disposed of by anyone among some (more or less well defined) 
number of persons, under rules that may range from anything goes 
to quite crisply articulated formal rules that are effectively enforced. 
Id. at 6. 
 59. See generally Robert Heverly, The Information Semicommons, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127 (2003); Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property 
Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000). 
 60. See Frischmann, Internet Infrastructure, supra note 42, at 59. To 
elaborate: 
[T]he public domain is a form of social infrastructure, an open-access 
management or governance regime for resources, that is socially con-
structed from customs, norms, rules, laws, etc. Resources that fall 
within the public domain, and thus are governed by an open-access 
regime, are openly available to the public without restriction; no one 
lays claim to such resourcesnot the government or private parties. 
Everyone is equally privileged to use the resource. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 61. See Heverly, supra note 59, at 113031; cf. Farrell & Weiser, supra 
note 6, at 95 ([M]odularity can arise as an internal management system, as a 
self-governing organization of a market, or as a result of public policy deci-
sions.). 
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arrangements. Ultimately, the optimal degree of openness or 
restrictiveness depends upon a number of functional economic 
considerations related to the nature of the resource in question, 
the manner in which the resource is utilized to create value, in-
stitutional structures, and the community setting. 
The openness or restrictiveness of access to a resource and 
the related terms of access can be analyzed as characteristics of 
the resource itself. For example, does society demand an open 
infrastructure, a closed infrastructure, or something in be-
tween? Does society demand an infrastructure designed to be 
neutral to the types of end-uses or end-users that may require 
access?62 Part IV later explores these issues in more detail in 
the context of the ongoing debate over network neutrality and 
the future of the end-to-end architecture of the Internet. 
The key points, then, are that: (1) accessibility or exclud-
ability conditions are generally contingent upon human deci-
sions about how to manage the underlying resource, and (2) 
demand for access to the underlying resource depends upon 
how the resource may be used to create value. For example, 
demand for access to a road connecting A to B does not depend 
upon whether the road is privately or publicly owned. Demand 
depends upon individuals desire to get from A to B, which de-
pends, of course, on what can be done at the destination. With 
respect to supply-side issues, private or public ownership mat-
 
 62. More generally, this subject brings to mind the intimate relationship 
between inherent and socially constructed characteristics of resources. See 
Mike J. Madison, On Things 8081 (2005) (working paper, on file with author). 
See generally Dan L. Burk, DNA Rules: Legal and Conceptual Implications of 
Biological Lock-Out Systems, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1553 (2004); Dan L. Burk, Lex 
Genetica: The Law and Ethics of Programming Biological Code, 4 ETHICS & 
INFO. TECH. 109 (2002). For example, it is one thing to say that information is 
inherently a public good because, technically and abstractly speaking, in its 
purest form, information is both nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. See infra 
Part II.A (exploring these concepts). However, one might dismiss such abstract 
talk of inherent characteristics as technically correct but practically irrelevant 
because, in the real world, we regularly alter the characteristics of information 
through social constructs like intellectual property and technology. These al-
terations facilitate exclusion, artificially create scarcity, and make some real-
world markets work. See infra Part III.B (discussing intellectual property as a 
socially-constructed means for facilitating exclusion). These alterations may 
correct certain types of market failure but exacerbate others. 
Of course, the fact that social constructs often mask inherent characteris-
tics does not make discussion of inherent characteristics irrelevant. Rather, 
we must understand both the inherent and socially constructed features of re-
sources. This Article and the infrastructure theory that it lays out focus on so-
cial demand for openly accessible infrastructure resources. 
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ters. For example, private and public entities will fund con-
struction and maintenance of the roads in different manners, 
and if demand exceeds supply and leads to congestion on the 
road, public and private owners may respond differently. The 
difference between public and private ownership therefore mat-
ters, but primarily with respect to evaluating how demand will 
be satisfied. 
For purposes of this Article, the term commons will refer 
to a de jure or de facto management decision governing the use 
and disposition of a resource.63 Environmental, informational, 
and Internet resources are not inherently commons, in the 
same way that an apple is not inherently private. 
There are many ways in which a resource can come to be 
managed in an openly accessible manner. A resource may be 
open for common use naturally. The resource may be available 
to all naturally because its characteristics prevent it from being 
owned or controlled by anyone.64 For example, for most of the 
earths history, the oceans and the atmosphere were natural 
commons.65 Why? Because, for example, exercising dominion 
over such resources was beyond the ability of human beings or 
simply was unnecessary because there was no indication of 
scarcity.66 
A resource also may be open for common use as the result 
of social construction.67 That is, laws or rules may prohibit 
 
 63. Benkler, The Political Economy of Commons, supra note 58, at 6. 
 64. See Carol Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of 
Public Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 93 
(2003) [hereinafter Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators] (discussing 
the traditional Roman categories of nonexclusive property, one of which, res 
communes, was incapable of exclusive appropriation due to its inherent char-
acter). 
 65. Id. (The usual Roman law examples of res communes resources were 
the oceans and the air mantle, since they were impossible for anyone to own.). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Paul David and Dominique Foray note that the activity of diffusing 
economically relevant knowledge is not itself a natural one. Paul A. David & 
Dominique Foray, Information Distribution and the Growth of Economically 
Valuable Knowledge: A Rationale for Technological Infrastructure Policies, in 
TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, 
supra note 20, at 87, 91. Rather, it is socially constructed through the crea-
tion of appropriate institutions and conventions, such as open science and in-
tellectual property . . . . Id.; see also id. at 9399 (discussing the distribution 
of scientific and technological knowledge through institutions). The open 
source and creative commons movements are two prominent examples. See 
LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 16465, 25556; see also J.H. 
Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons 
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ownership or ensure open access, or an open access regime may 
arise through norms and customs among owners and users. For 
example, the Internet infrastructure is governed by norms cre-
ating an open access regime where end-users can access and 
use the infrastructure to route data packets without fear of dis-
crimination or exclusion by infrastructure owners. 
The general values of the commons management principle 
are that it maintains openness, does not discriminate among 
users or uses of the resource, and eliminates the need to obtain 
approval or a license to use the resource.68 Generally, manag-
ing infrastructure resources in an openly accessible manner 
eliminates the need to rely on either market actors or the gov-
ernment to pick winners downstream.69 In theory, at least, 
this catalyzes innovation through the creation of and experi-
mentation with new uses.70 More generally, it facilitates the 
generation of positive externalities by permitting downstream 
production of public goods and nonmarket goods that might be 
stifled under a more restrictive access regime.71 
Sustaining both natural commons and socially constructed 
commons poses numerous challenges, however. Environmental 
and information resources highlight the most well known and 
studied dilemmas. Environmental resources suffer from the 
famous tragedy of the commons,72 a consumption or capacity 
problem,73 which is common to many infrastructure resources. 
 
for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 43032 (2003). 
 68. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL 
CREATIVITY (2004) [hereinafter LESSIG, FREE CULTURE]; LESSIG, THE FUTURE 
OF IDEAS, supra note 7; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 1516 (2004) [herein-
after LANDES & POSNER, POLITICAL ECONOMY] (acknowledging such benefits 
with respect to the public domain). Part IV of this Article demonstrates that 
understanding commons management as applied to specific resources is mark-
edly complex. Some benefits of commons management are easier to ascertain 
than others, and some potential problems with commons management are not 
easy to dismiss. See infra Part IV. 
 69. I discuss this point in more detail below. See infra Part II.E. 
 70. See generally LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7. 
 71. See infra Part II.E. 
 72. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 
124445 (1968) (advancing the argument that freedom of the commons will 
result in exhaustion or depletion of natural resources). 
 73. See infra Parts II.B (discussing consumption/capacity issues as they 
relate to infrastructure resources) and III.A (discussing consumption/capacity 
issues as they relate to environmental resources). 
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Information resources suffer from the famous free-rider di-
lemma, a production problem,74 which is also common to many 
infrastructure resources. The Internet suffers from both types 
of problems.75 
It is interesting how two frequently told stories of uncon-
trolled consumptionthe tragedy of the commons and the free-
rider storycame to dominate the policy discourse in the envi-
ronmental and intellectual property areas and how both stories 
seem to lead to the conclusion that granting property rights is 
the best way to manage these resources.76 Both stories can be 
translated in game-theoretic terms into a prisoners dilemma, 
another good story, although one that does not necessarily 
point to private property as a solution to the coordination di-
lemma.77 
Whichever story one chooses to tell, the underlying eco-
nomic problems are not insurmountable and should not stand 
in the way of managing infrastructure in an openly accessible 
manner. Social institutions reflect a strong commitment to sus-
taining common access to certain infrastructure resources.78 As 
theorized in Part II and illustrated in subsequent Parts, society 
values common access to infrastructure resources because 
these resources are fundamental inputs into productive activi-
ties that generate benefits for society as a whole. 
 
 74. See infra Part II.A (discussing the free-rider problem) and Part III.B 
(discussing information resources). 
 75. See infra Part IV. 
 76. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 56, at 3 (connecting the tragedy of the 
commons with the prisoners dilemma); Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regu-
latory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1332 (2004); cf. David Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, 
The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimiza-
tion in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 
24) (suggesting that the goal of minimizing transaction costs in both private 
law and public law settings tend[s] to support private markets and private 
law, while disfavoring established public law and challenging the desirability 
of that goal), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=571005; Lemley, Property, 
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, supra note 34 (manuscript at 18) 
([F]ree riding seems to be the flip side of the tragedy of the commons . . . .). 
 77. See, e.g., Wayne Eastman, Telling Alternative Stories: Heterodox Ver-
sion of the Prisoners Dilemma, the Coase Theorem, and Supply-Demand Equi-
librium, 29 CONN. L. REV. 727, 74951 (1997); David Luban, The Social Re-
sponsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 955, 963 
(1995); David Crump, Game Theory, Legislation, and the Multiple Meanings of 
Equality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 331, 375 (2001). 
 78. See infra Parts III, IV. 
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II. A DEMAND-SIDE THEORY OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
This Part develops a demand-side model of infrastructure 
that provides a better means for understanding and analyzing 
societal demand for infrastructure resources. The goal is to bet-
ter understand how value is created and realized by individuals 
who obtain access to infrastructure resources. This Part begins 
by reviewing the traditional economic concepts used in welfare 
analysis of infrastructure goods and then delves deeper to bet-
ter understand societal demand for infrastructure resources. 
Keep in mind that when discussing demand, I am referring 
to human desire to realize value (or utility), and when discuss-
ing societal demand, I am referring to societys aggregated de-
sires. With respect to infrastructure resources, one must better 
understand how value is created and realized by human beings, 
and thus, where demand for infrastructure comes from. Only 
with such an understanding can one analyze and compare pro-
visional mechanisms (supply systems such as markets, gov-
ernment, community, family, and so on), and institutions aimed 
at optimizing these mechanisms (laws, norms, subsidies, taxes, 
and so on). This is because a critical aspect of comparative 
analysis concerns the relative effectiveness of these mecha-
nisms to generate, communicate, process, and respond to de-
mand signals. 
Analysts often classify infrastructure resources as public 
goods,79 network goods,80 natural monopolies,81 or some combi-
 
 79. See Button, supra note 19, at 15155. The public good label does not 
always fit traditional infrastructure resources well. On one hand, telecommu-
nications networks and courthouses, for example, are subject to congestion; 
they are not always nonrivalrously consumed. On the other hand, the cost of 
excluding users of these resources is not always high. Cf. id. at 151 (making 
the same point with respect to transportation and communications infrastruc-
tures); see also infra Part II.A (discussing the characteristics of public goods). 
 80. See infra Part II.D (discussing network effects). 
 81. Many traditional infrastructure resources have been analyzed by 
economists as so-called natural monopolies. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 21, 
at chs. 1115. Generally speaking, industries where suppliers of a good or ser-
vice face a decreasing cost pricing problem are considered natural monopolies; 
it is efficient to have a single producer supply the good. Id. at 323, 351; see also 
Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 
548, 548 (1969) (offering a similar definition of a natural monopoly). Notably, 
the single producer need not be a for-profit actor; the government or a non-
profit entity may serve this function. VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 21, at ch. 14. 
There are a host of regulated monopolies in the United States that provide es-
sential infrastructure. See Posner, supra, at 549. 
In many respects, the natural monopoly problem is a supply-side issue 
concerning cost recovery, efficient pricing structures, entry management, and 
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nation thereof. Analysts use these classifications to justify gov-
ernment intervention, and proceed to analyze regulatory op-
tions.82 In other words, it is generally accepted that the market 
will fail in one way or another to efficiently provide society with 
infrastructure and that there is some role for government in-
tervention.83 In some cases, the government may supplant the 
market by supplying the resource directly or contracting di-
rectly with providers on behalf of its citizens.84 In other cases, 
the government may attempt to correct the market failure 
through institutions, such as intellectual property and tax in-
centives, and continue to rely on private actors to assess de-
mand for a resource and supply it to the public.85 The question 
then becomes one of comparative institutional analysis: how 
should the government modify or regulate the market? Many of 
the debates in this area focus on the degree and form of gov-
ernment intervention into the market.86 Operating on the 
premise that markets are the best mechanism to generate and 
process demand information (e.g., the quantity and quality of 
infrastructure access that society desires),87 the analysis of cor-
 
consumer protection from monopoly-inflated prices. See RICHARD A. POSNER, 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 363 (6th ed. 2003). There may be some inter-
esting demand-side issues as well. In particular, natural monopoly classifica-
tion usually depends on both supply and demand information. VISCUSI ET AL., 
supra note 21, at 47582. We must determine the socially optimal industry 
output before we can determine whether a single supplier would minimize 
cost and be the most efficient option. Id. at 323. To the extent that we are con-
sidering an industry that supplies public and social infrastructure, the de-
mand curve may shift such that the socially optimal output increases. Accord-
ing to Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington, such a shift could lead to 
declassification as a natural monopoly and reclassification as a potentially 
competitive industry. Id. at 35253, 44047. For the remainder of this Article, 
I put aside natural monopoly theory as it is not especially relevant to the de-
mand-side analysis of infrastructure undertaken here. 
 82. Examples of these analyses are plentiful. See, e.g., INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND THE COMPLEXITY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 19. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 21, at ch. 14 (discussing public enter-
prise); see also LEVY, supra note 22, at 1617 (discussing procurement and 
government contracting for infrastructure); Frischmann, Innovation and Insti-
tutions, supra note 33, at 38687 (same). 
 85. See Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 33, at 382
85. 
 86. See, e.g., David F. Batten, Introduction to INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE 
COMPLEXITY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 19, at 1, 10 (arguing 
that, in an era of increasing privatization, the role of government intervention 
is at the heart of many infrastructure debates). 
 87. This may be an overstatement. In regulated markets, particularly 
those involving so-called natural monopolies, regulated entities must make 
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rective institutions tends to focus on the supply-side problems 
noted earlier.88 Yet the underlying premise does not hold true 
for all resources. Specifically, markets are not necessarily bet-
ter than the government or other alternative, nonmarket 
mechanisms89 at processing information about or meeting the 
demands of our complex society for infrastructure.90 
The remainder of this Part is structured as follows: Section 
A explores the key economic characteristics necessary to appre-
ciate the demand-side analysis of infrastructure. Section B de-
velops a general definition of infrastructure comprised of three 
demand-side criteria common to traditional and nontraditional 
infrastructure resources. Building upon this general definition, 
section C develops an infrastructure typology to distinguish be-
tween commercial, public, and social infrastructure based on 
the nature of the productive activities facilitated by an infra-
 
decisions about how to invest in building the infrastructure resources neces-
sary to service consumers. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 21, at 37071. Regu-
lators, then, are often involved in verifying that expenditures are justified by 
demand. In other industries, government contracts with private entities to 
build infrastructure to meet community demands. Id. at 45374. For the most 
part, demand assessments for partially (non)rival resources focus on the 
amount of capacity needed to meet the expected number of users over the life-
time of the project based on estimated use patterns and growth projections. 
 88. See supra notes 4346 and accompanying text (listing the three major 
types of supply-side problems). 
 89. See, e.g., Benkler, Coases Penguin, supra note 14, at 381; Benkler, 
Freedom in the Commons, supra note 13, at 1247; cf. David R. Johnson et al., 
The Accountable Internet: Peer Production of Internet Governance, 9 VA. J.L. & 
TECH. 9 (2004) (arguing that peer production of governance may be the best 
way to manage the Internet), available at http://www.vjolt.net. 
 90. See Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 33, at 387; 
see also Benkler, Coases Penguin, supra note 14, at 40607; Cohen, Perfect 
Curve, supra note 47, at 180914. Consider also Cornes and Sandlers com-
ments on the theory of externalities: 
Economists have been criticized, with some justification, for a ten-
dency to forget that institutions other than markets exist and play 
important roles in allocating resources. [In the context of external-
ities,] [p]erhaps the absence of a market reflects the availability of 
some other institutional structure that, in the light of all the frictions 
and costs of coordination and information gathering, does a good job. 
Consider the humble traffic light. It does a remarkable job of coordi-
nating motorists actions at busy intersections. True, there are times 
when a motorist who is not in a great hurry is allowed to pass 
straight through, while another, in danger of missing a vital meeting, 
and hence with a higher marginal cost associated with waiting, fumes 
and frets at the red light. However, given the current state of technol-
ogy, it is difficult to imagine how a more efficient method of coordina-
tion could be achieved through more-market-oriented devices. 
CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 31, at 66. 
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structure resource and the potential for these activities to gen-
erate positive externalities. Section D then compares infra-
structure and network effects. Critically, both types of economic 
effects have the potential to generate demand-side external-
ities, but the externalities attributable to network effects are 
more likely to be internalized by network providers than the 
externalities that are attributable to infrastructure effects. Sec-
tion E evaluates the economic arguments for managing differ-
ent types of infrastructure resources in an openly accessible 
manner. Finally, section F addresses how price discrimination 
affects the demand-side concerns raised in this Article. 
A. NONRIVAL AND PARTIALLY (NON)RIVAL GOODS 
This section explains why nonrivalry or partial (non)rivalry 
is a critical characteristic of infrastructure. In short, this char-
acteristic describes the sharable nature of infrastructure re-
sources. Infrastructures are sharable in the sense that the re-
sources can be accessed and used by multiple users at the same 
time. Infrastructure resources vary in their capacity to accom-
modate multiple users, and this variance in capacity differenti-
ates nonrival (infinite capacity) resources from partially 
(non)rival (finite but renewable capacity) resources. 
Nonrivalry is a key economic concept that one must appre-
ciate when analyzing social welfare from a utilitarian perspec-
tive. Synonymous with indivisibility of benefits, nonrivalry de-
scribes the situation when a unit of [a] good can be consumed 
by one individual without detracting, in the slightest, from the 
consumption opportunities still available to others from that 
same unit.91 For economists, consumption simply refers to 
the realization of benefits by virtue of ones access to the good. 
Analysts frequently classify resources based on the degree 
to which the resource is (non)rival and (non)excludable.92 Table 
1 below presents these classifications. As economists recognize, 
this classification scheme oversimplifies the true nature of re-
sources. Both rivalrousness and excludability are matters of 
degree, and these two characteristics often comprise only a 
piece of the economic puzzle, a point brought into relief by this 
Article.93 
 
 91. CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 31, at 8. 
 92. See id. at 9. 
 93. Ultimately, the classification scheme is stretched in different direc-
tions when we focus on specific goods. What matters, however, is the struc-
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Table 1: Classification of Resources Based on 
Rivalrousness of Consumption and Excludability 
 
EXCLUDABILITY  
Nonexcludable Excludable 
Nonrival Pure public 
goods 
Toll goods 
RIVALROUSNESS 
OF CONSUMPTION Rival Common pool 
resources 
Pure 
private goods 
 
It is easy to see how excludability varies by degree. When 
economists talk about excludability, they refer to the costs of 
exclusion; that is, how costly it will be for one person to prevent 
another from consuming the resource.94 Consider, for example, 
ideas and apples. It is very difficult to prevent someone else 
from consuming an idea, and the cost of doing so depends on 
both context and technology.95 If I originate an idea, I can pre-
vent others from deriving its benefits if I keep the idea secret. 
This may involve some internal cost, in terms of precautions I 
must take to keep the idea secret and perhaps in terms of fore-
gone opportunities to utilize the idea. I will face significantly 
higher costs if the idea is not my secret, and others may share 
the idea. Ideas are slippery; it is difficult to maintain exclusive 
possession of them. In contrast, it is relatively cheap to main-
tain exclusive possession of an apple and thereby prevent an-
other person from consuming it. 
Excludability is relevant to a supply-side analysis of 
whether markets will work efficiently. Low cost exclusion is one 
key to a well-functioning market. If one can cheaply exclude 
others from consuming a resource, one can demand payment as 
 
ture of incentives and the efficiency and distributional implications of the 
various feasible structures. Id. at 10. Shubha Ghosh critiques this classifica-
tion scheme because it is insufficient in identifying government functions and 
may be misleading in its prescriptions. See Ghosh, supra note 42, at 40206; 
see also OSTROM, supra note 56, at 815 (critiquing the taxonomical approach 
for similar reasons); cf. Hess & Ostrom, supra note 57, at 11821 (suggesting 
that scholars sometimes conflate resource classification with property right 
issues). 
 94. CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 31, at 4, 810. 
 95. For example, the inventions of barbed wire and digital rights man-
agement technology greatly reduced the costs of exclusion for land and digital 
content, respectively. See BOLLIER, supra note 10, at 2730, 57. 
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a condition for access. If one cannot cheaply exclude others 
from consuming a resource, then the market may fail to satisfy 
consumer demand for the resource because suppliers will not be 
able to recoup their costs from consumers. Simply put, a pro-
ducer of a good must exclude you from consuming the good it 
has produced if it wishes to charge you for access and consump-
tion. Further, a producer of a good needs to be able to charge 
you for access if it wishes to recover its costs. If the costs of ex-
clusion are high, then producers must either absorb these addi-
tional costs and charge higher fees, or run the risk that con-
sumers will free ride (i.e., consume the good without paying). 
Either route may lead to market failure. Thus, if market provi-
sion of a resource is desirable96 but the costs of exclusion are 
too high, then government intervention to fix the market may 
be appropriate. There are various institutional fixes to this 
form of market failure.97 
 
 96. It is a mistake to presume, as many do, that the market mechanism is 
always the superior mechanism for satisfying social demand for a resource. 
See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 31, at 66; Benkler, Coases Penguin, supra 
note 14, at 406; Cohen, Perfect Curve, supra note 47, at 180914; Moshe Just-
man & Morris Teubal, Technological Infrastructure Policy (TIP): Creating Ca-
pabilities and Building Markets, in TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
POLICY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 20, at 5152; Nelson, 
supra note 42, at 54248; see also supra note 90. Such a presumption may 
make sense for certain types of resources, such as private goods, but may be 
inapposite when applied to public goods. See Frischmann, Internet Infrastruc-
ture, supra note 42, at 44 n.138; see also CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 31, at 
66. For public goods and impure public goods, it may be the case that the mar-
ket mechanism will assess and satisfy social demand more efficiently than the 
government or alternative mechanisms, see id., but we should not adopt a pre-
sumption in favor of the market. The case must be made for each specific re-
sourceor, at the very leastfor each category of resource, as I am doing in 
this Article. Cf. Justman & Teubal, supra, at 5152 (implying that this ap-
proach is proper). To be clear, I do believe that the market mechanism will be 
the preferred method of measuring demand for some pure and impure public 
goods. See discussion infra Parts II.B, II.D. 
 97. For a discussion of exclusionary market failure and intellectual 
property as a corrective institution for this particular type of market failure, 
see Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 33, at 35960, 363
64, 374, 37682. See also James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and 
the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 4142 
(2003) [hereinafter Boyle, Second Enclosure Movement] (describing the stan-
dard argument); Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace, supra note 47, at 471 (By 
guaranteeing authors certain exclusive rights in their creative products, copy-
right seeks to furnish authors and publishers, respectively, with incentives to 
invest the effort necessary to create works and distribute them to the public.); 
Hess & Ostrom, supra note 57, at 119 ([I]t is very costly to exclude individu-
als from using the flow of benefits either through physical barriers or legal in-
struments.); Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 3 (not-
FRISCHMANN.3FMT 04/13/2005 04:50:51 PM 
2005] AN ECONOMIC THEORY 945 
 
Rivalrousness of consumption (rivalry) is a function of 
capacity98 and the degree to which one persons consumption of 
a resource affects the potential of the resource to meet the de-
mands of others.99 At the extremes, we can think of purely rival 
goods, such as apples, and purely nonrival goods, such as ideas. 
One persons consumption of an apple significantly affects the 
availability of the apple for anyone else; apples are depleted 
when consumed. Putting aside transaction costs and distribu-
tional issues, it is widely accepted that social welfare is maxi-
mized when a rivalrous good is consumed by the person who 
values it the most100 and that the market mechanism is gener-
 
ing that in the past decade, American communications and information policy 
makers have relied exclusively on private provision of public goods). Even if 
intellectual property is the preferred institutional option for correcting exclu-
sionary market failure, there is a significant debate as to how intellectual 
property systems might be optimized. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lem-
ley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003); Suzanne Scotch-
mer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Pat-
ent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 40 (1991) [hereinafter Scotchmer, Standing on 
the Shoulders of Giants]; Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differen-
tiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 (2004). 
 98. Capacity is a technological and economic variable that, depending on 
the context in which it is used, may describe the data-processing ability of a 
computer system, the data-storage ability of a computer system, the informa-
tion-carrying ability of telecommunications facilities, or the ability of a lake to 
process waste. See, e.g., ACADEMIC PRESS DICTIONARY OF SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY 353 (Christopher Morris ed., 1992) (defining capacity within the 
field of computer technology as the maximum rate at which a computer sys-
tem can process work, or the total amount of data that a computer memory 
component can store); NEWTONS TELECOM DICTIONARY 149 (16th ed. 2000) 
(explaining the different capacity measurements for various telecommunica-
tions facilities, such as data lines, switches, and coaxial cables). See generally 
MERRIAM WEBSTERS COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 168 (10th ed. 2001) (defining 
capacity as the potential or suitability for holding, storing, or accommodat-
ing, or the facility or power to produce, perform, or deploy). 
 99. Critically, (non)rivalrousness of consumption measures the degree to 
which one users consumption of a resource directly affects another users pre-
sent consumption possibilities and not how production costs are distributed 
among users. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that congestion costs 
and production costs may trade off against each other in a cost-benefit analy-
sis. For example, one experiences this trade-off when analyzing whether to in-
vest in technologies which mitigate congestion or increase capacity. See dis-
cussion infra Part II.B. 
 100. See Karl Manheim & Lawrence B. Solum, An Economic Analysis of 
Domain Name Policy, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 359, 40304 (2003) (dis-
cussing Pareto-efficient transactions for private goods); see also Harold Dem-
setz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 295 (1970) 
(explaining that rationing of [an existing] inventory [of private goods] by 
market price minimizes the loss in value due to others being excluded from 
consumption . . . by allocating the inventory to those who find it most valu-
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ally the most efficient means for rationing such goods and for 
allocating resources needed to produce such goods.101 Thus, pro-
ducers of apples are given exclusive control over the apples 
they produce through basic property rights, and those produc-
ers are then able to transfer their apples to consumers willing 
to pay for access. 
By contrast, consumption of an idea by one person does not 
affect the availability of the idea for any one else; an idea is not 
depleted in quantity or quality when consumed, regardless of 
the number of persons consuming it. An idea only needs to be 
created once to satisfy consumer demand while an apple must 
be produced for each consumer. Essentially, this means that 
the marginal costs of allowing an additional person to use an 
idea are zero.102 Most economists accept that it is efficient to 
maximize access to, and consequently consumption of, an exist-
ing nonrival good because generally there is only an upside; 
additional private benefits come at no additional cost. Ideas, 
like other nonrival goods, have infinite capacity. 
Economists also find that a static, ex post perspective on 
existing resources is an incomplete perspective. One must 
adopt a dynamic perspective and consider how nonrival goods 
are produced and made available to society. From a dynamic 
perspective, nonrival, nonexcludable goods present a well-
known supply-side problem: The inability to cheaply identify 
and exclude nonpaying users (sometimes called, free riders)103 
coupled with high fixed costs of initial production and low mar-
ginal costs of reproduction presents a risk to investors, which 
 
 
able). 
 101. See Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, supra note 100, 
at 29596. As Demsetz puts it, [t]he market price of private goods serves effi-
ciently both the function of rationing the existing inventory and rationing re-
sources into replenishment of the inventory. Id.; see Spulber & Yoo, supra 
note 43, at 89598. 
 102. Note that I have been careful to focus solely on the accessibility rule. I 
intentionally have excluded distribution or transmission costs from my analy-
sis, which may vary considerably by resource type. See, e.g., Yoo, Copyright 
and Product Differentiation, supra note 97, at 23132 (explaining that mar-
ginal costs of making and transmitting copies of a copyrighted work vary on a 
spectrum depending on, among other things, the extent to which the copy-
righted material must be combined with physical inputs and whether every 
copy of the creative work must be fixed into a physical form). 
 103. On the free-rider label, see Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, 
and Free Riding, supra note 34 (manuscript at 22). 
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may lead to undersupply by markets.104 Christopher Yoo ex-
plains how this occurs in the context of copyrighted works: 
If authors are to break even, the per-copy price they charge for a work 
must cover both a portion of the fixed costs needed to produce the 
work in the first place (often called first-copy costs) as well as the 
incremental cost of making the particular copy sold (which economists 
call marginal cost). Allowing third parties to copy freely would allow 
those third parties to underprice original authors, because the prices 
charged by those third parties would need only to cover the costs of 
producing an additional copy without having to include any surplus to 
defray the first-copy costs incurred by the authors. This would de-
prive authors of any reasonable prospect of recovering their fixed-cost 
investments and would thus leave rational authors with no economic 
incentive to invest in the production of creative works.105 
Taken together, these two perspectivesstatic and dy-
namic efficiencyyield a complicated economic puzzle in terms 
of maximizing social welfare. As a policy matter, it may be nec-
essary to strike a balance between opening access to reap static 
efficiency gains and restricting access to reap dynamic effi-
ciency gains. Whether this is necessary depends on the re-
source, the costs and benefits of doing so, and the alternatives 
available. 
At times, nonrivalry seems inextricably linked to nonex-
cludability106 and the associated risk of free riding.107 In a 
 
 104. Basically, high fixed costs of production and low or decreasing mar-
ginal costs together mean that average costs will be decreasing. Essentially, 
the fixed costs of production can be spread over a larger number of consumers. 
Such a cost structure makes pricing difficult but possible, as discussed above 
with respect to natural monopolies. See supra note 81. High costs of exclusion 
may lead to exclusionary market failure for the reasons discussed in the text 
above. However, it is critical to keep in mind that high exclusion costs do not 
inevitably lead to market failure, as the existence of visible private flower beds 
should remind us. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing private flower bed exam-
ple); Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, supra note 34 
(manuscript at 2122). 
 105. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, supra note 97, at 21415. 
See generally LANDES & POSNER, POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 68, at 22
23; Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 61416 (Natl Bureau Econ. Research 1962); Mark 
A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, The Economics of Improvement]; 
Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, supra note 34 (manu-
script at 22). 
 106. In a seminal article, Demsetz made a similar observation, arguing 
that [t]here is nothing in the public good concept that disallows the ability to 
exclude. Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, supra note 100, at 
295. Demsetz applied the label public goods to nonrivalrously consumed 
goods, and viewed nonrivalrously consumed, nonexcludable goods as a subset 
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sense, nonrivalry opens the door to free riding, and in some 
cases makes it likelyif not inevitablebecause nonrival goods 
can be consumed by many persons simultaneously and 
jointly.108 Producers of nonrival goods seeking to maximize 
their returns face the risk that nonpaying consumers may ob-
tain access to the goods (e.g., from competitors that need not 
bear the fixed cost of production and thus may sell the good at 
marginal cost), but this risk is really a function of excludability, 
not nonrivalry.109 More importantly, not all nonrival goods are 
produced by entities seeking to maximize profits or recoup their 
costs of production (consider, for example, national security), 
nor are all such goods even produced (consider, for example, 
sunshine). 
Yet possible free riding drives analysts to focus on supply-
side considerations, and more specifically, to correct market-
driven supply problems by designing property-based institu-
tions to lessen the costs of exclusion and minimize free rid-
ing.110 As I have argued elsewhere, nonexcludability is not a 
necessary condition for market failure; markets may fail for 
many other reasons. Nor, however, does exclusion fix all mar-
ket failures.111 In fact, exclusion may aggravate other failures 
of the market. Even if an owner can exclude users from a non-
rival resource and therefore meter use by charging a fee, dy-
namic inefficiencies still may abound.112 Simply put, property 
rights and other institutions that lessen the costs of exclusion 
 
of public goods which he referred to as collective goods. Id. 
 107. This relates to an earlier point: economists tend to focus on the public 
good classification initially and then swiftly shift to the supply-side analysis of 
institutions designed to fix exclusionary market failure without carefully con-
sidering the potential benefits of nonrivalrous consumption. See supra notes 
4046 and accompanying text. 
 108. As Mark Lemley notes with respect to intellectual property, [W]e 
should not therefore be particularly worried about free riding in information 
goods. It is not that free riding wont occur with information goods; to the con-
trary, it is ubiquitous. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Rid-
ing, supra note 34 (manuscript at 26). 
 109. Consider excludable goods, such as a telecommunications network, 
that exhibit similar cost structures (high fixed costs coupled with low marginal 
costs, and thus decreasing average costs). Such goods do not encounter the 
free-riding problem. 
 110. See Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, supra 
note 34 (manuscript at 317). 
 111. See Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 33; Frisch-
mann, Internet Infrastructure, supra note 42. 
 112. See, e.g., Cohen, Perfect Curve, supra note 47, at 180709; Lemley, The 
Economics of Improvement, supra note 105, at 105658. 
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and facilitate market-driven provision of nonrival goods are no 
panacea. As two well-respected economists, Richard Cornes and 
Todd Sandler, observed: 
Exclusion . . . can strengthen the motives for production of a public 
good and make possible the operation of a market. Given the effi-
ciency problems associated with pure public goods, it is interesting to 
consider whether or not the possibility of exclusion is sufficient to re-
store the presumption that market provision is efficient. . . . 
. . . A number of writers have investigated the implications of price 
excludability under various assumptions regarding market structure 
and the amount of information about demand possessed by the sup-
plier. There are no clear conclusions, except that Pareto efficiency is 
not guaranteed by the possibility of exclusion. Excludability alone 
cannot reinstate the presumptive efficiency of decentralized market 
provision, and most writers . . . have argued for a presumption of un-
derprovision even when exclusion is possible.113 
Critically, focusing on free-riding and market-driven sup-
ply obscures the economic meaning and importance of nonri-
valry.114 Developing a more sophisticated understanding of 
what nonrivalry facilitates is crucial to providing a more robust 
economic argument for commons management.115 Nonrivalry 
opens the door to much more than free-riding. 
When analyzing nonrival and partially (non)rival re-
sources, it is important to distinguish between consumption 
goods and intermediate goods (inputs).116 Consumption goods 
 
 113. CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 31, at 5657 (citation omitted). 
 114. The enclosure movement has developed considerable momentum and 
theoretical leverage based on the free-riding concept. See Lemley, Property, 
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, supra note 34 (manuscript at 1217). 
William Landes and Richard Posner provide an interesting explanation as to 
growth of intellectual property protection since 1976. They suggest that the 
free-market ideology behind the deregulation movement also pushed towards 
increasing the strength of intellectual property rights. See LANDES & POSNER, 
POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 68, at 2223. The problem, they argue, is 
that [i]ntellectual property was already deregulated in favor of a property 
rights system, and the danger that the system would be extended beyond the 
optimal point was as great as the danger that it would be undone by a continu-
ing decline in the cost (especially the quality-adjusted cost) of copying. Id. at 
23. 
 115. See David & Foray, supra note 67, at 8788 (providing a strong eco-
nomic argument for open access and knowledge distribution that focuses on 
optimal utilization of a nonrival good and the dominance of positive external-
ities derived from learning and productive use of knowledge); see also Benkler, 
Coases Penguin, supra note 14, at 40405, 43839; Boyle, Second Enclosure 
Movement, supra note 97, at 4446 (discussing distributed creativity). 
 116. See Cohen, Perfect Curve, supra note 47, at 180304 (explaining that 
the traditional economic analysis of the supply and demand curves for copy-
righted information views the consumer surplus as a benefit derived from con-
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are consumed directly by the user to generate private benefits. 
Nonrival consumption goods are subject to the economic con-
siderations set forth above. From a static efficiency perspective, 
maximizing access for consumption maximizes social welfare, 
but from a dynamic efficiency perspective, such a policy could 
lead to market failure (if the good is supplied by the market) 
because of free-riding concerns.117 
In contrast, intermediate goods are used as inputs to pro-
duce other goods. Nonrival intermediate goods (nonrival in-
puts) may be used by multiple users as an input to produce 
other goods (outputs).118 This is a door opened by nonrivalry 
worth exploring more carefully.119 
Generally, demand for nonrival inputs depends on the na-
ture of the outputs. As discussed in more detail in the next sec-
tion, however, evaluating demand may be difficult where the 
outputs are public goods and nonmarket goods. Yet the social 
benefits derived from widespread access to a nonrival input 
used to produce such goods may be quite large.120 Thus, a de-
 
sumption and not productive use); Lemley, The Economics of Improvement, 
supra note 105, at 105658. 
 117. Note that maximizing access does not mean free provision, nor does it 
mean force-feeding. Even from a static perspective, consumers presumably 
must bear any distribution costs, and those consumers for whom the marginal 
benefits of consumption are less than the marginal costs of distribution may 
decline to access the good. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 43, at 896. 
 118. Throughout this Article, I have used input-output terminology to de-
scribe resource use in production processes. There are other ways to describe 
these relationships. One alternative refers to generic or basic inputs as plat-
forms. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 143. Another refers to the relation-
ships in terms of layers. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 335. As I am span-
ning a number of disciplines, there is bound to be some confusion with respect 
to terminology, which I can only hope to minimize. 
 119. The cumulative nature of information production is well recognized in 
the literature and is the subject of extensive academic study. See, e.g., 
TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, 
supra note 20, at 8 n.2 (Cumulative forms of knowledge are those in which 
todays advances lay the basis for tomorrows, which in turn lay the basis for 
the next round. The integrative aspect of the production of knowledge means 
that new knowledge is selectively applied and integrated into existing systems 
to create new systems.); Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 
33; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On Limiting or Encouraging Ri-
valry in Technical Progress: The Effect of Patent Scope Decisions, 25 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1994); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Com-
plex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Scotchmer, 
Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, supra note 97; Benkler, The Commons as 
a Neglected Factor of Information Policy, supra note 5. 
 120. See LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 87 (arguing that a 
resource should be managed in an openly accessible manner when the re-
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mand-side emphasis is critical to valuing nonrival inputs, both 
in terms of measurement (i.e., the actual value of the resource) 
and in terms of understanding how the resource creates social 
value. These are related tasks, but one only begins to grasp the 
true social value of infrastructure resources when one looks to 
the downstream uses and applications. At a minimum, policy 
decisions aimed at striking a balance between opening access to 
reap static efficiency gains and restricting access to reap dy-
namic efficiency gains ought to explicitly take these issues into 
account. 
So far, I have discussed extremes, describing purely nonri-
val goods such as ideas and purely rival goods such as apples. 
It is important, however, to understand that there are a host of 
resources in between these extremes, generally referred to as 
impure public goods.121 An important subset of these in-
between resources includes partially (non)rival goods. 
Partially (non)rival goods are durable goods that have fi-
nite, renewable, and sharable capacity. Whether these re-
sources are consumed nonrivalrously or rivalrously often de-
pends on other conditions, such as how the resource is 
managed, the number of users, and the available capacity. I re-
fer to these resources as partially (non)rival goods because they 
can be managed in a way that avoids rivalrous consumption. To 
be clear, this concept focuses on how one users consumption di-
rectly affects another users, not on how production costs are 
distributed among users. Consider a resource with finite, shar-
able capacity, such as a lake or computer network. Up to a 
point, the marginal costs of allowing an additional user to ac-
cess and use the resource are zero; beyond that point, the mar-
ginal costs become positive and increase with each additional 
user.122 This assumed structure does not perfectly fit all re-
sources; deviations will vary across resources. An important 
 
source is  most valuable when used by indefinite and unlimited numbers of 
persons  (quoting Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 26, at 744)); 
Benkler, Coases Penguin, supra note 14, at 369 (discussing the benefits of 
peer-production of information). 
 121. CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 31, at 9; cf. Benkler, The Commons as 
a Neglected Factor of Information Policy, supra note 5, at 13 (noting that mar-
ket-based production of a nonrival input will lead to a different output mix 
than commons-based production). 
 122. See, e.g., CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 31, at 27277 (describing 
congestible resources); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property 
and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13 (2003) (observing that parks are 
impure public goods that admit of nonrivalrous uses only to a certain point). 
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deviation occurs where, in addition to multiple users, there are 
multiple uses of the resource for which compatibility, potential 
rivalry in consumption, and potential benefits vary.123 Depend-
ing upon the number and types of potential uses, the degree to 
which they compete with each other, and the value each has 
the potential to generate, we might wish to avoid reaching the 
congestion point. 
From the demand side, the absence of resource depletion 
and the possibility of avoiding congestion while still allowing 
multiple users (uses) is what makes the resource partially 
(non)rivalrous. I recognize that this terminology is a bit un-
usual in the sense that most economists would not characterize 
precongestion consumption as nonrivalrous. Instead, they 
would view consumption as depletion of the fixed capacity 
available and thus as rivalrous. As I see it, temporary depletion 
of renewable capacity that does not cause any congestion exter-
nalities is not strictly rivalrous.124 
There is a close connection between partially (non)rival re-
sources and club goods.125 Cornes and Sandler define club 
goods as a subclass of impure public goods that are partially ri-
val, excludable goods.126 Cornes and Sandler assume that ex-
clusion is practiced for club goods and analyze decisions as to 
club membership, the provision quantity of a shared resource, 
and congestion management.127 Most, if not all, club goods are 
partially (non)rival in the sense that they can be managed in a 
fashion that eliminates congestion (rivalrousness in consump-
tion) by keeping membership size small.128 As Cornes and 
Sandler remarked, Congestion is not something that must be 
completely eliminated; rather an optimal level of congestion 
must be found.129 As discussed below, figuring out the optimal 
level of congestion is a critical question for infrastructure. For 
purposes of this Article, I employ the term partially (non)rival 
 
 123. Both lakes and the Internet exhibit variance in these dimensions. See 
discussion infra Parts III.A, IV. 
 124. Cf. Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia, supra note 13, passim (discuss-
ing sharable resources with finite but perfectly renewable capacity); Benkler, 
The Commons as a Neglected Factor of Information Policy, supra note 5, at 21 
(same). 
 125. See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 31, at 34951; James M. Bu-
chanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1 (1965). 
 126. CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 31, at 9, 34950. 
 127. See id. at 34769. 
 128. See id. at 34849. 
 129. Id. at 52425. 
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resources rather than impure public goods or club goods for 
two reasons: (1) to emphasize that the degree of (non)rivalry of 
consumption is variable and often manageable; and (2) to em-
phasize that the means for managing congestion is also vari-
able, as I discuss below.130 Table 2 illustrates the categorization 
of goods as the degree of rivalry varies. 
Table 2: Classification of Goods Based on Degree of 
Rivalrousness 
 
  TYPE OF GOOD 
Nonrival Pure public good (idea) 
Partially 
(non)rival 
Impure public good  
(lake, road, the Internet) 
RIVALROUSNESS 
OF 
CONSUMPTION Rival Private good (apple) 
 
Many partially (non)rival resources are sometimes nonri-
valrously consumed and sometimes rivalrously consumed, de-
pending upon the number of users and available capacity at a 
particular time.131 Highways, in real space and cyberspace, of-
fer excellent illustrations.132 During off-peak hours, consump-
tion of these resources is often nonrivalrous. At these times, 
users do not impose costs on other users and the marginal cost 
of allowing an additional person to use the resource is zero. At 
some point, however, nonrivalrous consumption turns rivalrous 
and congestion problems arise. Congestion on the highway or 
on the Internet is a function of variable demand imposed on a 
 
 130. We will revisit excludability and restrictions on membership size be-
low. See infra Part III.A (discussing targeted regulation of certain sets of us-
ers/uses of a resource in order to avoid congestion and sustain nonrival con-
sumption by other sets of users/uses). 
 131. See, e.g., Frischmann, Internet Infrastructure, supra note 42, at 2534 
(modeling the Internet interconnection infrastructure as a sometimes rival-
rous good). 
 132. The information superhighway metaphor has been critiqued by 
many, and rightly so, in my opinion, to the extent that the metaphor is used as 
the exclusive lens for elucidating the relevant facts of the Internet in a legal 
dispute. See Brett M. Frischmann, The Prospect of Reconciling Internet and 
Cyberspace, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 205 (2003). Nonetheless, the metaphor is a 
useful way of thinking about the physical infrastructure of the Internet (i.e., 
the interconnected networks and nodes that transport information to and from 
computers at the ends) from an economic perspective. See id. 
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system with finite capacity. As a general matter, congestion 
dissipates over time and the capacity of the resource is re-
newed. Thus, it is not permanently depleted, unless the system 
is overwhelmed and crashes.133 
Like a door that may be closed, opened, or left partially 
open, partially (non)rival resources present choices.134 Opening 
the door to take advantage fully of nonrivalry may require in-
vestments in capacity expansion and/or access restrictions tai-
lored to control congestion. It is important to realize that not all 
partially (non)rival goods are amenable to capacity expansion. 
Highways or telecommunications systems can be expanded; 
others, like some environmental resources that act as a sink for 
pollutants, cannot. 
For expandable infrastructure resources, the costs of ex-
pansion (e.g., adding more lanes to a highway or more fiber op-
tic cables to the Internet network) must be weighed against the 
costs of congestion (e.g., slowing down traffic) and/or the costs 
of regulating use in a manner that prevents congestion (e.g., 
prohibiting certain traffic during peak load times).135 Instead of 
building capacity sufficient to handle all users and uses at all 
times, we might prefer to regulate certain types of uses. For ex-
ample, imagine that if we keep a certain class of vehicles (big 
trucks) off the highway during rush hour, we could then keep 
the highway completely open for all other types of vehicles 
without suffering any congestion, meaning the marginal cost of 
each additional allowable vehicle (non-big-truck) is zero. This 
type of management scheme imposes costs on the regulated ve-
hicles to avoid congestion costs on the unregulated vehicles. 
Rather than spreading congestion costs on all users (or perhaps 
on the entire tax base), displacement costs are placed on a par-
ticular class of users. For these resources, we must make the 
difficult choice between building congestion-free levels of capac-
ity (which may be cost prohibitive), saddling all congestion 
costs on a particular class of users, or spreading congestion 
costs among all users. 
 
 133. Some infrastructure resources are more vulnerable to being over-
whelmed than others. See Robert Wilson, Architecture of Power Markets, 70 
ECONOMETRICA 1299, 1302 (2002) (discussing technological transmission con-
straints and vulnerability to instability, cascading failures, or collapse at 
great cost). 
 134. Closing the door entails enclosure of a resource. Cf. Boyle, Second 
Enclosure Movement, supra note 97, passim (addressing the second enclosure 
movement). 
 135. See infra Parts III.A, IV (using examples to illustrate trade-offs). 
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Further, if expansion is desirable, it is necessary to deter-
mine who will finance this investment.136 If, on one hand, ca-
pacity expansion is to be financed privately, then private actors 
may push for private ownership and control over the conditions 
of access to the resource to ensure that payments can be ex-
tracted from users. On the other hand, capacity expansion may 
be financed publicly, or perhaps through alternative means, 
which may be worthwhile if open access is socially desirable. 
Expansion of capacity is not the only (or even predominant) 
means of eliminating or controlling rivalrous consumption. 
Uses can be regulated by the market through pricing,137 the 
government by regulation,138 norms, or even technology that 
mitigates congestion.139 Such institutional structures must be 
evaluated carefully and contextually. 
 
 
 136. The lumpiness of investments in capacity expansion presents a re-
lated supply-side issue. As Spulber & Yoo explain: 
Capacity in network industries is notoriously lumpy in that it can 
only be efficiently added in large, discrete quantities. In addition, if 
the needs of network users are to be met, such capacity must neces-
sarily be added before it is actually needed, a problem that is particu-
larly acute for carriers of last resort who are obligated to provide ser-
vice to anyone who requests it. The tendency towards excess capacity 
is exacerbated further by the manner in which excess capacity can 
enhance network reliability and provide insurance against unforesee-
able variability in demand. These qualities make excess capacity a 
feature that is endemic to all networks. In addition, these courts have 
fallen into the same trap as computer system managers that have al-
lowed additional users free use of what, at the time, appeared to be 
excess capacity. That is, this approach overlooks the fact that use of 
what appears to be excess capacity imposes real costs by hastening 
the need for additional capacity. 
Spulber & Yoo, supra note 43, at 913. From a social welfare perspective, it 
may, at times, be desirable to have excess capacity and hasten[ ] the need for 
additional capacity for public and social infrastructure. Id. 
 137. See Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia, supra note 13, at 352. Benkler 
explains: 
Overuse expressed as congestion will lead to queuingor higher 
pricesexpressed in time. Queuing, in turn, is the appropriate alloca-
tion method whenever the cost of avoiding queuingincreasing ca-
pacity or instituting a price system without a queuing componentis 
higher than the cost of the time lost in the queue. 
Id. 
 138. See infra Part III.A (discussing regulation of consumptive uses). 
 139. A spectrum commons is possible because spectrum, while rivalrous, is 
inexhaustible and perfectly renewable, permitting rival uses to be coordinated 
better with equipment that utilizes these attributes than with institutions de-
veloped to overcome more primitive technological conditions. Benkler, The 
Commons as a Neglected Factor of Information Policy, supra note 5, at 21. 
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To be clear, not all nonrival or partially (non)rival goods 
are infrastructure, and not all nonrival or partially (non)rival 
goods should be managed in a manner that takes advantage of 
nonrivalry. First, to qualify as infrastructure, a resource must 
act as an input into the production of a wide variety of out-
puts.140 Second, even if a resource can be characterized as in-
frastructure, whether it should be managed in a manner that 
takes advantage of nonrivalry (i.e., in an openly accessible 
manner) will depend on the context and the mix of outputs it 
generates. The next section addresses these questions. 
B. DEFINING INFRASTRUCTURE FROM THE DEMAND SIDE 
Infrastructure resources are resources that satisfy the fol-
lowing demand-side criteria: 
(1) The resource may be consumed nonrivalrously; 
(2) Social demand for the resource is driven primarily by 
downstream productive activity that requires the resource as 
an input; and 
(3) The resource may be used as an input into a wide range 
of goods and services, including private goods, public goods, and 
nonmarket goods. 
Traditional infrastructure, such as roadways, telephone 
networks, and electricity grids, satisfy this definition, as do a 
wide range of resources not traditionally considered to be infra-
structure resources, such as lakes, ideas, and the Internet. 
The first criterion captures the consumption attribute of 
nonrival and partially (non)rival goods, as detailed in the pre-
vious section. Simply put, nonrivalry opens the door to wide-
spread shared access and productive use of the resource. For 
nonrival resources of infinite capacity, the marginal cost of al-
lowing an additional person to access the resource is zero.141 
For partially (non)rival resources of finite capacity, the cost-
benefit analysis is more complicated, but the potential for an 
 
 140. For purposes of this Article, at least. 
 141. To be clear, allowing access and providing access are two different con-
cepts. Allowing access simply means not restricting or erecting barriers to ac-
cess. If marginal distribution costs are greater than zero, which will often be 
the case, then the person seeking access generally is required to bear these 
costs, absent a subsidy scheme. I recognize that exclusion may be necessary in 
some cases to recover such costs and/or the fixed costs of production. Keep in 
mind, however, that I am focusing on the demand side. The key point is that 
allowing consumers access to the resource has no impact on the availability of 
the resource for other consumers. 
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open door or partially open door must be taken into account 
when evaluating provisional mechanisms (e.g., market, gov-
ernment, community, family, and individual supply systems), 
and institutions aimed at optimizing these mechanisms (e.g., 
laws, norms, subsidies, and taxes). 
The second and third criteria focus on the manner in which 
infrastructure resources create social value. The second crite-
rion emphasizes that infrastructure resources are intermediate 
goods that create social value when utilized productively down-
stream and that such use is the primary source of social bene-
fits. In other words, while some infrastructure resources may 
be consumed directly to produce immediate benefits, most of 
the value derived from the resources results from productive 
use rather than consumption.142 Essentially, infrastructure re-
sources are enabling platforms upon which others build.143 
The third criterion emphasizes both the variance of poten-
tial downstream outputs (the genericness of the input) and the 
nature of those outputs (particularly public goods and nonmar-
ket goods).144 The reason for emphasizing variance and the pro-
 
 142. For some infrastructure resources, all of the value is derivative. For 
other infrastructure resources, there is a balance between productive use and 
consumption. See, e.g., infra Part IV (detailing how the Internet falls into the 
latter category). For purposes of this Article, I am not concerned with drawing 
a bright line between the two.  
 143. Jonathan Zittrain has analyzed the importance of open platform tech-
nologies and ways to encourage their development. See Jonathan Zittrain, The 
Future of the InternetAnd How To Stop It (Jan. 2005) (working paper, on 
file with author). On platforms, see Shane Greenstein, The Evolving Structure 
of the Internet Market, in UNDERSTANDING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 151, 154
55 (Erik Brynjolfsson & Brian Kahin eds., 2000) (A platform is a common ar-
rangement of components and activities, usually unified by a set of technical 
standards and procedural norms around which users organize their activities. 
Platforms have a known interface with respect to particular technologies and 
are usually open in some sense.) (citation omitted) and ANNABELLE GAWER 
& MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO, PLATFORM LEADERSHIP: HOW INTEL, MICROSOFT 
AND CISCO DRIVE INDUSTRY INNOVATION 55 (2002), quoted in Cooper, supra 
note 27, at 29 (describing platform technologies as enabling technologies that 
exist to entice other firms to use them to build products that conform to the 
defined standards and therefore work efficiently with the platform). 
 144. See Justman & Teubal, supra note 96, at 2123 (defining technological 
infrastructure as a set of collectively supplied, specific, industry-relevant ca-
pabilities, intended for several applications in two or more firms or user or-
ganizations); Gregory Tassey, Infratechnologies and Economic Growth, in 
TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, 
supra note 20, at 59, 5960 (similarly defining technological infrastructure as 
generic and jointly used inputs); see also Justman & Teubal, supra note 96, at 
24 n.5 (describing genericness as having broad relevance from a demand per-
spective for multiple users/uses). 
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duction of public goods and nonmarket goods downstream is 
that when these criteria are satisfied, the social value created 
by allowing additional users to access and use the resource may 
be substantial but extremely difficult to measure.145 The infor-
mation problems associated with assessing demand for an in-
frastructure resource and valuing its social benefits plague 
both suppliers and consumers of that resource where consum-
ers are using the infrastructure as an input into the production 
of public goods or nonmarket goods. This is an information 
problem that is pervasive and not easily solved.146 
Whether we are talking about transportation systems, the 
electricity grid, ideas, environmental ecosystems, or Internet 
infrastructure, the bulk of the social benefits generated by 
these resources derives from their downstream uses. They cre-
ate value downstream by serving a wide variety of end-users 
who rely on access to them. Yet social demand for the infra-
structure itself is extremely difficult to measure. 
A road system, for example, is not socially beneficial simply 
because we can drive on it. I may realize direct consumptive 
benefits when I go cruising with the windows down and my fa-
vorite music playing,147 but the bulk of social benefits attribut-
able to a road system comes from the activities it facilitates at 
the ends, including, for example, commerce, labor, communica-
tions, and recreation.148 As recognized by the National Re-
search Council, [i]nfrastructure is a means to other ends, and 
the effectiveness, efficiency, and reliability of its contribution to 
these other ends must ultimately be the measure of infrastruc-
 
 145. This may give rise to market failure that is related to, but still differ-
ent and more complicated than, market failure traditionally associated with 
public goods. Once we establish the existence of this type of market failure and 
that pure market provision of these resources is socially undesirable, we must 
carefully consider the institutional responsewhether substitution of an al-
ternative provider or institutional intervention into the market will improve 
its performance. This institutional analysis must take into account the ways in 
which infrastructure resources differ from ordinary public goods. See Tassey, 
supra note 144, at 6772 (describing a variety of technology-based market 
failures). 
 146. Cf. Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia, supra note 13, at 37588, 390 
(discussing information and transaction cost problems associated with articu-
lating and communicating preferences about the use of communications infra-
structure in an imperfect market). 
 147. See Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 22 (dis-
cussing the benefits of driving on the open road). 
 148. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 26, at 76870; see also 
Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 2223. 
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ture performance.149 Yet, despite general recognition that so-
cial demand for infrastructure is driven by downstream appli-
cations, theoretical modeling of this relationship and empirical 
measurement of value creation downstream appear underde-
veloped and incomplete.150 
From an economic perspective, it makes sense to manage 
certain infrastructure resources in an openly accessible manner 
because doing so permits a wide range of downstream produc-
ers of private, public, and nonmarket goods to flourish. As 
Yochai Benkler has noted, [t]he high variability in value of us-
ing both transportation and communications facilities from 
person to person and time to time have made a commons-based 
approach to providing the core facilities immensely valu-
able.151 The point is not that all infrastructure resources (tra-
ditional or nontraditional) should be managed in an openly ac-
cessible manner, but rather that, for certain classes of 
resources, the economic arguments for managing the resources 
in an openly accessible manner vary in strength and substance. 
The next section further refines the economic theory by defin-
ing three classes of infrastructure resources: commercial, pub-
lic, and social infrastructure. As a general matter, economic ar-
guments for managing an infrastructure resource in an openly 
accessible manner vary by type and are stronger for the latter 
two types.152 For commercial infrastructure, the arguments are 
largely grounded in concerns about anticompetitive behavior 
and/or natural monopolies. For public and social infrastructure, 
the arguments extend further to encompass information and 
transaction cost problems that inhibit efficient operation of 
both markets and targeted government subsidies. 
C. AN INFRASTRUCTURE TYPOLOGY 
To better understand and evaluate these complex economic 
relationships, I define three general categories of infrastructure 
resources, illustrated in table 3, based on the nature of the dis-
 
 149. COMM. ON MEASURING & IMPROVING INFRASTRUCTURE 
PERFORMANCE, NATL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING AND IMPROVING 
INFRASTRUCTURE PERFORMANCE 5 (1995). 
 150. The difficulty in assessing social demand for the infrastructure re-
source is experienced in traditional infrastructure industries. CORNES & 
SANDLER, supra note 31, at 483505. 
 151. Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 4748. 
 152. See infra Part II.D (explaining the various economic arguments for 
managing each type of infrastructure resource in an openly accessible man-
ner). 
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tribution of downstream activities: commercial, public, and so-
cial infrastructure. 
 
Table 3: Typology of Infrastructure Resources 
 
Type Definition Examples 
COMMERCIAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Nonrival or partially 
(non)rival input into 
the production of a 
wide variance of 
private goods 
1. Basic manufac-
turing processes 
2. Cable television 
3. The Internet 
4.  Road systems 
PUBLIC 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Nonrival or partially 
(non)rival input into 
the production of a 
wide variance of  
public goods 
1. Basic research 
2. Ideas 
3. The Internet 
SOCIAL  
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Nonrival or partially 
(non)rival input into 
the production of a 
wide variance of 
nonmarket goods*   
1. Lakes 
2. The Internet 
3. Road systems 
 
 * The last subset also includes many traditional infrastructure, such as 
governance systems and school systems.  
 
These categories are neither exhaustive nor mutually ex-
clusive. Real-world infrastructure resources often fit within 
more than one of these categories at the same time. For exam-
ple, as explored in Part IV, the Internet is a combination of all 
three types of infrastructure. I will refer to such infrastructure 
resources as mixed and to infrastructure resources that fall 
within only one category as pure. This schema provides a 
means for understanding the social value generated by these 
infrastructure resources and identifying different types of mar-
ket failures. 
1. Commercial Infrastructure 
Commercial infrastructure resources are used to produce 
private goods.153 Consider the examples listed in table 3. Basic 
 
 153. A private good is a rivalrously consumed good, such as an apple. See 
supra Part II.A. 
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manufacturing processes, such as die casting, milling, and the 
assembly line process, are nonrival inputs into the production 
of a wide variety of private manufactured goods. Similarly, ba-
sic agricultural processes and food processing techniques are 
nonrival inputs into the production of a wide variety of private 
agricultural goods and foodstuffs. Many commercial infrastruc-
ture resources are used productively by suppliers purely as a 
delivery mechanism for manufactured goods, agricultural 
goods, foodstuffs, and many other commercial products, includ-
ing digital content. A cable television system, for example, acts 
as an input into the delivery of copy-protected (or controlled) 
digital content purely for consumption by an end-user (e.g., a 
cable customer). Content providers use the infrastructure to 
provide a private service to the consumer (delivery of content 
for consumption) under conditions that render the output rival-
rous and excludable. At least in theory, a wide variety of con-
tent suppliers can deliver a wide variety of content under such 
conditions. Similarly, the Internet and road systems are used 
by a wide range of suppliers to deliver private goods and ser-
vices. 
For pure commercial infrastructure, basic economic theory 
predicts that: (1) competitive output markets should work well 
and effectively create demand information for the input,154 (2) 
 
 154. It may be the case that commercial infrastructure may run into a 
similar type of demand-side market failure as discussed below with respect to 
public and social infrastructure. See infra Part II.C.2. Consumer surplus is the 
portion of the value created by outputs that is not captured by output produc-
ers. See Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, supra note 
34 (manuscript at 1925). If (1) access is prioritized (e.g., due to capacity con-
straints) and (2) perfect price discrimination is not effective in the input mar-
ket, infrastructure suppliers may bias access priority or optimize infrastruc-
ture design in favor of output markets that generate the highest levels of 
appropriable returns, perhaps at the expense of output markets that generate 
a larger aggregate surplus (consumer surplus plus producer surplus). See id. 
(manuscript at 3043). I thank Mark Lemley for raising this issue. While in-
teresting, I leave further consideration for future work. Lemley sets forth the 
issue as follows: 
If there is a chain of markets, each with its own positive externalities, 
the initial owner may demand a fee for licensing which is less than 
the aggregate social value across all markets, but greater than the 
private value users can capture. In this case, market failure will 
cause us to forego efficient new uses. . . . In short, granting perfect 
control privileges initial inventors at the expense of improvers, and 
may therefore actually reduce the size of positive externalities from 
invention by discouraging the improvements and new uses which 
generate those externalities. 
Id. (manuscript at 3940). 
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market actors (input suppliers) will process this information, 
and (3) demand will be satisfied efficiently.155 Simply put, for 
commercial infrastructure, output producers should fully ap-
propriate the benefits of the outputs (via sales to consumers) 
and thus accurately manifest demand for the required inputs in 
upstream markets. Therefore, with respect to demand for 
commercial infrastructure, the key is maintaining competition 
in the output markets, where producers are competing to pro-
duce and supply private goods to consumers. Competition is the 
linchpin in this context because the publics consumptive de-
mands can be best assessed and satisfied by competitive mar-
kets. 
The first two points underlie one of the famous arguments 
made by Ronald Coase in The Marginal Cost Controversy.156 
Coase argued that governments should not subsidize public ac-
cess to utilities (natural monopolies) with an aim toward keep-
ing prices charged to consumers at marginal cost.157 Doing so, 
he argued, would distort the market and disrupt its ability to 
generate and process individual demand information.158 I agree 
with Coase on this point as it pertains to demand for pure com-
mercial infrastructure. As I will discuss below, however, the 
argument does not apply with equal force to public and social 
infrastructure. First, social and individual demand for access to 
infrastructure will diverge to the extent that individuals are 
unable to appropriate the full value of outputs they generate.159 
Second, managing the infrastructure resource in an openly ac-
cessible manner does not preclude market or government pro-
vision. It does, however, avoid relying on either the pricing sys-
tem or the government to assess demand on an individualized 
 
 155. With respect to the third point, there is significant disagreement 
among economists about the need for competitive input markets and the need 
for government intervention into various input markets. The thrust of the ar-
guments made in this debate concern incentives, the presence of natural mo-
nopolies, strategic behavior by monopolists (infrastructure providers), and the 
effectiveness of government intervention. These debates generally focus on 
supply-side issues without challenging the first two points made above. 
 156. See R.H. Coase, The Marginal Cost Controversy, 13 ECONOMICA 169 
(1946) [hereinafter Coase, The Marginal Cost Controversy]; R.H. Coase, The 
Marginal Cost Controversy: Some Further Comments, 14 ECONOMICA 150 
(1947) [hereinafter Coase, Some Further Comments]. 
 157. Coase, The Marginal Cost Controversy, supra note 156, passim. 
 158. Id. at 176; cf. Buchanan, supra note 125 (making a similar demand-
side argument with respect to investing in capacity beyond the point of con-
gestion for club goods). 
 159. See infra Part II.C.2. 
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basis, which is precisely the advantage of a commons manage-
ment regime. For infrastructure managed in an openly accessi-
ble manner, demand is assessed more crudely on a group, 
community, or societal basis.160 
Not surprisingly, the topic of open access to commercial in-
frastructure roots itself in the familiar territory of antitrust, 
regulated markets, and commons-like management principles 
of common carrier and essential facilities doctrines.161 Histori-
cally, common carrier obligations were said to arise in markets 
affected with the public interest.162 According to Richard Ep-
stein, government intervention into such markets to ensure 
public access was justified because of the risk of market domi-
nance and the lack of competition upstream (in the input mar-
ket).163 
One of the insights that flows from this infrastructure 
model is that these regulatory principles are being applied to a 
subset of a much broader phenomenon. First, there is a wider 
range of resources that are affected with the public interest 
and that are candidates for similar institutional treatment. 
Second, the institutional responsecommon carrier regula-
tionneed not be justified purely on the argument that it is 
necessary to facilitate competition downstream. When the 
downstream uses or applications of an infrastructure resource 
include the production of public goods and nonmarket goods, 
the case for common carrier regulation may be even stronger. 
Mark Cooper stated the argument nicely: 
 
 
 160. See Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of 
Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242, 24748 
(1938) (deciding whether demand was sufficient to justify the costs of building 
a bridge would be a matter of estimation of vehicular and pedestrian traffic 
originating and terminating in particular zones, with a comparison of dis-
tances by alternative routes in each case, and an evaluation of the savings in 
each class of movement), quoted in Coase, The Marginal Cost Controversy, 
supra note 156, at 175. 
 161. For a discussion of the history and role of common carrier obligations 
on infrastructure providers, see Cooper, supra note 27, at 35. Cooper also ar-
gues that these principles should extend to the Internet. See id. at 3945. 
 162. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: 
RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 279318 (1998) 
(detailing the history of common carrier regulation); Walter H. Hamilton, Af-
fection with Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089, 110001 (1930); cf. Rose, The 
Comedy of the Commons, supra note 26, passim (discussing inherently public 
property). 
 163. EPSTEIN, supra note 162, at 156, 279318 (quoting Allnut v. Inglis, 
104 Eng. Rep. 206, 208 (K.B. 1810)). 
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The paramount concern is the nature of the service, not the conditions 
of supply. Public convenience and necessity is required of a service 
because it is a critically important, indispensable input into other 
economic activity. The function provided by and the network charac-
teristics of transportation and communications industries are condu-
cive to creating the conditions for affecting the public interest.164 
2. Public and Social Infrastructure: Understanding the 
Outputs 
When analyzing nonrival inputs, the outputs matter. The 
typology above defines three infrastructure types based on the 
nature of the outputs. The value of an infrastructure resource 
ultimately is realized by consumers of these downstream out-
puts. It is thus the demand for these outputs that determines 
demand for the infrastructure. 
Recall the economic classification schema discussed in the 
previous section: Private goods are rivalrously consumed, pure 
public goods are nonrivalrously consumed, and impure public 
goods are (non)rivalrously consumed.165 Two points made in the 
last section bear repeating. First, the public or private nature 
of a resource is a function of (non)rivalryhow its capacity ad-
justs to consumption.166 If consumption by a person always has 
a negative effect on the consumption opportunities for other po-
tential consumers, then the resource is rivalrously consumed 
and can be labeled a private good. If consumption by a person 
never has a negative effect on the consumption opportunities 
for other potential consumers, then the resource is nonrival-
rously consumed and can be labeled a pure public good. Finally, 
if consumption by a person may have a negative effect on the 
consumption opportunities for other potential consumers de-
pending upon the context, then the resource is (non)rivalrously 
consumed and can be labeled an impure public good. 
Second, the public or private nature of a resource is not a 
function of excludability.167 Excludability refers to how costly it 
 
 164. Cooper, supra note 27, at 17. 
 165. See supra Part II.A. 
 166. See supra Part II.A. 
 167. See supra note 106 (discussing Demsetz). Some analysts view public 
goods narrowly in terms of a putative market failure that occurs because con-
sumers, in particular, fail to contribute their optimal or fair share. See, e.g., 
CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 31, at 39 (analyzing public goods as this type 
of collective action problem). This narrow view implicitly links nonrivalry with 
free-riding behavior that results from nonexcludability. See supra Part II.A. 
To avoid this mistake, I adopt a more expansive view of public goods. Specifi-
cally, I view public goods as resources that have the potential to generate posi-
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is to prevent someone else from consuming the resource and is 
relevant to a supply-side analysis of how well the market 
mechanism will work. 
Private goods and public goods (pure and impure) are sup-
plied by the market mechanism with varying degrees of effec-
tiveness. For private goods, the market mechanism generally 
works well from both the supply and demand sides, assuming 
markets are competitive. For public goods, the market mecha-
nism may fail from both the supply and demand sides, even if 
markets are competitive. In some cases, the market may be cor-
rected through institutional intervention. For example, if the 
costs of exclusion are sufficiently high that undersupply is ex-
pected, legal fences may be employed to lessen the costs of ex-
clusion and thereby provide improved incentives to invest in 
supplying the desired public good. 
Nonmarket goods refer to those goods that are neither 
provided nor demanded through the market mechanism; we do 
not purchase such goods.168 We may recognize their value but 
we simply do not rely on the market as a provisional mecha-
nism.169 Instead, we rely on other provisional mechanisms, in-
cluding government, community, family, and individuals. 
Consider, for example, the preservation of certain re-
sources, perhaps historic or environmental, for future genera-
tions. It may be the case that society as a whole considers such 
an objective to be worthwhile, but for various reasons not dis-
cussed in this Article, the market mechanism simply will not 
accurately measure or respond to societal demand for preserva-
tion of this sort. The same can be said for active participation in 
democratic dialogue; voting; free speech; society-wide educa-
tion; and redistribution of wealth to aid those in need. Many of 
the things we collectively value in the United States are non-
market goods.170 
 
tive externalities, depending on how access to the resources is managed. Cf. 
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, supra note 31, at 348 (Every 
cost and benefit associated with social interdependencies is a potential exter-
nality.). As explored in the text below, whether or not this potential ought to 
be tapped will depend on the institutional setting and overall context. 
 168. See Nicholas E. Flores, Conceptual Framework for Nonmarket Valua-
tion, in A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION, supra note 43, at 27, 2729, 39. 
 169. See id. at 3839. 
 170. Cf. CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 31, at 51 (discussing environ-
mental commodities); Cohen, Perfect Curve, supra note 47, at 180810 (noting 
difficulties in social value judgments of cultural works). There is some overlap 
between nonmarket goods and merit goods. While nonmarket goods are not 
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From the demand side, the important distinction between 
these outputswhat separates nonmarket goods in particular 
from public goodsis the means by which they create value for 
society. The value of public goods is realized upon consumption. 
That is, upon obtaining access to a public good, a person con-
sumes it and accrues benefits (value or utility). The production 
of public goods has the potential to generate positive external-
ities. Whether the benefits are external to production depends 
upon the conditions of access and the degree to which the pro-
ducer internalizes the value realized by others upon consump-
tion. For example, consider a flower garden. A person who 
plants flowers in his front yard creates the potential for posi-
tive externalities that may be realized by those who walk by 
and appreciate their beauty. The view of the flowers is nonri-
val; consumption by one person does not deplete the view or 
beauty available for others to consume. Consumption depends 
upon access, however, and the realization of potential external-
ities depends upon whether the homeowner builds a fence that 
effectively obstructs the publics view. If the homeowner builds 
an effective fence, then he has restricted access and the poten-
tial for positive externalities remains untapped. If, on the other 
hand, the homeowner does not build such a fence, then people 
who pass by obtain access to the view, consume it, and realize 
external benefits. I like to refer to such persons as incidental 
beneficiaries,171 although some would use derogatory, loaded 
labels such as free riders or even pirates.172 At least in the 
context of an open view of a flower garden, however, we do not 
really expect people to stop and compensate the homeowner.173 
 
provided for by the market, merit goods are partially provided by the market. 
See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 1314 (1959). 
Merit goods are considered so beneficial to the public that any deficiency in 
market provision will be compensated for with public provision. See id. For ex-
ample, education could be provided exclusively by the private sector. However, 
this would leave many children without access to education and cause a sub-
sequent host of social problems when these children do not have the necessary 
skills to become productive members of society. See id. Education is a good 
whose social merit has been recognized, and therefore both the public and pri-
vate sectors often provide it to insure more widespread consumption. See id. 
 171. CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 31, at 55 ([T]he only motive that an 
individual has to provide units of such a [public] good is his or her own private 
motive of present or future consumption. Enjoyment of those units by others is 
an incidental by-product.). 
 172. See LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 68, at 5361 (discussing such 
labels); Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, supra note 34 
(manuscript at 1112) (same). 
 173. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, supra note 
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The homeowner may anticipate and value the fact that persons 
passing by appreciate the visual beauty and wonderful smells 
of the garden, but generally the homeowner does not seek com-
pensation or take into account the summed benefits for all. Nei-
ther the law nor economic efficiency require complete internali-
zation; external benefits are a ubiquitous boon for society.174 
By contrast, the value of nonmarket goods is realized in a 
more osmotic fashion and not through direct consumption. 
Nonmarket goods change environmental conditions and social 
interdependencies in ways that increase social welfare.175 Take, 
for example, active participation in democratic dialogue or edu-
cation. While participants may realize direct benefits as a re-
sult of their activity, nonparticipants (nonconsumers) also 
benefitnot because they also may gain access to the good (dia-
logue or education), but instead because of the manner in which 
dialogue or education improves societal conditions. As I discuss 
in more detail in Part IV, active participation in online discus-
sions regarding political issues such as the Iraq war and the 
2004 presidential election benefit participants as well as those 
who never log onto the Internet.176 
In sum, the production of public goods has the potential to 
generate positive externalities for nonpaying consumers (inci-
dental beneficiaries or free riders), and the production of non-
market goods generates diffuse positive externalities, often re-
alized by nonparticipants or nonconsumers. 
3. Public and Social Infrastructure: Understanding the 
Demand-Side Analysis 
Public and social infrastructure resources are used to pro-
duce public goods and nonmarket goods, respectively.177 For 
much of the analysis that follows, I group public and social in-
frastructure together because the demand-side problems and 
arguments for commons management generally take the same 
form. 
For both public and social infrastructure, the ability of 
competitive output markets to effectively create and process in-
 
34 (manuscript at 1923). 
 174. See id. (using the flower bed example and making the same argument 
more generally with respect to internalization of positive externalities). 
 175. See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 31, at 51. 
 176. See infra Part IV; see also infra Part III.A (discussing how a family 
fishing trip may generate nonmarket goods such as family values). 
 177. I discuss examples of them throughout Parts III and IV. 
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formation regarding demand for the nonrival input is less clear 
than in the case of commercial infrastructure. Competitive out-
put markets will not necessarily work well in generating de-
mand information for the required inputs in upstream markets. 
Infrastructure users that produce public goods and non-
market goods suffer valuation problems because they generally 
do not fully measure or appropriate the (potential) benefits of 
the outputs they produce and consequently do not accurately 
represent actual social demand for the infrastructure re-
source.178 Instead, for public and social infrastructure, demand 
[generated by competitive output markets will] tend[ ] to reflect 
the individual benefits realized by a particular user and not 
take into account positive externalities.179 As I noted in an ear-
lier article: 
To the extent that individuals willingness to pay for [access to infra-
structure] reflects only the value that they will realize from an [out-
put], the market mechanism . . . will not [fully] take into account (or 
provide the services for) the broader set of social benefits attributable 
to the public goods[, nonmarket goods,] and network externalities. 
[Infrastructure consumers] will pay for [access to infrastructure] to 
the extent that they benefit (rather than to the extent that society 
benefits) [from the outputs produced].180 
Difficulties in measuring and appropriating value gener-
ated in output markets thus translates into a valuation or 
measurement problem for infrastructure suppliers.181 As 
 
 178. I say potential benefits to remind the reader that once created, public 
goods have the potential to generate positive externalities. See supra Part 
II.B.2. In addition, it bears emphasizing that the inability to fully appropriate 
the potential benefits of public goods and nonmarket goods is not remedied by 
full excludability. As noted in the previous section, exclusion facilitates condi-
tioning access to something upon payment. But absent perfect price discrimi-
nation, where sellers match the price of their goods to each consumers will-
ingness to pay, the full range of potential benefits may not be realized or 
appropriated because some consumers may be priced out of the market. 
 179. Frischmann, Internet Infrastructure, supra note 42, at 51; see also 
LANDES & POSNER, POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 68, at 16. Landes and 
Posner untangle this concept: 
One possible explanation for the asymmetry in stakes between copy-
right owners and public domain publishers is that the public domain 
really is not worth muchthat we have been exaggerating the de-
pendence of authors and inventors (especially the former) on previ-
ously created works. But this suggestion confuses private with social 
value. Public domain works have less private value than copyright-
able works, because they cannot be appropriated. They may have 
great social value. 
Id. 
 180. Frischmann, Internet Infrastructure, supra note 42, at 55. 
 181. For an illustration, see infra Part III.A (the lake example). 
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Yochai Benkler has emphasized, output producers do not al-
ways seek to measure or appropriate the value they create; 
they may participate in a form of decentralized, nonmarket pro-
duction (for example, peer-to-peer production) that depends on 
access to the infrastructure, but not for the immediate purpose 
of creating appropriable benefits.182 Such productive activity 
generates positive externalities for society as a whole, and may 
be part of a structural shift in our societys industrial and cul-
tural economies.183 
To further complicate matters, for some infrastructure re-
sources, and particularly those that act as inputs into cumula-
tive production processes, there may be considerable uncer-
tainty as to what types of downstream applications may arise 
in the future.184 Prospective uncertainty can exist along various 
dimensions that affect investment and management deci-
sions.185 Such uncertainty complicates decision making and in-
creases transaction costs (e.g., costs associated with identifying 
and dealing with future contingencies). Moreover, this uncer-
tainty may deter market actors from becoming market produc-
ers.186 
All of these factors suggest that competitive output mar-
kets may fail to accurately manifest demand for public and so-
cial infrastructure because of the presence of demand-side ex-
ternalities. To better understand this dynamic, the next section 
compares infrastructure and network effects, both of which in-
volve demand-side externalities. 
 
 182. See Benkler, Coases Penguin, supra note 14, at 37881; Benkler, 
Freedom in the Commons, supra note 13, at 1251; Benkler, The Political Econ-
omy of Commons, supra note 58, at 7. 
 183. See Benkler, Coases Penguin, supra note 14, at 37881; Benkler, 
Freedom in the Commons, supra note 13, at 1251. 
 184. For an illustration, see infra Part III.B (the basic research example). 
 185. See, e.g., Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 33, at 
362, 36667, 37475 & n.104; Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, 
supra note 97, at 3132 (uncertainty makes ex ante contracting between input 
suppliers and output producers difficult); Flores, supra note 168, at 47 
([D]emand for the environment has dynamic characteristics that imply value 
for potential use, though not current use, and that trends for future users need 
to be explicitly recognized in order to adequately preserve natural areas. (dis-
cussing an argument from J.V. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. 
ECON. REV. 777 (1967))). 
 186. Market actors may be averse to uncertainty itself. See Frischmann, 
Innovation and Institutions, supra note 33, at 375 n.109 (citing to studies of 
risk aversion of decision makers). 
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D. NETWORK EFFECTS 
Most, if not all, traditional infrastructure resources are 
networks.187 Economists have devoted substantial effort in re-
cent years to unravel the peculiar economic features of net-
works, commonly referred to as network effects.188 Interest-
ingly, much like the analysis of infrastructure in this Article, 
network economists realize that many nonnetwork industries 
exhibit network effects and have extended their analysis ac-
cordingly.189 Nicholas Economides, a pioneering network 
economist, provides the following explanation of networks: 
Networks are composed of complementary nodes and links. 
The crucial defining feature of networks is the complementarity 
between the various nodes and links. A service delivered over a 
network requires the use of two or more network components. 
Thus, network components are complementary to each 
other.190 
Network effects are demand-side effects that often, though 
not always, result in positive externalities (generally referred 
to as network externalities).191 Network effects exist when the 
utility to a user of a good or service increases with the number 
of other people using it, either for consumption or production 
 
 187. See Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 INTL J. 
INDUS. ORG. 673, 67374 (1996) (Formally, networks are composed of links 
that connect nodes. It is inherent in the structure of a network that many 
components of a network are required for the provision of a typical service. 
Thus, network components are complementary to each other.). Amitai Aviram 
observes that [o]ften, though not always, realization of network effects re-
quires interconnection between the users. The institution that facilitates in-
terconnection between users of a good or service exhibiting network effects, 
thus enabling the realization of the network benefits, is called a network. 
Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1179, 1182. Tradi-
tional infrastructure resources often act as such a network. 
 188. See generally supra note 187; Nicholas Economides, Network External-
ities, Complementarities, and Invitations to Enter, 12 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 211, 
213 (1996). 
 189. Economides, The Economics of Networks, supra note 187, at 673. 
 190. Nicholas Economides, Competition Policy in Network Industries: An 
Introduction 4 (June 2004) (NET Institute Working Paper #04-23), at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=386626. 
 191. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network 
Effects, J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 96100 (1994); see also Michael L. Katz & Carl 
Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. 
REV. 424, 436 (1985). Economists often define network effects as increasing 
returns to scale in consumption. Economides, Competition Policy in Network 
Industries: An Introduction, supra note 190, at 5. 
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(specifically, to produce functionally compatible goods).192 
Economists differentiate between direct and indirect network 
effects, which arise on so-called actual and virtual networks, 
respectively. Direct network effects arise because the number of 
connections an end-user (consumer) can make increases with 
the size of the network. Standard examples of goods that ex-
hibit direct network effects include telephones and fax ma-
chines. As Mark Lemley and David McGowan have explained: 
[O]wning the only telephone or fax machine in the world would be of 
little benefit because it could not be used to communicate with any-
one. The value of the telephone or fax machine one has already pur-
chased increases with each additional purchaser, so long as all ma-
chines operate on the same standards and the network infrastructure 
is capable of processing all member communications reliably.193 
Basically, the idea is: the more the merrier.194 
Indirect network effects arise under similar conditions ex-
cept that it is not the number of connected end-users that gen-
erates value, but rather it is the increased availability of com-
patible, interoperable, and thus complementary goods.195 
Computer software is the paradigm example.196 Indirect net-
work effects in the software industry may arise from horizontal 
compatibility, such as the compatibility between word process-
ing software (e.g., WordPerfect and Microsoft Word),197 and 
from vertical interoperability, as in the case of operating sys-
 
 192. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 54, at 48894; Economides, Com-
petition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction, supra note 190, at 5 
(A market exhibits network effects (or network externalities) when the value 
to a buyer of an extra unit is higher when more units are sold, everything else 
being equal.). 
 193. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 54, at 48889. 
 194. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 26, at 768. Congestion 
may act as a significant constraint. See Aviram, supra note 187, at 1201 n.71. 
As Aviram notes: 
Congestion is a major limit on efficient scales in rivalrous networks, 
i.e., networks in which, besides the positive network externality, 
there is a negative externality imposed by an additional member of 
the network on the other members. Rivalrous networks include, inter 
alia, cellular phones, broadband Internet and peer-to-peer informa-
tion networks. Nonrivalrous networks, such as languages, PC or video 
cassette standards, etc., do not suffer from congestion; it is no more 
difficult for me to express myself in English merely because many 
millions of additional people also express themselves in English. 
Id.; see also Lemley & McGowan, supra note 54, at 497. 
 195. Economides, Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduc-
tion, supra note 190, at 5. 
 196. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 54, at 491. 
 197. Id. 
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tems and application programs (e.g., Microsoft Windows and 
word processing software).198 Mark Lemley and David 
McGowan explained it as follows: 
[S]oftware may be subject to increasing returns based on positive 
feedback from the market in the form of complementary goods. Soft-
ware developers will write more applications programs for an operat-
ing system with two-thirds of the market than for a system with one-
third because the operating system with the larger share will provide 
the biggest market for applications programs. The availability of a 
broader array of application programs will reinforce the popularity of 
an operating system, which in turn will make investment in applica-
tion programs compatible with that system more desirable than in-
vestment in application programs compatible with less popular sys-
tems. Similarly, firms that adopt relatively popular software will 
likely incur lower costs to train employees and will find it easier to 
hire productive temporary help than will firms with unpopular soft-
ware. Importantly, the strength of network effects will vary depend-
ing on the type of software in question. Network effects will be mate-
rially greater for operating systems software than for applications 
programs, for example.199 
Nicholas Economides has noted that the key reason for 
the appearance of network externalities is the complementarity 
between network components.200 The essential difference be-
tween direct and indirect effects is whether customers are 
identified with components, in which case the effect is di-
rect.201 
Although both types of network effects are prevalent for in-
frastructure resources and may generate significant positive 
externalities, network externalities are not the only type of de-
mand-side externalities generated by infrastructure. The other 
positive externalities generated by infrastructure resources 
may be attributable to the production of public goods and non-
market goods by end-users who obtain access to the infrastruc-
ture resource and use it as an input.202 
There is a critical difference between network effects and 
infrastructure effects203 and the resulting types of external-
 
 198. See Phillip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Prop-
erty Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 56468 (2003). 
 199. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 54, at 49192 (footnotes omitted). 
Lemley and McGowan also discuss other examples of virtual networks. Id. at 
49194. 
 200. Economides, Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduc-
tion, supra note 190, at 6. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See supra Part II.B. 
 203. I hesitate to use this term because it is very difficult to isolate a nar-
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ities. Network effects tend to increase consumers willingness to 
pay for access to the resource.204 By definition, network effects 
arise when users utilities increase with the number of other 
users.205 Economists assume that consumers appreciate the 
value created by network effects and thus are willing to pay 
more for access to the larger network, which may lead to the in-
ternalization of some network externalities.206 Thus, although 
the generally applicable law of demand holds that the willing-
ness to pay for the last unit of a good decreases with the num-
ber of units sold,207 the opposite may hold true for goods that 
exhibit network effects. The presence of network effects may 
cause the demand curve to shift upward as the quantity of 
units accessed (sold) increases, leading to an upward-sloping 
portion of the demand curve.208 
Infrastructure effects do not necessarily increase users 
willingness to pay for access to the infrastructure resource. As 
discussed above, a users willingness to pay for access to the in-
frastructure resource is limited to benefits that can be obtained 
by the user, which depends upon the nature of the outputs pro-
duced, the extent to which such outputs generate positive ex-
ternalities, and the manner in which those externalities are 
distributed. Infrastructure effects resemble indirect network 
effects in the sense that a larger number or a wide variance of 
applications may lead to an increase in consumers valuation of 
the infrastructure or network.209 However, the externalities 
generated by public and social infrastructure are even more in-
direct; they are diffuse, derived from public and nonmarket 
goods, and not simply a function of increased availability of de-
sired end-users or end-uses. Further, the externalities gener-
ated by public and social infrastructure often positively affect 
the utility of nonusers, that is, members of society who are not 
 
row definition. For now, I use infrastructure effects to refer to comedy of the 
commons type situations where open access to a resource generates positive 
externalities through the production of public goods and nonmarket goods. See 
generally Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 26. 
 204. Economides, Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduc-
tion, supra note 190, at 6. 
 205. See id. at 7. 
 206. See id. at 11; Spulber & Yoo, supra note 43, at 926.  
 207. Economides, Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduc-
tion, supra note 190, at 6. 
 208.  Id.; Economides, The Economics of Networks, supra note 187, at 682. 
 209. See Aviram, supra note 187, at 1197. 
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using the infrastructure itself also benefit.210 In a sense, the 
positive externalities generated by the outputs are closely con-
nected to the nature of the outputs and only loosely connected 
to the complementary relationship between the infrastructure 
and the output. This is important because the prospect of infra-
structure suppliers internalizing complementary externalities 
is much less likely,211 making the possibility of a demand-side 
market failure much more likely. 
E. THE CASE FOR INFRASTRUCTURE COMMONS 
At this point, we have developed an economic theory of in-
frastructure that provides a better understanding of societal 
demand for infrastructure resources. The key insights from this 
analysis are (1) that infrastructure resources generate value 
when used as inputs into a wide range of productive processes, 
and (2) that the outputs from these processes are often public 
goods and nonmarket goods that generate positive externalities 
benefiting society as a whole. Managing such resources in an 
openly accessible manner may be socially desirable when doing 
so takes advantage of nonrivalry and facilitates these types of 
downstream activities.212 
The case for commons management must be evaluated 
carefully and contextually. Broad prescriptions are not easily 
derived. To facilitate analysis, I developed an infrastructure ty-
 
 210. I discuss a few examples below. See infra Part III.A (the lake example: 
discussing positive externalities associated with development of family values 
while on a family fishing trip); Part III.B (the basic research example: discuss-
ing positive externalities associated with saving lives); Part IV (the Internet 
example: discussing positive externalities associated with online democratic 
discourse and the derivative benefits realized by members of society that 
never log onto the Internet). 
 211. On the theory of internalizing complementary externalities, see Far-
rell & Weiser, supra note 6, at 89, 10026. See also Douglas Lichtman, Prop-
erty Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 615, 617 
(2000). 
 212. Benkler explores the possibility of managing nonrival and partially 
nonrival inputs in an openly accessible manner. See Benkler, The Commons as 
a Neglected Factor of Information Policy, supra note 5, passim (addressing in-
formation and spectrum). Benkler implicitly recognized that spectrum can be 
managed in a fashion that overcomes potential rivalry and takes advantage of 
nonrivalry. See id. at 21; see also Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless 
Communications, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25, 79 (2002); Benkler, Overcoming 
Agoraphobia, supra note 13, at 36162. More generally, Benkler has explored 
the advantages of commons-based information production. See, e.g., Benkler, 
Coases Penguin, supra note 14; Benkler, From Consumers to Users, supra note 
14. 
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pology to distinguish between commercial, public, and social in-
frastructure, based upon the nature of outputs and the poten-
tial for positive externalities. This section sets forth the eco-
nomic arguments for managing these different types of 
infrastructure in an openly accessible manner. 
For commercial infrastructure, antitrust principles provide 
a sufficient basis for determining whether open access is desir-
able because competitive markets (for both inputs and outputs) 
should work well.213 Downstream producers of private goods 
can accurately manifest demand for infrastructure because con-
sumers realize the full value of the goods (i.e., there are no ex-
ternalities) and are willing to pay for such benefits. Accord-
ingly, from the demand side, there is less reason to believe that 
government intervention into markets is necessary, absent 
anticompetitive behavior. The special case of natural monopo-
lies, in which a single producer supplies commercial infrastruc-
ture, triggers similar considerations over the risk of anticom-
petitive behavior (e.g., leveraging into output markets), pricing 
issues for the input, and fear of less than socially desirable out-
put.214 
For public or social infrastructure, the case for commons 
management becomes stronger for a few reasons. First, output 
producers are less likely to accurately manifest demand due to 
information/appropriation problems. It is difficult for these 
producers to measure the value created by the public or non-
market good outputs; producers of such outputs are not able to 
appropriate the full value because consumers are not willing to 
pay for the full value (due to positive externalities); and such 
producers willingness to pay for access to the input likely will 
be less than the amount that would maximize social welfare. 
For purposes of illustration, let us engage in a brief 
thought experiment. For each infrastructure type, (1) imagine a 
ranking of uses based on consumers willingness to pay, and (2) 
imagine a similar ranking based instead on social value gener-
ated by the use. For commercial infrastructure, we should ex-
pect significant overlap if not identical ordering for the two 
rankings. For public and social infrastructure, the rankings 
likely are quite different because there may be users with low  
 
 
 213. See supra Part II.C.1; see also Farrell & Weiser, supra note 6, passim; 
Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 41, 7484 (2003). 
 214. See supra note 81 (discussing natural monopolies). 
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willingness to pay, but uses that generate great social value 
(much of which is externalized).215 
Social surplus (i.e., the amount by which the social value 
exceeds the private value) may result from a killer app, such 
as e-mail or the World Wide Web, that generates significant 
positive externalities, or from a large number of outputs who 
generate positive externalities on a smaller scale. That is, in 
some situations, there may be a particularly valuable public (or 
nonmarket) good output that generates a large social surplus, 
and in others, there may be a large number of such outputs 
that generate small social surpluses. Both types of situations 
are present in the Internet context. While the killer app phe-
nomenon appears to be well understood, the small-scale but 
widespread production of public and nonmarket goods by end-
users that obtain access to the infrastructure appears to be un-
derappreciated (and undervalued) by most analysts.216 Yet in 
both cases, there may be a strong argument for managing the 
infrastructure resource in an openly accessible manner to fa-
cilitate these productive activities. 
The social costs of restricting access to public or social in-
frastructure can be significant and yet these costs evade obser-
vation or consideration within conventional economic analysis. 
Initially, we may analyze the issue as one of high transaction 
costs and imperfect information. Yet, even with perfect infor-
mation and low or no transaction costs with respect to input 
suppliers and input buyers, input buyers would still not accu-
rately represent social demand because it is the benefits gener-
ated by the relevant outputs that escape observation and ap-
propriation. 
To the extent that infrastructure resources can be opti-
mized for particular applications, which is often the case, there 
is a risk that infrastructure suppliers will favor existing or ex-
pected applications.217 If we rely on the market as the provi-
 
 215. See infra appendix figures 13. 
 216. See infra Parts III, IV (illustrating this dynamic in the context of 
lakes, basic research, and the Internet). 
 217. As we will see in Part IV, the Internet provides a wonderful example 
of how an infrastructure resource can be optimized for different types of appli-
cations. As noted in Part I.B, the degree and terms of access to infrastructure 
can be thought of as definitional characteristics of the resource itself. Does so-
ciety demand an open infrastructure, a closed infrastructure, or something in 
between? Does society demand an infrastructure designed to be neutral to the 
types of end-uses or end-users that may require access? We will explore these 
issues in Part IV in the context of the ongoing debate over network neutrality 
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sional mechanism, there is a related risk that infrastructure 
suppliers will favor applications that generate appropriable 
benefits at the expense of applications that generate positive 
externalities.218 Even putting aside the generation and process-
ing of demand signals, it remains unclear whether markets will 
operate efficiently with respect to the supply of public and so-
cial infrastructure. There may be significant transaction cost 
problems that hamper markets.219 For example, transaction 
costs associated with price setting, licensing, and enforcement 
may increase as the variance of public good and nonmarket 
good outputs increases.220 
 
and the future of the end-to-end architecture of the Internet. 
Still, it is worth noting that other infrastructure resources face similar is-
sues. As I explored in an earlier article, we might ask whether federally 
funded scientific research ought to be directed at commercial ends, noncom-
mercial ends, or no particular ends at all. See Frischmann, Innovation and In-
stitutions, supra note 33, at 395416. I argued that the Bayh-Dole Act repre-
sented a shift in federal policy towards a regime of more restrictive access to 
research results through the issuance of intellectual property rights and at the 
same time, the Act, as well as funding priorities, suggested that Congress was 
seeking to direct scientific research towards commercial ends. See id. at 406
07; see also Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property 
Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 10915 (1999) [herein-
after Rai, Regulating Scientific Research]; Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 289, 291314 (2003); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 67, at 341440; 
Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Sci-
entific Research, in SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
145 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1996); cf. LANDES & POSNER, POLITICAL 
ECONOMY, supra note 68, at 1517 (illustrating through public choice analysis 
how copyright law itself may be biased toward appropriable benefits). 
 218. I discuss this bias below. See infra Part III; see also Benkler, Freedom 
in the Commons, supra note 13, at 125354 (discussing various market bi-
ases). 
 219. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Proprietary Rights and Collective Action: The 
Case of Biotechnology Research with Low Commercial Value, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER THE 
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME (Keith Maskus & Jerome H. 
Reichman eds., forthcoming May 2005) (manuscript at 2) [hereinafter Rai, 
Proprietary Rights and Collective Action], available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=56821; Tassey, supra note 144, at 7172. For an interesting paper on 
transaction costs, see Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 76 (manuscript at 3134) 
(defining transaction costs broadly as the costs of dealing with people and 
arguing that transaction costs serve various positive functions). 
 220. CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 31, at 91 (expressing sympathy with 
the argument that transaction costs may increase as the number of externality 
recipients increases, but suggesting that a more careful analysis of transaction 
costs needs to be undertaken); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. 
& ECON. 1 (1960) (discussing the limitations that increasing numbers places 
upon bargaining). 
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Economists recognize that there is a case for subsidizing 
public and nonmarket goods producers because such goods are 
undersupplied by the market.221 The effectiveness of directly 
subsidizing such producers will vary, however, based on the ca-
pacity for subsidy mechanisms to identify and direct funds to 
worthy recipients. 
In some cases, open access to the infrastructure may be a 
more effectivealbeit bluntmeans for supporting such activi-
ties than targeted subsidies. Open access is not necessarily a 
subsidy,222 but it eliminates the need to rely on either the mar-
ket or the government to pick winners223 or uses worthy of ac-
cess.224 On one hand, the market picks winners according to the 
amount of appropriable value generated by outputs and conse-
quently output producers willingness to pay for access to the 
infrastructure.225 On the other hand, to subsidize production of 
public goods or nonmarket goods downstream, the government 
needs to pick winners by assessing social demand for such 
goods based on the social value they create.226 As illustrated in 
Parts III and IV, the inefficiencies, information problems, and 
transaction costs associated with picking winners under either 
system may justify managing public and social infrastructure 
resources in an openly accessible manner. 
F. PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
Perfect price discrimination could eliminate some of the 
demand-side concerns that I have raised.227 Perfect price dis-
crimination means that output producers who desire access to 
the infrastructure are granted access individually at their re-
 
 221. See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 31, at 15358. 
 222. Depending on the context, open access may operate as the functional 
equivalent of a subsidy. 
 223. I thank Lauren Gelman of the Stanford Law School Center for Inter-
net and Society for focusing my attention on the notion of picking winners. 
 224. Lessig has emphasized that a commons avoids relying on market in-
cumbents to decide the future of innovation. See LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF 
IDEAS, supra note 7, at 14. Benkler has emphasized that a commons avoids 
relying on the market (and property rights holders) more generally. Benkler, 
The Political Economy of Commons, supra note 58, at 7. 
 225. See supra Part II.BD (discussing this dynamic). 
 226. See Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 33, at 38691 
(discussing government assessment of demand for public goods). 
 227. See generally Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, supra 
note 100. 
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spective willingness to pay.228 Perfect price discrimination typi-
cally is not feasible in the real world, however.229 Although im-
perfect price discrimination may be possible in particular con-
texts, the welfare implications of imperfect price discrimination 
are ambiguous and vary considerably by context.230 Accord-
ingly, while issues pertaining to price discrimination may be 
important in specific contexts, they are beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the path to price dis-
crimination may be fraught with peril for society. Pricing prac-
tices in many industries evolve over time.231 When unchecked 
by competition or the government, producers often drive toward 
price discrimination for an intuitively obvious reason
differential pricing allows the producer to extract a greater 
proportion of the surplus than under uniform pricing. This can 
be a good thing for society. For example, the ability to extract a 
greater proportion of the surplus may lead to increased private 
incentives to invest in producing and maintaining infrastruc-
ture. Yet the evolutionary path to price discrimination within 
an infrastructure industry may entail hidden social costs be-
cause of the likelihood that investments, technological design, 
and even the regulatory system can be optimized along the way 
in favor of commercial outputs (and the producers of such out-
puts) that generate observable and appropriable benefits. The 
constant pull of market forces exerts tremendous pressure on 
infrastructure providers and the government to direct invest-
ments to capacity expansion, technological upgrades to the in-
frastructure, and research and development toward commercial 
 
 228. In theory, then, for nonrival infrastructure resources, all output pro-
ducers obtain access, even if their willingness to pay is quite low. For partially 
(non)rival infrastructure resources, the analysis becomes more complicated 
because infrastructure capacity may be constrained. Perfect price discrimina-
tion will not necessarily lead to a socially optimal allocation of access because 
low willingness to pay/high social value uses may be excluded. Further, there 
may be inadequate incentives for infrastructure providers to invest in capacity 
expansion that would be socially optimal but not privately desirable. Of 
course, there may be inadequate incentives under a commons regime as well. 
See infra Part IV. 
 229. Economides, The Economics of Networks, supra note 187, at 682 
(Clearly, the welfare maximizing solution can be implemented through per-
fect price discrimination, but typically such discrimination is unfeasible.). 
 230. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 139, 
149 (1988) (concluding that the welfare effects of imperfect price discrimina-
tiontechnically, second and third degree price discriminationare ambigu-
ous and may be socially suboptimal, depending upon the context). 
 231. See generally Odlyzko, supra note 29. 
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ends.232 The same pressure also has public choice implications 
and may affect the shape of law and regulation.233 
III. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES: ENVIRONMENT AND 
INFORMATION 
To provide a bit more context to what may seem like an ab-
stract economic theory, this Part provides a few descriptive ex-
amples of nontraditional infrastructure resources. I focus on 
environmental and information resources. In doing so, I elabo-
rate on a number of the issues raised in the previous Parts. 
In an important article, A Politics of Intellectual Property: 
Environmentalism for the Net?, James Boyle argued that we 
need a politics, or perhaps a political economy, of intellectual 
property, modeled after the environmental movement.234 
Boyles vision for the information or public domain movement is 
one that parallels and learns from the environmental move-
ment, and is driven by shared normative principles of protect-
ing diffuse social benefits and overcoming collective action 
problems.235 
Scholars have begun borrowing from the environmental 
movement,236 but the borrowing thus far is founded mainly 
upon rhetorical or descriptive metaphors and analogies (e.g., 
commons or information ecosystems). While such an analysis is 
a useful starting point, substantive comparisons of both re-
source problems and solutions are lacking.237 This Article takes 
 
 232. See generally infra Part IV. 
 233. See Nelson, supra note 42, passim. 
 234. James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for 
the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 87 (1997). 
 235. Id. at 10812. 
 236. See id. (intellectual resources); Boyle, Second Enclosure Movement, 
supra note 97 (same); Benkler, Battle over the Institutional Ecosystem, supra 
note 14 (the Internet); Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-Trust Doc-
trine and Principles of Natural Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spec-
trum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 285 (2004) (spectrum). For an in-
teresting mapping between the environment, information, and the Internet, 
see Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of Informa-
tion Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 495 (2004); Symposium, Intellectual Property, 
Sustainable Development, and Endangered Species: Understanding the Dy-
namics of the Information Ecosystems, Michigan State University-Detroit Col-
lege of Law (Mar. 2004), information available at http://www.law.msu.edu/ 
ipclp/conference04/index.html. 
 237. But see Frank A. Pasquale, The Market Effects of an Intellectual 
Commons: Lessons from Environmental Economics for the Law of Copyright 
2838 (Aug. 29, 2004) (Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 12) (apply-
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a step in the direction of analytic comparison by developing a 
substantive economic basis for mapping environmental princi-
ples to information and Internet disciplines. Moreover, it may 
be the case that the truly important borrowing that should take 
place is not from descriptive metaphors, but from normative 
principles. The precautionary principle, intergenerational eq-
uity, and sustainable development, for example, have gained 
traction in the environmental area because of theoretical and 
empirical support. These principles may be more powerful than 
rhetoric if they are analytically justified.238 
The infrastructure theory developed in this Article builds a 
substantive bridge between these disciplines that is grounded 
in economics. Building this bridge provides an important foun-
dation for mapping normative principles across disciplines. 
This Article focuses on the principle of managing fundamental 
resources in an openly accessible manner. 
There are interesting parallels between environmental and 
information infrastructure resources; both are inputs into com-
plex dynamic processesnatural ecosystem processes and cu-
mulative intellectual processes, social and cultural processes, 
learning processesthat have the potential to yield significant 
positive externalities that benefit society as a whole. Sustain-
ing these fundamental resources in an openly accessible man-
ner is critical to realizing this potential. 
A. THE ENVIRONMENT AS INFRASTRUCTURE 
At a very general level, the environment can be viewed as 
natural infrastructure that is an essential input into a wide 
range of human and natural productive processes. The envi-
ronment provides service flows used by people in the produc-
tion of goods and services, such as agricultural output, human 
health, recreation, and more amorphous goods such as quality 
of life.239 It also provides service flows essential to natural 
processes, including a wide variety of ecosystem services such 
 
ing substantive environmental models to information and intellectual property 
issues), at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=584682. 
 238. To be clear, James Boyle was not advocating the borrowing of rhetoric 
alone. He argued more broadly for political and social change and for a recon-
ceptualiztion of the intellectual debate. See Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual 
Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, supra note 234, passim. 
 239. Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins, Environmental Law and Pol-
icy, in THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (forthcoming 2005) (manu-
script at 9), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=552043. 
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as purification of air and water, detoxification and decomposi-
tion of wastes, regulation of climate, regeneration of soil fertil-
ity, and production and maintenance of biodiversity.240 Rich-
ard Revesz and Robert Stavins observe that [t]his effect is 
analogous to the manner in which real physical capital assets 
[such as traditional infrastructure] provide service flows used 
in manufacturing. As with real physical capital, a deterioration 
in the natural environment (as a productive asset) reduces the 
flow of services the environment is capable of providing.241 
While a birds eye view of the environment is appealing, it 
is also helpful to focus more acutely on specific environmental 
resources. Consider, for example, a lake. What makes a lake 
valuable to society? Like a road system, a lake is socially valu-
able primarily because it can be used to produce social benefits. 
Think about the wide variety of uses of many lakes. They can 
be used for fishing, boating, swimming, and for other recrea-
tional activities. Further, lakes can be used as subject matter 
for artwork, for commerce, for transportation of goods, for 
waste processing, as a sink for pollution, or as a drinking water 
source, to name a few. These uses are in addition to the socially 
valuable role the lake plays in supporting a complex ecosys-
tem.242 
A lake satisfies all three criteria in the general definition of 
infrastructure. It may be consumed (non)rivalrously; social de-
mand for access to the lake is driven primarily by downstream 
productive activities; and the range of goods and services pro-
duced downstream varies considerably across the spectrum of 
public, private, and nonmarket goods. Some of these uses are 
purely consumptive and some are competing. For example, too 
much pollution may preclude swimming or ruin a view.243 
Thus, a lake is a partially (non)rival good; it may be consumed 
 
 240. Gretchen C. Daily et al., Ecosystem Services: Benefits Supplied to Hu-
man Societies by Natural Ecosystems, ISSUES ECOLOGY, Spring 1997, at 1, 1, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/watertrain/pdf/issue2.pdf; see A. Myrick 
Freeman III, Economic Valuation: What and Why, in A PRIMER ON 
NONMARKET VALUATION, supra note 43, at 1, 3 (Examples include nutrient 
recycling, organic material decomposition, soil fertility generation and re-
newal, crop and natural vegetation pollination, and biological control of agri-
cultural pests.). 
 241. Revesz & Stavins, supra note 239 (manuscript at 9). 
 242. On the wide variety of socially valuable uses of environmental re-
sources, see generally A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION, supra note 43. 
 243. The fact that there are competing uses of a resource with finite capac-
ity means that we are dealing with scarcity and trade-offs. See Freeman, su-
pra note 240, at 13. 
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nonrivalrously, depending upon how it is managed. Viewed 
from the opposite perspective, downstream uses are potentially 
rivalrous. From either perspective, it is critical to realize that 
rivalrousness is not a preordained fact. As noted in Part II.A, 
whether or not consumption of a partially (non)rival resource is 
rivalrous turns on the capacity of the resource, the number of 
users, the amount of capacity consumed by each use, the rate at 
which capacity is renewed, and thus more generally, on how ac-
cess and consumption of the resource is managed.244 In decid-
ing how to manage a partially (non)rival good and deal with in-
herent scarcity, priorities should vary based on rates of 
potential congestion and potential value produced by down-
stream uses. 
What is the social value of a lake? Can we measure its 
value? It is difficult to estimate the social value of a lake, 
mainly because of the wide variety of downstream uses that 
generate public and nonmarket goods.245 Economists have de-
veloped various methods to estimate the value of environ-
mental resources, such as stated preference methods and re-
vealed preference methods.246 These methods have advanced 
significantly in the past few decades,247 and are used increas-
ingly in policy and resource management settings.248 These 
methods, however, are, at best, useful but incomplete proxies 
for measuring the social value of environmental resources.249 
 
 244. See supra Part II.A. 
 245. See generally A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION, supra note 43. As 
discussed at length by Rose, courts have recognized both the existence of mul-
tiple uses of waterways and bodies of waters (e.g., recreation, commercial 
travel, fishing, and transportation) and the social benefits not captured or 
well-represented in the marketplace derived from some of these uses. See 
Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 26, at 72350. She argues that 
doctrines requiring open access to certain resources may be understood as re-
sponsive to a comedy of the commons situation, where increased access leads 
to increased social returns (i.e., scale returns). See id. at 723. 
 246. See A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION, supra note 43. Stated pref-
erence methods, such as contingent valuation, rely on statements made by in-
dividuals in response to questions about various hypothetical scenarios. Id. at 
21, chs. 47. Revealed preference methods rely on observations of how people 
act in actual scenarios. Id. at 21, chs. 811. See also Revesz & Stavins, supra 
note 239 (manuscript at 1220) (providing an accessible account of these and 
other methods). 
 247. See generally A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION, supra note 43. 
 248. See Daniel W. McCollum, Nonmarket Valuation in Action, in A 
PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION, supra note 43, at 483. 
 249. See Richard C. Bishop, Where to from Here?, in A PRIMER ON 
NONMARKET VALUATION, supra note 43, at 537, 539 ([T]rue economic values 
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As James Salzman and J.B. Ruhl have observed, environ-
mental law relies almost entirely on proxy measures.250 
The partially (non)rival nature of the lake itself is only 
part of the puzzle. The frequently told tragedy of the com-
mons story focuses our attention on the dilemma of uncon-
strained consumption and the risk that congestion (via rival-
rous consumption) will rise to a level that the resource cannot 
sustain.251 This is a very important demand-side dilemma.252 
Yet a myopic focus on the potential for negative externalities 
ignores the potential for positive externalities. 
Classifying a lake as infrastructure frames the resource 
problem traditionally encountered with respect to lakes in a 
broader fashion. Lakes are products of nature, and thus we 
need not worry about producing lakes. Lakes, however, present 
a consumption problem because they may be consumed in an 
unsustainable manner. Accordingly, our goal is to figure out 
how to manage the resource in a manner that maximizes social 
welfare. In its most fundamental form, the environmental 
management problem faced by society is to choose the mix of 
environmental and resource service flows that is consistent 
with the highest possible level of human well-being, that is, the 
mix with the highest aggregate value to people.253 As Revesz 
and Stavins remind us, we live in a world of finite resources 
and we must therefore consider trade-offs between social in-
vestments: 
 
are unobservable.); Revesz & Stavins, supra note 239 (manuscript at 12) 
(These and other related methods attempt to infer [individuals] willingness 
to trade off other goods (or monetary amounts) for environmental services.); 
see also id. (manuscript at 9) ([T]he benefits of environmental policy are de-
fined as the collection of individuals willingness to pay (WTP) for the reduc-
tion or prevention of environmental damages or individuals willingness to ac-
cept (WTA) compensation to tolerate such environmental damages.). 
 250. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of 
Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 623 (2000). 
 251. See generally Hardin, supra note 72. 
 252. I refer to congestion as a demand-side dilemma because it arises as a 
result of consumption decisions. It is interesting to compare network effects 
and congestion effects. Network effects arise from the manner in which a 
users utility function responds positively to an increase in the number of 
other users. Congestion effects arise from the manner in which a users utility 
function responds negatively to an increase in the number of other users. In a 
sense, both types of effects are related to the number of consumption opportu-
nities available. For network effects, the number of opportunities increases 
with the number of users; for congestion effects, the number of opportunities 
decreases with the number of users because of depletion. 
 253. Freeman, supra note 240, at 3. 
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Protecting the environment usually involves active employment of 
capital, labor, and other scarce resources. Using these resources to 
protect the environment means they are not available to be used for 
other purposes. Hence, the economic concept of the value or benefit of 
environmental goods and services is couched in terms of societys will-
ingness to make trade-offs between competing uses of limited re-
sources, and in terms of aggregating over individuals willingness to 
make these trade-offs.254 
Recognizing that lakes create social value primarily when 
used as inputs into the production of a wide variety of outputs 
suggests that the nature of those outputs is important when 
evaluating these trade-offs. To the extent that public goods and 
nonmarket goods constitute a significant portion of the poten-
tial outputs, we should recognize that the potential for positive 
externalities generated by such activities may be realized only 
if the producers of such outputs obtain access to the resource.255 
Lakes are resources that have the potential to create nega-
tive and positive demand-side externalities. Negative external-
ities may arise in consumption due to congestion, and positive 
externalities may arise in consumption due to productive use of 
the lakes to create public goods and nonmarket goods. As the 
capacity of lakes is finite and cannot be expanded (like some 
other partially (non)rival resources that also present a similar 
set of trade-offs), these competing potentialities give rise to a 
trade-off between open and restricted access to the resource 
that must be reconciled.256 How should this trade-off be recon-
 
 254. Revesz & Stavins, supra note 239 (manuscript at 9). 
 255. See Freeman, supra note 240, at 3 (recognizing that many service 
flows are not properly regulated by markets because of their public goods 
characteristics of nonexcludability and nondepletability, externalities, and 
other factors). 
 256. Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 122, at 1314 (observing that 
parks are impure public goods that admit of nonrivalrous uses only to a cer-
tain point, and that once conservation is considered to be a use (or anti-use) 
from which some will derive value, a conflict between incompatible uses arises 
that is very different from the excessive use problem ordinarily considered to 
be a tragedy of the commons). Bell and Parchomovsky do not explore why con-
servation may be a socially valuable use, except to say that it does not deplete 
the resource and thus averts the tragedy of the commons. See id. at 14. Still, 
conservation may be viewed as a use that (1) preserves unimpeded access to 
the resource for nonconsumptive uses that do not deplete the resource (i.e., 
other compatible uses), and/or (2) preserves the resource for future genera-
tions. Each of these perspectives suggests that conservation would be a pro-
ductive use that has the potential to generate positive externalities for other 
users. Cf. id. at 6 n.23 (suggesting that anticommons regimes used to sustain 
parks and open space yield positive externalities for adjacent private property 
owners). 
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ciled? Canor shouldan infrastructure commons be sus-
tained in this context? 
The dominant regulatory approach in the environmental 
area targets particular consumptive uses of an environmental 
resource.257 This approach limits consumption to sustainable 
levels (at least in theory with the appropriate information), 
while simultaneously preserving an open access/commons re-
gime for other uses. With respect to our hypothetical lake, di-
rect government regulation may target polluting uses of the 
lake that rivalrously consume its ability to process waste while 
leaving the lake openly accessible for recreational and other 
community uses. This does not mean that no pollution is al-
lowed. Rather, it means that various types of pollution are 
regulated in a manner that sustains access to the resource for 
other nonpolluting uses.258 
The same result likely would not occur if we give an exclu-
sive property right in the lake to a private actor and rely on the 
market mechanism to allocate access to the lake for various us-
ers.259 Suppose the owner decides to exclude recreational users 
so as to permit a higher degree of pollution in the lake (perhaps 
within the range that the lake can tolerate but beyond the 
range permissible to humans and fish). It is tempting to pre-
sume that the owner has internalized all of the costs and bene-
fits associated with his or her decisions, and thus conclude that 
the decision maximizes social welfare.260 Such reasoning, how-
ever, is faulty. The lost benefits to recreational users may ex-
 
 257. Keep in mind that I am not focusing on the institutional means by 
which consumptive uses are regulated and thus am not distinguishing be-
tween command-and-control versus market-based instruments. On such in-
struments, see Revesz & Stavins, supra note 239 (manuscript at 3155); David 
M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law: Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, Emissions Trading, and Priority-Setting, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 501, 50207 (2004). 
 258. I do not mean to suggest that lakes are open access resources for eve-
rything except pollution. To the contrary, fishing, boating, and swimming in 
some lakes may be regulated to prevent congestion and for health and safety 
reasons. The example is simply intended to illustrate how regulation can be 
narrowly targeted to curb a particular consumptive, potentially rivalrous use 
in order to sustain a commons for other uses. 
 259. The prospect of reaching an optimal outcome through bargaining 
among potential users is doubtful because we live in a world of imperfect in-
formation and high transaction costs. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 
supra note 220, at 1519. 
 260. See generally Demsetz, supra note 31, at 34849 (A primary function 
of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internaliza-
tion of externalities.). 
FRISCHMANN.3FMT 04/13/2005 04:50:51 PM 
2005] AN ECONOMIC THEORY 987 
 
ceed the marginal benefits of additional pollution, but the latter 
may be more easily appropriated than the former. The property 
owner might not consider the wide variety of downstream uses 
of a lake because valuing them and appropriating benefits may 
be too difficult. 
To get a basic idea of why this might be so, imagine that 
you owned one of the Great Lakes. Further, imagine the diffi-
culty in managing access to the lake, even assuming the costs 
of exclusion are low.261 In terms of appropriating maximum 
benefits (so as to maximize your own welfare, a key reason for 
granting a property right), it should not be surprising that it 
would be much easier and more profitable to deal with a 
smaller number of large-scale commercial users rather than a 
much larger number of small-scale commercial and noncom-
mercial users.262 
Difficulties in appropriation may be a function of transac-
tion costs associated with dealing with a wide variety of differ-
ent types of users.263 Such costs may relate to information ac-
quisition and exchange,264 negotiation and enforcement of 
commitments,265 demand-side coordination and collective action 
problems,266 and other related costs. 
More importantly, appropriation difficulties may result be-
cause the downstream users themselves generate positive ex-
ternalities that they do not internalize. For example, when I 
take my family to the lake for a fishing trip, society as a whole 
 
 261. The underlying information problems a single property owner seeking 
to maximize his or her own welfare faces are similar to those a manager of a 
public resource faces. It is difficult to even assess the value of various down-
stream uses of a lake and thus to make decisions about how the resource 
should be managed. Cf. Thomas C. Brown & George L. Peterson, Multiple 
Good Valuation, in A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION, supra note 43, at 
221, 22122 (noting the need to measure and compare the value of multiple 
downstream goods). 
 262. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 122, at 2728 (discussing the 
impact of group size and skewed distribution of benefits on conservation ef-
forts). Bell and Parchomovsky offer an innovative approach to sustaining 
commons: take advantage of the transaction costs associated with dealing with 
multiple parties by granting antiproperty rights to property owners proxi-
mate to the commons. See id. at 3137. 
 263. See Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 76 (manuscript at 3133). 
 264. See id. at 34; Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Informa-
tion Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 14055 (2004). 
 265. See Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 76 (manuscript at 2629). 
 266. See Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, supra note 31, at 
35759. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d 
ed. 1971) (offering a seminal analysis of collective action problems). 
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accrues external benefits that we (my family) do not capture or 
necessarily even appreciate. We develop connections with na-
ture and each other, create long-lasting memories, and rein-
force cultural and social values that resonate, at least histori-
cally, with our society. Sustaining access to the lake for 
recreational fishing therefore benefits participants directly and 
nonparticipants (third parties) indirectly. Consider also a pris-
tine view. While appreciation of the view of Lake Michigan 
yields direct consumptive benefits that people certainly appre-
ciate and value,267 it also acts as an input into cultural and so-
cial processes that yield, among other things, artwork, litera-
ture, memories, and culture.268 
Difficulties in appropriation also may arise in situations 
where there are simply no human agents engaged in production 
downstream. For example, socially valuable outputs may be 
products of natural rather than human processes.269 As noted 
above, many environmental resources, including lakes, support 
a wide range of socially valuable ecosystem services. These ser-
vices are not produced by human agents, and, the social bene-
fits of such services are diffuse, indirect, and difficult to ob-
serve, much less appropriate.270 
The market mechanism exhibits a bias for outputs that 
generate observable and appropriable benefits at the expense of 
 
 267. Given the market value of property adjoining the lake, it is clear that 
these property owners realize and to some extent appropriate substantial 
benefits from the view. Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 122, at 2023 
(describing the proximate property principle which explains the high value of 
land located near commons). 
 268. At a macro level, the identities of communities surrounding the lake, 
including the City of Chicago itself, are intimately tied to a particular concep-
tion of the lakethat of a fundamental, natural resource accessible for com-
munity use. 
 269. Freeman, supra note 240, at 23 (describing indirect environmental 
services that support biological and ecological production processes that yield 
value to people). 
 270. As James Salzman and J.B. Ruhl explain with respect to wetlands: 
The social value of the habitat is absent from the transaction. The 
ecosystem services provided by the wetlandspositive externalities 
such as water purification, groundwater recharge, and flood control
are largely ignored. Opinions may differ over the value of a wetlands 
scenic vista, but they are in universal accord over the contributions of 
clean water and flood control to social welfare. 
Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 250, at 612; cf. Esty, supra note 264, at 16263 
(discussing why it is important to  see many environmental problems more 
clearly). 
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outputs that generate positive externalities.271 This is not sur-
prising because the whole point of relying on property rights 
and the market is to enable private appropriation and discour-
age externalities.272 The problem with relying on the market is 
that potential positive externalities may remain unrealized if 
they cannot be easily valued and appropriated by those that 
produce them, even though society as a whole may be better off 
if those potential externalities were actually produced. 
The market mechanism exhibits other biases as well.273 
For instance, because private discount rates tend to be higher 
than social discount rates, markets tend to be biased toward 
the short term.274 Among other things, the divergence between 
private and social discount rates can lead to current overcon-
sumption of environmental resources without due regard to the 
costs for future generations. Similarly, such divergence may 
lead to overinvestment in applied research and commensurate 
underinvestment in basic research, and technological optimiza-
tion of the Internet in favor of existing or reasonably foresee-
able applications to the potential detriment of yet-to-be-
developed applications.275 Further, incumbent market actors 
may act strategically to preserve their market positions or to 
control the direction of innovation.276 These biases introduce 
further dynamic complications associated with path depend-
ence and the costs of changing directions once a path has been 
chosen.277 
 
 
 271. In essence, the market picks winners based on the amount of appro-
priable value generated by an output. This does not mean that full appropria-
tion of benefits is necessary for a market to function. See Lemley, Property, In-
tellectual Property, and Free Riding, supra note 34 (manuscript at 33) 
([I]ntellectual property law is justified only in ensuring that creators are able 
to charge a sufficiently high price to ensure a profit sufficient to recoup their 
fixed expenses. Sufficient incentive, as Larry Lessig reminds us, is something 
less than perfect control. (citing Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual Property and 
Code, 11 ST. JOHNS J. LEGAL COMMENT. 635, 638 (1996))). 
 272. See, e.g., Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, supra note 31, 
at 34849; Lichtman, supra note 211, at 61517. 
 273. See Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 33, at 37475 
(discussing various types of market biases in the context of innovative process 
market failure). 
 274. See id. 
 275. See infra Parts III.B, IV. 
 276. See LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 3233; see also 
Benkler, Freedom in the Commons, supra note 13, at 127275 (discussing 
various market biases). 
 277. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 54, 59798. 
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This example illustrates how an environmental resource 
can be viewed as infrastructure. It is hard to classify all lakes 
as a particular type of infrastructure because the range of pro-
ductive activities supported by the resource will vary across dif-
ferent lakes.278 That being said, most lakes play an integral 
role in supporting natural ecosystems that generate nonmarket 
goods, and thus may constitute social infrastructure. Equally 
important, this example illustrates that for consumption prob-
lems, such as pollution of an environmental resource, regula-
tion may be targeted to curb the particular activities that can 
lead to a tragedy without banning them altogether. Instead, by 
seeking to limit these activities to sustainable levels, govern-
ment regulation can preserve the open-access nature of the 
commons for other activities.279 
Viewing a lake as infrastructure allows us to appreciate 
the value of the resource as part of a complex resource system. 
Like traditional infrastructure, a lake is a foundational re-
source upon which many different productive activities depend. 
This view also allows us to perceive societys relationship with 
traditional infrastructure resources in an alternative fashion. 
Specifically, we might say that, like a lake, traditional infra-
structure resources are an integral part of our environment. 
While not a product of nature, society interacts with and de-
rives value from traditional infrastructure in much the same 
fashion as it does with a lake. 
B. INTELLECTUAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Applying infrastructure theory to information generally de-
lineates a class of intellectual resources that creates benefits 
for society primarily through the facilitation of downstream 
productive activity. Of course, not all information is infrastruc-
ture. 
Many intellectual resources clearly do not fall within the 
scope of the general definition of infrastructure. Two examples 
 
 278. Compare, for example, Lake Michigan, one of the Great Lakes, with 
Keuka Lake, one of the small Finger Lakes in upstate New York. 
 279. Of course, government regulation may not be the only means for strik-
ing such a balance between open and restricted access. Community norms, 
common property systems, and antiproperty easements also may be designed 
to accomplish a similar outcome. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER 
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE passim (1999); Smith, supra note 59, at 6167; Heverly, 
supra note 59, at 117883; see also Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 122, at 
1937 (adding the concept of antiproperty easements to the list of institutions 
which can manage access to resources). 
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are worth discussing briefly. First, consider a standard nail. 
While a nail satisfies the latter two prongs of the definition, it 
fails to satisfy the first prong because nails are rivalrously con-
sumed and cannot be managed in a way that renders consump-
tion nonrivalrous. What about the idea of a nail? Ideas are non-
rival goods, and thus it would seem that the idea of a nail must 
be infrastructure. The idea of a nail is a nonrival input into the 
production of a single outputa tangible nail, which happens 
to be an input into a wide range of outputs. This example high-
lights a difficulty with my definition. It is hard to draw lines 
where there is a chain of cumulative inputs (idea of a 
nail→nail→range of outputs).280 Even if the idea of a nail is 
deemed infrastructure, however, the fact that the output is a 
private good suggests that it would be classified as commercial 
infrastructure. This means that the case for open access is 
quite weak because competitive output markets should work 
fine from the demand side.281 
Second, imagine that scientists discover the cure for a par-
ticular disease. While this resource is a nonrival input and thus 
satisfies the first two prongs of the infrastructure definition, 
the range of outputs is relatively narrow (curing the particular 
disease and perhaps some related research avenues). While 
there may be a strong case for open access to such discoveries 
on social welfare grounds, I would not classify the discovery as 
infrastructure. 
Focusing on information that satisfies all three criteria for 
infrastructure helps to distinguish different types of informa-
tion based on the manner in which they create social value. 
This class of resources deserves careful attention because the 
benefits of open access (costs of restricted access) may be sub-
stantially higher than for information that is not infrastruc-
ture. We know that the production of all types of intellectual 
resources involves cumulative processes. We know that some 
intellectual resources are more generic and basic, and more 
fundamental to these cumulative processes. Finally, we know 
that in the great balancing act we call intellectual property 
law, not all intellectual resources are or should be treated the 
same. Yet, despite our knowledge of these facts, our struggle 
 
 280. This example also reminds us of the important economic differences 
between nonrival and rival goods and the welfare implications of restricting 
access to such goods. See supra Part II.A (comparing ideas and apples). 
 281. See supra Part II.D. I thank F. Scott Kieff for using this example to 
poke holes in my theory. 
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over striking the appropriate balance does not adequately ac-
count for the economic differences between intellectual re-
sources.282 
Consider, for example, basic research.283 What makes basic 
research valuable to society? Again, like a road system (and a 
lake), basic scientific research is socially valuable primarily be-
cause of what it facilitates downstreamhow it can be used to 
produce further research.284 It satisfies all three criteria in the 
 
 282. See Mike Carroll, Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights (2004) (work-
ing paper, on file with author); Burk & Lemley, supra note 97, at 157778. 
 283. There are many other examples to consider. Take, for example, data-
bases. Is a database infrastructure? Not alwaysit depends on the contents of 
the database and the distribution of potential uses. A database of used car 
values is not infrastructure because the range of uses is quite narrow while 
the Human Genome database is infrastructure because the range of uses is 
quite wide. We might consider peer-to-peer software, which Raymond Ku has 
described as infrastructure and analogized to the historic Charles River Bridge 
decision. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Copyright, the Constitution & Progress 5 
(June 2004) (Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 
04-8) (discussing Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the 
Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837), at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract 
=556642. Computer operating system software is a useful example because it 
is ubiquitous. An operating system, such as Microsoft Windows or Linux, is a 
nonrival input into wide variety of applications. The operating system and ap-
plications are complementary products, and the operating system and many 
applications exhibit networks effects. Like basic research, the operating sys-
tem creates value primarily as an input into applications running on end-
users computersor in common parlance, as a platform upon which applica-
tions may run. See Bruce Abramson, Promoting Innovation in the Software 
Industry: A First Principles Approach to Intellectual Property Reform, 7 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 75, 11316 (2002) (explaining platform-application relation-
ship). Because the applications themselves are public goodsin the technical 
sense discussed in Part II.A, the operating system qualifies as a public infra-
structure. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that operating systems 
should be managed in an open manner, but it does suggest that there may be 
social benefits to doing so because of the potential for positive externalities 
generated by innovative applications. While the development of the Linux op-
erating system and its open source licensing agreement seems to have been 
driven by a need to free application developers from the control of Microsoft, it 
also reflects an implicit understanding of the societal benefits derived from 
open infrastructure. See Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public 
Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 193195 (2004). I leave a more detailed in-
quiry into various intellectual infrastructure resources for another paper. 
Brett M. Frischmann, Intellectual Infrastructure (2005) (working paper, on 
file with author) [hereinafter Frischmann, Intellectual Infrastructure]. 
 284. In discussing the value of basic research, I focus primarily on its in-
strumental value. One might ask, as a keen reviewer did, whether there also 
might be some intrinsic value in knowledge for its own sake. I believe there 
might be, and the same should be said for lakes as well. We should unpack 
what value in knowledge for its own sake means exactly. Knowledge is a 
human phenomenon, as is valuing knowledge; the value lies somewhere in 
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general definition of infrastructure and should be classified as 
public infrastructure: It is nonrival; it creates benefits or value 
primarily because of the downstream uses, which generally in-
volve the production of additional public goods (e.g., informa-
tion, knowledge, and learning); and, by definition, there is wide 
variation in downstream uses.285 It is difficult to estimate the 
social value of basic research, primarily because of the wide va-
riety of downstream uses that generate public goods and uncer-
tainty with respect to future directions that the cumulative 
productive processes may go.286 Nonetheless, as with many tra-
ditional infrastructures, it is well recognized that basic re-
search contributes significantly to economic growth and social 
welfare.287 
The nonrival nature of basic research itself is only part of 
the puzzle, albeit an important one. As noted in the previous 
section, nonrival resources have infinite capacity and thus do 
 
human utility functions, and it certainly need not be instrumental. Perhaps 
we can think of the noninstrumental, intrinsic value as value derived from 
consumption rather than productive use. Basic research may be consumed di-
rectly by humans in the sense that it generates immediate benefits to those 
that obtain the knowledge; the same can be said for many infrastructure re-
sources because such resources are not exclusively inputs and may generate 
value via consumption. Nonetheless, as noted above, the second criterion for 
infrastructure suggests that the bulk of the value derived from the resource is 
from productive use of the resource. See supra Part II.B. 
 285. See Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 33, at 36566 
(arguing that the difference between basic and applied research is the vari-
ance of anticipated applications or uses). But cf. WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 30506 (2003) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE] 
(Basic research is distinguished from applied research mainly by lacking im-
mediate commercial applications.). I agree with Landes and Posner that the 
distinction between basic and applied research depends upon the certainty 
with which particular applications are known. For Landes and Posner, im-
mediate refers to applications that already exist or are immediately foresee-
able. See id. at 306. I am not sure why applied research needs to be commer-
cial, however. I also am curious as to why Landes and Posner believe basic 
research ceases to be basic upon the discovery of a single commercial applica-
tion. See id. at 30607. While such a development may render the research re-
sult patentable because a patent on the research will pass the test of utility, 
id. at 306, it does not alter the basic or generic character of the research. Fur-
thermore, as Landes and Posner seem to suggest, granting a patent in this 
situation may be troublesome from a social perspective precisely because it 
may stifle other follow-on areas of research. See id. 
 286. See supra note 285. 
 287. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 285, 
at 30508; Rai, Regulating Scientific Research, supra note 217; Reichman & 
Uhlir, supra note 67. 
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not face the consumption problem.288 Information resources 
face a well-known supply-side problem; the inability to cheaply 
exclude competitors and nonpaying consumers (free riders) pre-
sents a risk to investors perceived ex ante (prior to production 
of the good), which could lead to undersupply.289 The frequently 
told free-rider story focuses our attention on the dilemma of 
unconstrained free riding and the risk of undersupply by the 
market. This is a very important supply-side dilemma. Yet, as 
discussed in the previous section, a myopic focus on free riding 
places too much emphasis on market-driven supply and on ex-
cludability as the solution.290 Ultimately, the complicated eco-
nomic puzzle involves balancing social benefits of granting ac-
cess (i.e., consumptive and productive use) and social benefits 
of restricting access (i.e., to overcome free riding and create in-
centives for private investment in production and dissemina-
tion). This is the basic trade-off reflected in the intellectual 
property literature and discussed in the previous section.291 
 
 288. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copy-
right, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 485 (2003); Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic 
Creators, supra note 64, at 90; R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants To Be Free: 
Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 
1001 (2003). Posner and Landes point to an interesting demand-side conges-
tion externality in the intellectual property context: trademark and right-of-
publicity cases [are] both examples of intellectual property the value of which 
can be diminished by consumption. Landes & Posner, supra, at 486. In a 
sense, these cases involve a situation that is akin to a network externality, ex-
cept that it involves costs. 
 289. See supra Part II.B. 
 290. See supra Part II.A; see also Brett M. Frischmann, Commercializing 
University Research Systems in Economic Perspective: A View from the De-
mand Side, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (JAI Press Series: Advances in the Study of En-
trepreneurship, Innovation & Economic Growth, vol. 16 (forthcoming 2005)) 
(manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Frischmann, Commercializing 
University Research Systems]. 
 291. See supra Part II.A. There are other trade-offs between social benefits 
and costs that are reflected in intellectual property law. For example, it is well 
established that increasing disclosure of information that would remain secret 
in the absence of patents is a critical function of patent law. See Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) ([P]atent 
rights are given in exchange for disclosing the invention to the public.); W.L. 
Gore & Assoc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Early 
public disclosure is a linchpin of the patent system.); Katherine J. Strand-
burg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 
2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 81; Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free 
Riding, supra note 34 (manuscript at 2223). This trade-off is a supply-side 
issue that derives first from the particular provisional mechanism (e.g., the 
market, the government, or some other alternative) and second from a choice 
of institution (e.g., trade secret, patent). In the absence of intellectual prop-
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When we focus on basic research, however, it is important 
to recognize that the balance tilts heavily toward access.292 As 
with lakes, recognizing that basic research behaves economi-
cally as infrastructurein the sense that it creates social value 
primarily when used as an input into the production of a wide 
variety of public good outputssuggests that the social costs of 
restricting access to the resource can be significant and yet 
evade observation or consideration within conventional eco-
nomic transactions. Others have noted that granting exclusive 
property rights (e.g., patents) over basic research293 stifles some 
downstream research, which can impose substantial social 
costs.294 This does not mean that no progress will be made. 
Some avenues of follow-on research may proceed, for example, 
by initial researchers or others to whom licenses are granted. 
The point is that basic research may be encumbered with ex-
cessive licensing fees and transaction costs.295 
Granting property rights over basic research links man-
agement of research results with commercialization and thus 
introduces the market mechanisms inherent bias for outputs 
that generate observable (or reasonably foreseeable) and ap-
propriable returns.296 Thus, in making decisions regarding ac-
 
ertyand even in the presence of intellectual propertysecrecy is a means of 
exclusion that private producers may utilize to overcome free-riding risks. See 
JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 4250 (1996). Secrecy signifi-
cantly constrains the potential social benefits of nonrivalry because access is 
severely limited. Comparatively speaking, then, patents open up access to in-
formation for consumption and productive use, although the range of produc-
tive uses is significantly limited by the patent. As described below, in certain 
respects, intellectual property can be understood as an institution designed to 
sustain the information commons. How well the system is designed in another 
question. 
 292. See TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY: AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 20, at 8 n.3. 
 293. While a significant amount of basic research is not patentable, it ap-
pears that more and more fruits of basic research [can] be patented, LANDES 
& POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 285, at 308. In some areas, at 
least, both the existence and the prospect of patents have had a significant ef-
fect on the research process. See id. at 30508. 
 294. See id.; Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, supra note 
97, at 32; Merges & Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, supra 
note 119, at 86980. As Robert Merges and Richard Nelson explain, some pri-
vate firms recognize the value of open access to basic research and have un-
dertaken efforts to place research results in the public domain. Id. 
 295. See Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, supra note 283, 
at 188. 
 296. Not only does this bias affect management of existing research results, 
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cess, owners face the same set of problems that our hypotheti-
cal owner of a lake faces (e.g., transaction costs and uncertainty 
regarding the prospect of appropriable returns). While down-
stream uses are not rivalrous in the technical sense (i.e., there 
is no risk of congestion because basic research is a nonrival in-
put), downstream users may compete with each other to de-
velop and commercialize the research, and thus may demand 
exclusive licenses. This tension was a major premise behind the 
Bayh-Dole Act and related legislation.297 
This competitive dynamic may introduce rivalry in con-
sumption and drive owners to favor uses reasonably expected to 
generate appropriable returns at the expense of uses more 
likely to generate positive externalities.298 This may retard pro-
gress in a manner that has substantial social opportunity costs 
in the sense that socially valuable research paths lie fallow and 
unexplored. In an earlier article, I argued that this constitutes 
a special type of market failure, which I named innovative 
process market failure, because the failure to pursue potential 
avenues of research involves hidden costs associated with the 
cumulative, nonlinear nature of the innovative process.299 
 
but it also has dynamic effects on the research process because the prospect of 
obtaining a patent may skew researchers incentives and basic scientific 
norms. See Rai, Regulating Scientific Research, supra note 217, at 10913; 
Frischmann, Commercializing Universtiy Research Systems, supra note 290; 
see also SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 12731 (2004) 
[hereinafter SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES]. Scotchmer explains: 
[I]t is not easy to compensate the developers of basic technologies. 
Commercial value generally resides in products that are developed 
later. If the founders earn some profit, it is only because they can de-
mand licensing fees from later developers. But this requires that later 
products infringe their patents. Basic scientific knowledge . . . is gen-
erally not patentable, in recognition of the fact that the benefits 
would be hard to appropriate. 
Id. at 129. One reason that basic research should be supported by public spon-
sors rather than private investors is that the benefits of basic research are 
hard to appropriate by private parties. Id. at 13132. To the extent that the 
public goods applications are sufficiently commercializable (applied and com-
mercial), there is an argument that markets should work quite well in mani-
festing demand for the infrastructure and that the major impediments to 
maximizing social welfare originate on the supply-side. See generally id. at 
12759. 
 297. See infra notes 30506 and accompanying text. 
 298. Cf. Rai, Proprietary Rights and Collective Action, supra note 219 
(manuscript at 8) ([I]n university contexts, where the immediately foresee-
able payoffscommercial or academicfrom research is often not high, re-
searchers are unlikely to be willing or able to incur high transaction costs in 
order to gain access to upstream research.). 
 299. Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 33, at 374; id. at 
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Consider the case of research that has uncertain or low 
commercial value, which, according Arti Rai, deserves particu-
lar attention: 
[I]n the context of research that is demonstrably of low commercial 
value, there is evidence that upstream proprietary rights have im-
peded downstream research. Consider the case of research into a ma-
laria vaccine. The disease burden associated with malaria is very sig-
nificant, on the order of over one million deaths a year. The social 
value of a malaria vaccine would therefore be quite high. Nonetheless, 
because the primary market for such a vaccine would be in the devel-
oping world, such research is of low commercial value. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . In the area of agricultural biotechnology, there is perhaps even 
more compelling evidence that research projects of low commercial 
value have been significantly delayed, or have not gone forward at all, 
because of upstream patent rights. Specifically, restricted access to 
patented technologies has been identified as a significant barrier to 
development of subsistence crops relevant to the developing world.300 
More generally, the social costs associated with the market 
mechanisms inherent bias for outputs that generate observable 
and appropriable returns may be significant. These costs evade 
observation because basic research is often an input into and 
output from cumulative processes involving multiple inputs, 
multiple outputs, multiple actors, and multiple research ave-
nues heading in different directions. These cumulative proc-
esses also involve nonlinear progression, feedback loops, spill-
overs, and numerous other complications that frustrate 
modelers and defy simplification.301 All of these characteristics 
contribute to information and transaction cost problems that 
make relying on property-based, market-driven management of 
basic research results almost outrageous, much like the seem- 
 
 
376 (The social costs of [innovative process market failure] are an interesting 
brand of opportunity costs, ranging from slowed technological development 
within an industry to significant macroeconomic effects on competitiveness in 
emerging industries.). 
 300. Rai, Proprietary Rights and Collective Action, supra note 219 (manu-
script at 811). Rai provides a number of specific examples where upstream 
patents have impeded downstream progress of research with low commercial 
value. See id. Rai also considers whether collective action may alleviate the 
problem. See id. 
 301. Consideration of these characteristics is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. There is, however, substantial literature in this area. See, e.g., Frisch-
mann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 33; Rai, Regulating Scientific 
Research, supra note 217, at 124; SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES, 
supra note 296; Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, supra note 
97. 
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ingly ridiculous hypothetical of granting ownership of Lake 
Michigan to an individual property owner.302 
These are strong reasons to believe that we ought not rely 
solely on property rights and the market mechanism to allocate 
access to information in all cases. In some cases, we need to 
take advantage of informations nonrival character and encour-
age widespread productive use downstream. But how do we 
overcome the production problem when we also need to strike a 
balance between access and control to encourage private in-
vestment? 
There is a continuum of hybrid solutionssuch as grants, 
procurement, subsidies, regulation, property rights, intellectual 
property rights, contracts, tax incentives, technology, and social 
normsthat respond implicitly to the fact that intellectual re-
sources are infrastructure. Moreover, the package of institu-
tional solutions varies according to the type of infrastructure. 
For basic research, one prevalent way to avoid the need to 
balance access and incentives is reliance on government fund-
ing. According to William Landes and Richard Posner: 
An enormous amount of basic research is produced every year in the 
United States and other advanced countries without benefit of pat-
entability. . . . In 1999 half of all basic research in the United States 
was funded by the federal government, and of the balance 29 percent 
 
 302. Edmund Kitchs prospect theory of patents simply does not work 
well for basic research. His theory is premised on two notions: (1) that the 
property owner will minimize social waste associated with duplicative efforts; 
and (2) that the property owner will best commercialize and license an inven-
tion. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 
J.L. & ECON. 265, 27678 (1977). Neither premise, however, holds up with re-
spect to basic research. Wasteful duplication is much less likely to be a prob-
lem in the context of basic research because of the multitude of directions and 
outcomes which grow out of basic research. Also, as discussed in the text, an 
exclusive focus on commercialization may result in significant social opportu-
nity costs. See Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 33, at 
37273, 37476; Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Obser-
vations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359, 381 (1992); 
SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES, supra note 296, at 155. Scotchmer 
concludes: 
Thus the licensing platform created by a pioneer patent can under-
mine competition . . . in the innovation market . . . and competition 
among users of the patented knowledge. It might be better not to give 
such patents. One alternative is public funding, and another is to let a 
later innovator who needs the pioneer innovation redevelop it. This 
leads to cost redundancy, but unless the tool is very expensive, such 
redundancy may be a lesser evil than retarding the development of 
later products through restrictive joint ventures or raising their price 
by facilitating collusion. 
Id. 
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was financed by universities and other nonprofit research establish-
ments out of their own funds.303 
This financing removes the need to rely on private invest-
ment and thus eliminates supply-side concerns over free riding. 
At least in theory, then, the optimal management decision 
would be to release research results into the public domain to 
encourage free, widespread, and potentially competitive use 
downstream. 
In reality, this solution depends on the government for 
both allocation of limited public funds and efficient manage-
ment of the research results. The governments capacity to exe-
cute these functions has been subject to extensive criticism on 
institutional and public choice grounds. In fact, based in part 
on the perception of a government with a poor record of manag-
ing federally funded research results,304 Congress enacted a se-
ries of legislative reforms, such as the Bayh-Dole Act.305 These 
reforms generally aimed to facilitate the transfer of publicly 
funded technology to the private sector.306 Most notably, the 
Bayh-Dole Act permitted and encouraged federally funded re-
searchers to obtain patent rights over their inventions.307 The 
rationale for this change was the governments failure to trans-
fer (or persuade contractors to transfer) valuable technology to 
market actors who would have commercialized the results.308 
Granting researchers patent rights, it followed, would enable 
them to better manage their inventions.309 In essence, relying 
 
 303. LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 285, at 306. 
 304. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: 
Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. 
L. REV. 1663, 170204 (1996) [hereinafter, Eisenberg, Public Research and 
Private Development] (explaining and critiquing this perception). 
 305. See Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, 
Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3019 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200
211) (2000); see also Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701
3714 (2000)). 
 306. On these legislative reforms, see Eisenberg, Public Research and Pri-
vate Development, supra note 304, at 170409; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technol-
ogy Transfer and the Genome Project: Problems with Patenting Research Tools, 
5 RISK 163, 16367 (1994); Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra 
note 33, at 406; Rai, Regulating Scientific Research, supra note 217, at 9294, 
10915. 
 307. See generally Frischmann, Commercializing University Research Sys-
tems, supra note 290. 
 308. See id. 
 309. See Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development, supra note 
304, at 166466. 
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on intellectual property to stimulate technology transfer re-
flected a fundamental shift from one restrictive access regime 
to anotherfrom government control to private market-driven 
control. This shift has had a profound effect on basic research 
efforts. For example, as noted by Walter Powell, there has been 
a sea change in the focus of basic research in life sciences be-
cause of commercialization by universities of basic scientific re-
search results.310 For basic research, however, coupling gov-
ernment funding with a clear dedication to the public domain 
remains a potentially attractive method for sustaining a com-
mons that relies on neither the government nor the market 
mechanism to allocate access among the public. 
For many other intellectual infrastructure resources, the 
question of how to strike the appropriate balance between ac-
cess and incentives is reconciled primarily within the law of in-
tellectual property.311 I leave a more complete discussion of in-
tellectual property law issues pertaining to intellectual 
infrastructure for a separate paper,312 but a brief discussion 
provides a flavor of how this balance is currently struck, and, at  
 
 
 310. Walter W. Powell, Networks of Learning in Biotechnology: Opportuni-
ties and Constraints Associated with Relational Contracting in a Knowledge-
Intensive Field, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 251, 26365 (Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining 
over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is this Market Failing or 
Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY, supra, at 223 (suggesting 
that delays and high transaction costs stifle transfers of biotechnology re-
search tools). 
 311. Striking a balance between access and incentives is explicitly recog-
nized as the central issue of intellectual property law. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (Copyright involves a 
difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control 
and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and soci-
etys competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce 
on the other hand); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 
141, 146 (1989) (From their inception, the federal patent laws have embodied 
a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition 
that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to inven-
tion itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.); Pfaff v. Wells 
Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 6062 (1998). The challenge lies in distinguish-
ing discoveries that are better developed and disseminated through open ac-
cess from discoveries that are better developed and disseminated under the 
protection of intellectual property rights. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 217, at 
291. 
 312. See generally Frischmann, Intellectual Infrastructure, supra note 283. 
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the same time, provides a point of contrast with the discussion 
of environmental regulation above. 
Intellectual property law is designed, at least in theory, to 
promote and preserve a sustainable information commons. In-
tellectual property law creates exclusive rights and thereby fa-
cilitates private restrictions on access to new information goods 
to promote progress, advancement, and continued expansion of 
the public domain as exclusive rights expire.313 More impor-
tantly, even before an intellectual property right expires, an 
important balance is struck with respect to short-term restric-
tion on access; restricted access is limited in scope and open ac-
cess is preserved for certain uses.314 
First, the public gains access to the newly produced infor-
mation because it is disclosed. Patents themselves serve as an 
important means of disclosing inventions to the public;315 to at-
tain a patent, the patentee must sufficiently describe the inven-
tion in the patent application, allowing others to recreate the 
invention.316 Competitors may be able to invent around the pat- 
 
 
 313. By providing an ex post reward in the form of a legally enforceable 
right to exclude others from using newly produced information, the govern-
ment lowers the costs of exclusion and thereby creates an incentive for private 
investors to allocate resources towards information production that might oth-
erwise be too risky due to potential free riding. See supra notes 9497 and ac-
companying text. The limited duration of intellectual property rights ensures 
that the protected information will make its way into the public domain even-
tually. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) (copyright term is life of the author plus sev-
enty years); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000) (patent term is twenty years from filing). 
 314. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 
100203 (1990); LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 285; 
see also Heverly, supra note 59, at 116188 (arguing that intellectual property 
is not pure private property but rather is a semicommons, which is a form of 
property that recognizes the dynamic relationship between private and public 
uses of information). 
 315. It is important to remember that trade secrecy is the primary alterna-
tive to patenting and that, in the absence of a patent system, a significant 
amount of information would arguably remain as privately held and guarded 
secrets and would not be accessible to the public. See supra notes 29295 and 
accompanying text. Although copyright does not have an express disclosure 
requirement, most material protected by copyright is naturally disclosed 
through consumers ordinary use of the material. See Brett Frischmann & Dan 
Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified 
Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 874 
(2000). Consider, for example, the use of books, articles, or songs. Id. Software 
presents an interesting exception. Id.; see Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, 
Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 34 
(2001). 
 316. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
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ent, essentially using the information as an input into their 
own productive activities. 
Second, intellectual property law imposes a number of re-
strictions on the scope of coverage. For example, patents cover 
functional innovationsone can only patent a new and useful 
process, machine manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
new and useful improvements; one cannot patent a pure algo-
rithm or abstract idea.317 Patented inventions must be reduced 
to practice, novel, nonobvious, and useful.318 Copyrights gener-
ally cover artistic expression and not functional innovations. 
One cannot copyright ideas, only expression.319 To be copy-
rightable, material must feature an original expression fixated 
in a tangible media, such as books, film, or sound recordings.320 
Intellectual property law also places restrictions on the 
scope of private control over others use of protected informa-
tion goods. The best example is fair use in copyright law.321 
Fair use of a copyrighted work expressly encompasses purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholar-
ship, and research,322 and implicitly encompasses many other 
purposes that further the public interest.323 Such uses may be 
excused from copyright infringement under the fair use doc-
trine.324 
In the following sense, fair use is the inverse of the envi-
ronmental regulation discussed earlier: fair use preserves open 
access for certain productive uses325 of protected expression 
while environmental regulation restricts access for certain con-
sumptive uses of an environmental resource, which, in turn, 
preserves access for certain productive uses. Critically, many of 
the productive uses of environmental and intellectual infra-
 
 317. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 
(1980) (The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have 
been held not patentable.). 
 318. Id. §§ 101103, 112 (2000). 
 319. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
 320. Id. § 102(a) (2000). 
 321. Id. § 107 (2000). 
 322. Id. 
 323. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 57881 
(1994) (acknowledging the strong public interest in critical works such as par-
ody); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 42834 (1984) 
(interpreting the concept of fair use broadly because of the public interests at 
stake). 
 324. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 325. I am using the term productive use much more liberally than the 
dissent in Sony. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 47781 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). 
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structure resources for which access is sustained involve the 
production of public and nonmarket goods that generate posi-
tive externalities realized by society as a whole. 
First and foremost, fair use facilitates the creative process 
itselfthe transformative manipulation and modification of ex-
isting works (nonrival inputs) to produce new creative works 
(public good outputs) that have the potential to generate posi-
tive externalities.326 Less often acknowledged but perhaps of 
equal importance, the fair use doctrine facilitates experimenta-
tion and learning, intellectual processes that generate direct 
benefits to participants as well as diffuse external benefits for 
society.327 
There is some degree of sensitivity in both patent and 
copyright law for sustaining open access to intellectual infra-
structure, as exhibited by the idea-expression doctrine and the 
nonpatentability of abstract ideas.328 In this brief discussion, I 
have ignored the growth in intellectual property protection in 
recent decades, as well as the ongoing debate over the optimal 
design of intellectual property rights, and whether the informa-
tion commons is at risk of enclosure.329 In a separate article, I 
explore these issues and argue that institutions, such as intel-
lectual property, ought to respond explicitly to the fact that cer-
tain intellectual resources are infrastructure.330 
 
 326. See Lydia P. Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair 
Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 49 
(1997) (An examination of the[ ] enumerated uses reveals a common thread: 
each one of these uses provides external societal benefits far beyond the bene-
fits to the individual who is making the criticism, the comment, the news re-
port or the individual who is doing the teaching, the scholarship or the re-
search.); see also Cohen, Perfect Curve, supra note 47, at 180304 (explaining 
that the traditional economic analysis of the supply and demand curves for 
copyrighted information views consumer surplus as benefits derived from con-
sumption and not productive use); Lemley, The Economics of Improvement, 
supra note 105, at 105658. 
 327. See sources cited supra note 326. 
 328. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (In no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery . . . .); Diamond v. Chak-
rabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (The laws of nature, physical phenomena, 
and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.). 
 329. Two recent books by Landes and Posner provide a nice point of entry 
into the voluminous literature on these issues. See LANDES & POSNER, 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 285; LANDES & POSNER, POLITICAL 
ECONOMY, supra note 68. 
 330. Frischmann, Intellectual Infrastructure, supra note 283. 
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IV. UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL VALUE OF AN OPEN 
INTERNET INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE NETWORK NEUTRALITY DEBATE 
This final Part demonstrates how infrastructure theory 
applies to the Internet in the context of the particularly conten-
tious open access versus private control debate over network 
neutrality. At the heart of this debate is whether the Internet 
should retain its end-to-end architecture and continue to be 
managed in an openly accessible manner. Ultimately, the out-
come of this debate will determine whether the Internet con-
tinues to operate as a mixed infrastructure (commercial, public, 
and social), or whether it evolves into a commercial infrastruc-
ture optimized for the production and delivery of commercial 
outputs.331 As Lessig reminded us in The Future of Ideas, there 
are two futures in front of us.332 
 
 331. In his most recent book, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technol-
ogy and the Law To Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity, Lessig is con-
cerned with the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned 
off. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 68, at xiiixiv. Lessig considers the 
two meta processes by which culture is producedan open, free creative proc-
ess and a controlled, permission-first processand argues that the law is 
changing to support the latter at the expense of the former. Id. at xiv. Al-
though Lessig focuses on a different infrastructure than Ispecifically, the 
lawwe are concerned with the same dynamic: the optimization of infrastruc-
ture for a certain range of (commercial) outputs. 
 332. See LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 7; Benkler, From 
Consumers to Users, supra note 14, at 56365 (making a similar point); Jack 
Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Ex-
pression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1923 (2004) (same). 
Lessig, Benkler, and Balkin vividly paint the picture of what the Internet 
would look like as a pure commercial infrastructure; each sees possibility of 
the Internet optimized to deliver content-on-demand. LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF 
IDEAS, supra note 7, at 7; Benkler, From Consumers to Users, supra note 14, at 
57679; Balkin, supra, at 2021 (describing a digital environment in which 
access providers seek to cocoon their customers and broadband companies 
enclose not only their proprietary content (and that of their affiliates) but also 
the end-users Internet experience itself). Lessig paints a less vivid picture of 
the Internet as mixed commercial, public and social infrastructure because, as 
he notes, the very premise of the Internet is that no one can predict how it 
will develop. LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 7. Still, Lessig 
illustrates his vision with detailed descriptions of the Internets creative en-
terprises, its technologies that enable users to engage more fully in the crea-
tive process, and its ability to enhance community and cultural values. Id. at 
710; see also LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 68, at 78 (providing a simi-
larly dichotomous picture of culture). Balkin has a similar vision of the Inter-
net as Lessig, although he is focused on the social value of promoting a democ-
ratic culture through the principle of free speech. See Balkin, supra, passim; 
see also infra notes 383402 and accompanying text (relating Balkins free 
speech theory with infrastructure theory). 
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A. THE INTERNET AS INFRASTRUCTURE 
The Internet consists of many infrastructure resources. 
Scholars have delineated two macro-level infrastructure re-
sources. The physical infrastructure consists of a wide variety 
of physical networks interconnected with each other, while the 
logical infrastructure consists of the standards and protocols 
that facilitate seamless transmission of data across different 
types of physical networks.333 The physical and logical infra-
structure both act as essential inputs into downstream produc-
tion of applications and content.334 In contrast with the up-
stream-downstream/input-output model used in this Article, 
Internet scholars tend to focus on layered models of the Inter-
net that distinguish between complementary layers based on 
the functions each layer performs.335 The number of layers in 
particular models varies, but the following four-layered model 
in table 4 is sufficient for our purposes. As the structure of this 
model implies, the physical and logical infrastructure are the 
foundational layers upon which the Internet environment we 
experience has been built. Thus, for purposes of this Article 
(and ease of reference), I refer to the physical and logical infra-
structure together as either the Internet or the Internet in-
frastructure and to the applications and content as down-
stream outputs.336 
 
 333. See, e.g., Benkler, From Consumers to Users, supra note 14, at 57072. 
 334. See Frischmann, Internet Infrastructure, supra note 42, at 3441 
(modeling the extrinsic aspects of the Internet infrastructure). Some applica-
tions are simply content delivery mechanisms while others combine content 
delivery with content creation. While there is a considerable amount of content 
for which the Internet is not an essential input to production (e.g., music), 
the Internet is an essential input for a wide variety of applications that sig-
nificantly lower the cost of distributing such content (e.g., peer-to-peer soft-
ware, e-mail, instant messaging, chat rooms, the World Wide Web). Further, 
as discussed below, there is a considerable amount of content for which the 
Internet is an essential input to production (e.g., blogs, Web pages, peer and 
consumer annotated books). On the last example, see http://free-culture 
.cc/remixes/. 
 335. See, e.g., Benkler, From Consumers to Users, supra note 14; Farrell & 
Weiser, supra note 6, at 9091; Douglas C. Sicker & Joshua L. Mindel, Re-
finements of a Layered Model for Telecommunications Policy, 1 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L 69 (2002); Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for 
Internet Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37, 5764 (2002); Chris-
topher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt 
Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 3234 (2004) [hereinafter Yoo, Mandating Broadband Network 
Neutrality?]. 
 336. Many of these downstream outputs also may constitute infrastructure 
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Table 4: Four-Layered Model of the Internet 
 
Layer Description Examples 
Content Information/data 
conveyed to end-users 
E-mail communication,  
music, Web page 
Applications Programs and 
functions used by end-
users 
E-mail program, media 
player, Web browser 
Logical  
Infrastructure 
Standards and 
protocols that facilitate 
transmission of data 
across physical 
networks 
TCP/IP, domain name 
system 
Physical  
Infrastructure 
Physical hardware that 
comprise intercon-
nected networks 
Telecommunications, 
cable and satellite 
networks, routers and 
servers, backbone 
networks 
 
The Internet meets all three demand-side criteria for infra-
structure. The Internet infrastructure is a partially (non)rival 
good; it is consumed both nonrivalrously and rivalrously, de-
pending upon available capacity.337 The benefits of the Internet 
are realized at the ends. Like a road system, a lake, and basic 
research, the Internet is socially valuable primarily because of 
the productive activity it facilitates downstream. That is, end-
users hooked up to the Internet infrastructure generate value 
and realize benefits through the applications run on their com-
puters and through the consumption of content delivered over 
the Internet. End-users thus create demand for Internet infra-
structure through their demand for applications and content. 
The Internet currently is a mixed commercial, public, and 
social infrastructure. As described below, the Internet is per-
 
(e.g., a Web browser). I will not, however, focus on them in this Article. 
 337. See Frischmann, Internet Infrastructure, supra note 42, at 2434 
(modeling the intrinsic aspects of the Internet infrastructure). To be more 
precise, the physical infrastructure and certain components of the logical in-
frastructure such as the domain name system are partially (non)rival insofar 
that (1) the risk of congestion depends upon the amount of capacity, number of 
users, and other contextual factors, and (2) this risk can be managed in a fash-
ion that sustains nonrivalry in consumption. See supra Part II.A. 
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haps the clearest example of an infrastructure resource that 
enables the production of a wide variety of public, private, and 
nonmarket goods, many of which are network goods.338 
Like most traditional infrastructure, the Internet currently 
is managed in an openly accessible manner.339 The current 
Internet infrastructure evolved with the end-to-end design 
principle as its central tenet.340 This design principle is imple-
mented in the logical infrastructure of the Internet through the 
adoption of standardized communication protocols (e.g., the 
Internet Protocol suite).341 End-to-end essentially means that 
infrastructure providers cannot differentiate or discriminate 
among data packets carried by their networks.342 This design 
promotes the open interconnection of networks and focuses ap-
plication development and innovation on the demands of end-
users.343 For the most part, infrastructure providers are igno-
rant of the identity of the end-users and end-uses, and at the 
same time, end-users and end-uses are ignorant of the various 
networks that transport data packets.344 In a sense, shared ig-
norance is built into the infrastructure and precludes indi-
vidualized exclusion of end-users or end-uses.345 
The institution that sustains the Internet infrastructure 
commons rests upon social norms embodied in the widespread 
adoption of technical standards, which are subject to change.346 
In fact, there is considerable pressure for change, pressure to 
replace the existing dumb, open architecture with an intelli-
gent, restrictive architecture capable of differentiating (and 
discriminating) among end-uses and end-users. Pressure for 
change derives from many sources: the Internets evolution to 
broadband infrastructure, applications, and content; the rapid 
 
 338. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 339. LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 39 (noting that both 
the Internet and roads are end-to-end systems and that both could be 
smart). 
 340. Id. at 3435; Frischmann, Internet Infrastructure, supra note 42, at 
33. 
 341. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 6, at 91 (describing how the Internet 
Protocol implements the end-to-end architecture). 
 342. Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserv-
ing the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 
925, 931 (2001). 
 343. See id. 
 344. Frischmann, Internet Infrastructure, supra note 42, at 27. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Lemley & Lessig, supra note 342, at 971. 
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increase in users; demand for latency-sensitive applications 
such as video-on-demand and IP telephony; demand for secu-
rity measures and spam regulation measures implemented at 
the core of the Internet; and, more generally and importantly, 
demand for increased returns on infrastructure investments.347 
We should resist this pressure and think more carefully about 
the benefits of sustaining an Internet infrastructure commons. 
B. THE NETWORK NEUTRALITY DEBATE AND THE FUTURE OF 
END-TO-END ARCHITECTURE 
For the past two decades, academics, commercial entities, 
technologists, government officials, universities, and citizens 
have debated the future of the Internet infrastructure.348 In the 
mid-1980s, participants in such debates focused on technology 
and coordinating interconnection among different types of net-
works.349 In the late-1980s and early-1990s, attention shifted in 
part to the viability of privatization and commercialization.350 
Since 1995, when the privatization and commercialization  
 
 
 
 347. See Odlyzko, supra note 29, at 324 (noting that the concern is really 
about the feasibility of price discrimination); Bruce M. Owen & Gregory L. 
Rosston, Local Broadband Access: Primum Non Nocere or Primum Processi? A 
Property Rights Approach 2122 (July 2003) (Stanford Law School, John M. 
Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper 263) (suggesting that the 
Internets end-to-end architecture has stifled investment in broadband infra-
structure and applications and thus slowed broadband deployment), at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=431620; see also Frischmann, 
Internet Infrastructure, supra note 42, at 89, 1213, 15, 18 (explaining how 
the recurring need for expensive infrastructure upgrades in response to con-
gestion problems created a demand for investment dollars that tested the 
bounds of public funding and gradually led to increased reliance on private 
funds). 
 348. These debates are extensively covered elsewhere and will not be re-
counted here. See generally JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 181220 
(1999). 
 349. See id.; Frischmann, Internet Infrastructure, supra note 42, at 1215. 
 350. ABBATE, supra note 348, at 195200; Brian Kahin, Commercialization 
of the Internet: Summary Report, RFC 1192 (Nov. 1990), available at 
http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc1192.html; Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us 
Once Shame on YouFool Us Twice Shame on Us: What We Can Learn from 
the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the Domain Name 
System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 13043 (2001); see also Frischmann, Internet In-
frastructure, supra note 42, at 1520 & n.64 (In the early 1990s, there was a 
significant discussion among interested parties in government, academia, in-
dustry, and the not-for-profit sector concerning privatization and commerciali-
zation.). 
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process was more or less complete, attention again has shifted 
to governance and (de)regulation.351 
The degree to which infrastructure providers (i.e., network 
owners) should have control over their privately owned net-
works has received considerable attention.352 Essentially, the 
open access versus control debate involves the same set of eco-
nomic issues discussed in previous parts with respect to tradi-
tional infrastructure, environmental resources, and informa-
tional resources. A substantial literature approaches this 
debate from a variety of perspectives, including law,353 econom-
ics,354 and technology.355 I believe the current debate is skewed, 
however, because it focuses myopically on neutrality, market-
driven provision of commercial outputs, and innovation. A new 
approach is needed because there is much more at stake than 
the current debate reflects. 
1. Network Neutrality 
Professor Tim Wu recently summarized the current status 
of the ongoing open access versus control debate and couched it 
as one about network neutrality, that is, whether the Internet 
should be made neutral (and if so, how).356 Wu and Lessig sub-
 
 351. See, e.g., Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate: A Users Guide, 3 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69, 7579 (2004) [hereinafter Wu, The Broad-
band Debate]; Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Prin-
ciples for the Industry, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5 (2004). 
 352. In the context of emerging broadband infrastructure, the open access 
debate focuses on the vertical relationships between input and output produc-
ers primarily from a competition policy perspective. For an excellent treat-
ment of these issues, see Farrell & Weiser, supra note 6. In this context, open 
access generally refers to a structural requirement that would prevent broad-
band operators from bundling broadband service with Internet access from in-
house Internet service providers. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband 
Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 14748 (2003). 
 353. See, e.g., Lemley & Lessig, supra note 342; James B. Speta, Handi-
capping the Race for the Last Mile? A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broad-
band Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 7778 (2000); Phil Weiser, Paradigm 
Changes in Telecommunications Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 819 (2000); 
Glenn A. Woroch, Open Access Rules and the Broadband Race, 2002 MICH. ST. 
DCL L. REV. 719. 
 354. See, e.g., Owen & Rosston, supra note 347; Paul A. David, The Evolv-
ing Accidental Information Super-Highway, 17 OXFORD REV. ECON. POLY 158 
(2001). In some respects, the approach taken in this Part follows Davids lead. 
 355. See, e.g., Marjory S. Blumenthal & David D. Clark, Rethinking the De-
sign of the Internet: The End to End Arguments vs. the Brave New World, 1 
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET TECH. 70 (2001). 
 356. See Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, supra note 
352, at 14549; Wu, The Broadband Debate, supra note 351, at 8894. 
FRISCHMANN.3FMT 04/13/2005 04:50:51 PM 
1010 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [89:917 
 
mitted an ex parte letter to the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) explaining their view that network neutrality 
ought to be an aspiration of the FCC.357 Wus research pro-
vides a fair assessment of the current debate, and I accordingly 
use his work to illustrate how the infrastructure theory reveals 
demand-side issues that have not been adequately addressed in 
the current debate. While the network neutrality debate en-
compasses many policy issues, I focus exclusively on the future 
of the end-to-end architecture of the Internet. 
How does the end-to-end design principle relate to network 
neutrality? Initially, implementing a commons via end-to-end 
network design might appear neutral to applications while 
shifting to an intelligent network design capable of allocating 
access to the infrastructure based on the identity of the uses 
(users) appears nonneutral. The problem with this view is 
that neutrality is a finicky concept.358 As Wu explained: 
As the universe of applications has grown, the original conception of 
IP neutrality has dated: for IP was only neutral among data applica-
tions. Internet networks tend to favor, as a class, applications insensi-
tive to latency (delay) or jitter (signal distortion). Consider that it 
doesnt matter much whether an email arrives now or a few millisec-
onds later. But it certainly matters for applications that want to carry 
voice or video. In a universe of applications that includes both la-
tency-sensitive and insensitive applications, it is difficult to regard 
the IP suite as truly neutral as among all applications. 
. . . The technical reason IP favors data applications is that it lacks 
any universal mechanism to offer a quality of service (QoS) guaran-
tee. It doesnt insist that data arrive at any time or place. Instead, IP 
generally adopts a best-effort approach[.] . . . [A]s a consequence, it 
implicitly disfavors applications that do care.359 
Wu and others are correct to say that the end-to-end design 
precludes differentiated QoS360 and thus disfavors latency-
sensitive applications, such as IP telephony and video-on-
demand.361 To be sure, this may be one significant cost of sus-
 
 357. Letter from Timothy Wu, Associate Professor, University of Virginia 
School of Law, & Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, to 
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC 3 n.3 (Aug. 22, 2003), available at 
http://faculty.virginia.edu/timwu/wu_lessig_fcc.pdf. 
 358. Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, supra note 352, 
at 147. 
 359. Id. at 148 (footnotes omitted). 
 360. The Internet currently provides best effort data delivery, which is a 
simple form of QoS. See id. at 148. There are different types of QoS, some of 
which are more consistent with end-to-end than others. See LESSIG, THE 
FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 47. 
 361. See Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, supra note 
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taining an infrastructure commons.362 Further, proponents of 
an intelligent Internet argue that the end-to-end design of the 
Internet inhibits other socially valuable applications best exe-
cuted at the core rather than at the endssecurity and spam 
regulation measures, for example.363 While the relative effec-
tiveness and costliness of executing various functions at the 
core or at the ends is a subject of debate, this also may be one 
significant cost of sustaining an infrastructure commons. 
That end-to-end design favors one set of applications does 
not mean that shifting to QoS will not do the same. There is a 
significant risk that the inherent biases of the market mecha-
nism will surface if access to the Internet infrastructure is allo-
cated to users by private property owners employing fine-
grained (end-user or end-use-specific) QoS. 
Just as the current end-to-end design favors data applica-
tions at the expense of time-sensitive applications, shifting to a 
fine-grained QoS regime also may exhibit a bias for particular 
applications, specifically for commercial applications that gen-
erate observable and appropriable returns. The bias would not 
be technologically determined (as in the case of end-to-end de-
sign), but rather would be determined by the predictable opera-
tion of the market mechanism. As discussed above, given the 
ability to discriminate among end-users and end-uses on a 
packet-by-packet basis and the inability to perfectly price dis-
criminate, infrastructure suppliers may bias access priority (via 
imperfect price discrimination) and/or optimize infrastructure 
design in favor of output markets that generate the highest 
levels of appropriable returns (producer surplus), at the ex-
pense of output markets that generate a larger aggregate sur-
plus (direct consumer surplus, producer surplus, and external 
surplus).364 
End-to-end design sustains a commons by insulating end-
users from market-driven control over access.365 Because infra-
 
352, at 148; Yoo, Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality?, supra note 335, 
at 2728, 3031. 
 362. LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 46 (acknowledging 
this as a cost of sustaining a commons). 
 363. See Blumenthal & Clark, supra note 355; David, supra note 354, at 
17178; Yoo, Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality?, supra note 335, at 
2728, 3141. 
 364. See supra Parts II.BD, III.A (explaining the inherent bias of the 
market for observable and appropriable returns). Note that I leave aside con-
cerns over anticompetitive behavior. 
 365. See LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 46. For discussion 
FRISCHMANN.3FMT 04/13/2005 04:50:51 PM 
1012 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [89:917 
 
structure providers cannot distinguish between end-uses or 
end-users, they cannot base access decisions or pricing on such 
information, nor can they optimize the infrastructure for a par-
ticular class of end-uses or end-users. 
2. Commercial Outputs and Innovation 
Discussion of the costs and benefits of preserving the end-
to-end design of the Internet focuses on issues relevant to 
commercial infrastructure, specifically, on competition in up-
stream and downstream markets,366 and on competition in in-
novation markets.367 For example, Lessig, a major proponent of 
sustaining the end-to-end design, focuses extensively on the no-
tion of sustaining an innovation commons. Lessig finds that ex-
perimenting, tinkering, and creating new applications and con-
tent are critically productive activities facilitated by the end-to-
end architecture of the Internet.368 Lessig is correct, but he 
could and should go much further. 
Innovation is an integral part of the debate, but it ought 
not be the linchpin upon which end-to-end architecture of the 
Internet hangs.369 Innovation is too narrow conceptually be-
cause of its traditional economic connection with the competi-
 
of this point more generally, see supra Part II.D. 
 366. See, e.g., Farrell & Weiser, supra note 6, at 123 (focusing on sustain-
ing competition in upstream and downstream markets); Owen & Rosston, su-
pra note 347, at 1725 (focusing on commercial markets and arguing that a 
property rights approach is preferable to common carrier-type regulation); 
Yoo, Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality?, supra note 335, at 3141 
(framing the network neutrality debate in competition theory); cf. Manheim & 
Solum, supra note 100 (analyzing root service, a fundamental component of 
the domain name systems operation, as a private good that could be provided 
efficiently by a competitive market). 
 367. See Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, supra note 
352, at 15254; Wu, The Broadband Debate, supra note 351, at 8084; Letter 
from Wu and Lessig to FCC, supra note 357, at 57. 
 368. See LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 4041. 
 369. Yet this seems to be the case. Both sides seem to agree that innovation 
is the objective and debate what type of management regime will best promote 
innovation. Cf. Wu, The Broadband Debate, supra note 351, at 80 ([T]he 
greatest unifying belief as between the Openist and Deregulationist is a com-
mon idolization of innovation.). Arguably, innovation has become the focus of 
the debate because it is the onlyor at least, the primaryargument raised 
by Openists for maintaining the end-to-end architecture of the Internet. This 
is unfortunate because many of the applications that are truly valuable to so-
ciety are not all that innovative (or creative)at least, not anymoreand are 
not subject to continued improvement. Consider, for example, e-mail, chat 
rooms, and message boards. 
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tive process and commercial markets.370 As discussed in the 
next section, the Internet supports a substantially wider range 
of socially valuable downstream activities that are neither in-
novative nor commercial.371 
The problem with focusing on innovation is that it pushes 
the debate into the confines of competition theory.372 For exam-
ple, Wu argues that network neutrality ought to be accepted 
both by openists and deregulationists as the operative norma-
tive goal, basing his views on the Schumpeterian concept that 
 
 370. I recognize that Lessig uses innovation broadly to mean [n]ot just 
the innovation of Internet entrepreneurs . . . , but also the innovation of au-
thors or artists more generally. LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, 
at 6; see also id. at 10 (Though most distinguish innovation from creativity, or 
creativity from commerce, I do not.); id. at 19 (This book is fundamentally 
about the Internet and its effect on innovation, both commercial and non.) 
(emphasis added). The problem with this approach is that innovation gener-
ally is considered to be intimately connected with commercialization. That is, 
from a definitional standpoint, innovation is not simply the creation of some-
thing new and valuable, but rather it is the creation of something new and 
commercializable. See F.M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: 
SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES 8 (1984). I should note that I also made the 
mistake of using a broad notion of innovation in another article. See Frisch-
mann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 33, at 34849 (criticizing the 
link to commercialization and adopting a broader definition). In The Future of 
Ideas, Lessig emphasizes that he is concerned with innovation and creativity. 
LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, passim. While I fear that partici-
pants in the network neutrality debate tend to focus on innovation, I believe 
that creativity is also too narrow a concept because it fails to capture the full 
range of socially valuable productive activity which the Internet makes possi-
ble. See infra Part IV.B.3; see also Frischmann, Internet Infrastructure, supra 
note 42, at 6869. As I have noted previously: 
[t]he Internet is like an overloaded highway that needs to be up-
graded. But if done badly, the Internets ability to support innovative, 
as-yet unimagined applications could be in jeopardy. While we cer-
tainly should be concerned with the fate of unimagined applications, 
the same rationale applies with even greater force to the fate of many 
existing public goods applications that thrive on the Internet. 
Id. (quoting Upgrading the Internet, ECONOMIST (TECH.Q.), Mar. 24, 2001, at 
32, 32). 
 371. Lessig knows this and clearly intends to use innovation broadly. See 
supra note 370. 
 372. For a thorough, competition-oriented analysis in this area, see Farrell 
& Weiser, supra note 6, at 86134; see also Weiser, supra note 213, at 7484 
(advocating an antitrust-like approach to regulation). Farrell and Weiser 
analyze whether infrastructure providers can be trusted to allow open access 
when it is efficient to do so. Farrell & Weiser, supra note 6, at 96. Their cen-
tral analytical tool is the economic concept of internalizing complementary 
externalities, which suggests that firms will manage their resources openly 
when doing so enhances consumer value. Id. They explore this concept and 
its eight important limitations. Id. at 10519. Farrell and Weiser do not, how-
ever, explore the demand-side problems highlighted in this Article. 
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innovation is an essential part of an evolutionary competitive 
process.373 Incidentally, Wu and Lessig make the same argu-
ment in their letter to the FCC.374 From the Schumpeterian 
perspective, innovation is about the creation and distribution of 
new commercial outputs that will drive competition with in-
cumbents, a process Schumpeter famously referred to as crea-
tive destruction.375 Wu suggests that a neutral Internet will 
support meritocratic competition among all applications (new 
and old),376 fostering a Darwinian competition among every 
conceivable use of the Internet so that only the best survive.377 
This view leaves unanswered important questions: By what 
process will such competition take place? On what metric do we 
assess what constitutes the best uses?378 Presumably, Wu, 
like Schumpeter, expects that competitive markets will effec-
tively judge the merits of innovative applications on the basis of 
consumer demand (consumers willingness to pay). This per-
spective is problematic because market competition judges the 
merit of outputs on the basis of observable and appropriable re-
turns rather than on overall social welfare.379 
To be fair, Wu does not expressly define meritocratic com-
petition and thus does not define such competition as market-
driven competition. I presume he means market-driven compe-
tition because of his emphasis on Schumpeter and innova-
 
 373. In his first article, Tim Wu makes an abbreviated and admittedly 
simple case for network neutrality based on the Schumpeterian view that in-
novation is an evolutionary process, and proceeds to analyze institutional 
means more or less under the assumption that network neutrality is the nor-
mative goal. Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, supra note 
352, at 19196, 197. In his second article, he spells out in more detail why 
network neutrality ought to be accepted both by Openists and Deregulation-
ists as the operative normative goal. See Wu, The Broadband Debate, supra 
note 351, at 84. 
 374. See Letter from Wu and Lessig to FCC, supra note 357, at 58 (argu-
ing that network neutrality is critical to sustaining an evolutionary, or com-
petitive model of innovation). 
 375. J.A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 8187 
(5th ed. 1976). 
 376. See Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, supra note 
352, at 14446. 
 377. Id. at 142. 
 378. Will uses compete in the market for access to the infrastructure and 
consumers? Will survival depend upon consumers willingness to pay for out-
puts and, in turn, on output producers willingness to pay for access to the in-
frastructure? 
 379. See supra Parts II, III. 
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tion.380 The Schumpeterian evolutionary perspective yields im-
portant insights that are relevant to the analysis of infrastruc-
ture resources. For example, as noted earlier with respect to 
lakes and basic research,381 and as Wu described: 
All of these teachings lead to a single principle that should be an ab-
solute policy consensus. Lost-cost market entry is the common foun-
dation of the innovation theories that both Deregulationists and 
Openists subscribe to. That means preventing any single actor, gov-
ernmental or otherwise, from becoming lord of the technological fu-
ture. A multiplicity of innovating actors, even if suffering from the 
same inability to accurately predict the future, may nonetheless 
stumble upon the optimal path.382 
The point Wu makes can and should be extended beyond the 
context of innovation, with its focus on commercial competition, 
to infrastructure more generally. 
To be clear, competition in upstream and downstream 
markets and innovation are important and deserve careful at-
tention. Further, I agree with Wu, Lessig, and others regarding 
the significant benefits that a theoretically neutral system has 
for innovation from an evolutionary perspective. I do not think, 
however, that true neutrality is attainable, nor do I believe that 
the Internet is a system focused on facilitating innovation 
alone. 
3. The Internet as Commercial, Public, and Social 
Infrastructure 
The Internet is a mixed commercial, public, and social in-
frastructure.383 The public and social aspects of the Internet in-
 
 380. See Wu, The Broadband Debate, supra note 351, at 8084. 
 381. See supra Part III. 
 382. Wu, The Broadband Debate, supra note 351, at 84. 
 383. Like a cable system, the Internet is a commercial infrastructure be-
cause it is an input into the delivery of a wide range of controlled digital media 
content for consumption. The delivery of controlled (or use-restricted) digital 
content purely for end-user consumption can be classified as a private good; 
the content provider is using the infrastructure to provide a service to the con-
sumer (delivery of content for consumption) under conditions that render the 
output private (rivalrous and excludable). The Internet also acts as an input 
into a number of commercial processes that have public good components and 
some potential for positive externalities. Consider, for example, use of the 
Internet for information dissemination and exchange for advertising, market-
ing, and to facilitate business transactions, as well as information gathering 
for product development, consumer demand assessment, and operations man-
agement. See ROBERT E. LITAN & ALICE M. RIVLIN, BEYOND THE DOT.COMS: 
THE ECONOMIC PROMISE OF THE INTERNET 45, 1938 (2001). These processes 
are likely to be strictly tailored to channeling end-users toward purchasing 
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frastructure are largely undervalued in the current debate. 
Bringing these aspects of the Internet into focus strengthens 
the case for preserving the end-to-end architecture of the 
Internet. In other words, the demand-side nature of the infra-
structure theory supports an additional, strong argument in fa-
vor of open access. Ultimately, sustaining an Internet infra-
structure commons avoids relying on either the government or 
the market to pick winners (or survivors) among downstream 
producers of private, public, and nonmarket goods.384 
What makes the Internet valuable to society?385 It is very 
difficult to estimate the full social value of the Internet, in large 
part because of the wide variety of downstream uses that gen-
erate public and nonmarket goods. Despite such difficulty, we 
know that the Internet is [t]ransforming [o]ur [s]ociety.386 The 
transformation is similar to transformations experienced in the 
past with other infrastructure,387 yet now change is occuring in 
a more rapid, widespread, and dramatic fashion.388 
The Internet environment is quickly permeating all aspects 
of the lives, affairs, and relationships of individuals, companies, 
universities, organizations, and governments worldwide. It is 
having significant effects on fundamental social processes and 
resource systems that generate value for society. The Internet 
is transforming commerce, community, culture, education, gov-
ernment, health, politics, and scienceall information- and 
communications-intensive systems. The transformation is tak-
ing place at the ends, where people are empowered to partici-
pate and are engaged in socially valuable, productive activities. 
As Jack Balkin has observed, the digital revolution makes 
 
and consuming commercial content. See Balkin, supra note 332, at 14. 
 384. See supra Part II.D. 
 385. I ask my Cyberlaw students this question each semester. While the 
range of answers that my students provide always proves to include a few sur-
prises (usually for me, sometimes for the whole class), most students empha-
size general purpose communications applications, such as e-mail and instant 
messaging, the World Wide Web, and file sharing. 
 386. INVESTING IN OUR FUTURE, supra note 1, at 1120. 
 387. Id. at 11. 
 388. Id. (As we approach the new millennium, it is clear that the informa-
tion infrastructurethe interconnected networks of computers, devices, and 
softwaremay have a greater impact on worldwide social and economic struc-
tures than all networks that have preceded them.); id. at 35 (Within the next 
two decades, the Internet will have penetrated more deeply into our society 
than the telephone, radio, television, transportation, and electric power distri-
bution networks have today. For many of us, the Internet has already become 
an integral part of our daily lives.). 
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possible widespread cultural participation and interaction that 
previously could not have existed on the same scale.389 
The Internet opens the door widely for users, and, more 
importantly, it opens the door to many different activities that 
are productive. End-users actively participate in the Internet: 
they engage in innovation and creation;390 they speak about 
anything and everything;391 they maintain family connections 
and friendships; they debate, comment, and engage in political 
and nonpolitical discourse; they meet new people; they search, 
research, learn, and educate; and they build and sustain com-
munities.392 
These are the types of productive activities that generate 
substantial social value, value that too easily evades observa-
tion or consideration within conventional economic transac-
tions.393 When engaged in these activities, end-users are not 
passively consuming content delivered to them, nor are they 
producing content solely for controlled distribution on a pay-to-
consume basis.394 Instead, end-users interact with each other to 
build, develop, produce, and distribute public and nonmarket 
goods.395 Public participation in such activities results in exter-
 
 389. Balkin, supra note 332, at 3. In this article, Balkin proposes a theory 
of free speech that casts free speech as the means to promoting a democratic 
culture. He defines democratic culture to be a culture in which individuals 
have a fair opportunity to participate in the forms of meaning-making that 
constitute them as individuals. Id. at 3. I believe his arguments for free 
speech parallel my own economic arguments which push for openly accessible 
management of some public and social infrastructure, including the Internet. 
 390. See LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 12034; Balkin, 
supra note 332, at 3334. 
 391. Balkin, supra note 332, at 33. [S]peech on the Internet ranges over 
every possible subject and mode of expression, including the serious, the frivo-
lous, the gossipy, the erotic, the scatological, and the profound. The Internet 
reflects popular tastes, popular culture, and popular enthusiasms. Id. 
 392. See id. at 4044. 
 393. See LITAN & RIVLIN, supra note 383, at 5 (noting that [n]ot all of the 
economic benefits of the Internet will show up in productivity statistics and 
suggesting that these hard-to-quantify benefits . . . are important even if they 
never enter the measured output of the economy); see also id. at 4563 (find-
ing that some benefits of the Internet that may not show up in the GDP). 
 394. I prefer pay-to-consume over pay-per-use because I have yet to see a 
pay-per-use system where the purchaser is allowed to use the work produc-
tively. 
 395. Balkin sees this process as follows: 
Internet speech is participatory and interactive. People dont merely 
watch (or listen to) the Internet as if it were television or radio. 
Rather, they surf through it, they program on it, they publish to it, 
they write comments and continually add things to it. Internet speech 
FRISCHMANN.3FMT 04/13/2005 04:50:51 PM 
1018 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [89:917 
 
nal benefits that accrue to society as a whole (online and off-
line) that are not captured or necessarily even appreciated by 
the participants. 
Further, active participation in these activities by some 
portion of society benefits even those who do not participate. In 
other words, the social benefits of Internet-based innovation, 
creativity, cultural production, education, political discourse 
and so on are not confined to those who use the Internet; the 
social benefits spill over. For example, when bloggers396 engage 
in a heated discussion about the merits of proposed legislation 
or the Iraq war, citizens who never use the Internet benefit be-
cause others have deliberated. With respect to weblogs, in par-
ticular, political scientists, journalists, economists, and law-
yers, among others, are beginning to appreciate and more 
carefully study the dynamic relationships between this new 
medium of communication and traditional, offline modes of 
communication and social interaction (whether economic, po-
litical, social, or otherwise).397 
Consider the fact that a significant portion of the content 
traveling on the Internet is noncommercial, speech-oriented in-
formationwhether personal e-mails and Web pages, blog post-
ings, instant messaging, or government documentation398and 
the economic fact that such information is a pure public good 
generally available for both consumption and productive use by 
 
is a social activity that involves exchange, give and take. The roles of 
reader and writer, producer and consumer of information are blurred 
and often effectively merge. 
Balkin, supra note 332, at 34. 
 396. For a concise background on weblogs, see Daniel W. Drezner & Henry 
Farrell, The Power and Politics of Blogs (July 2004) (presentation at the 2004 
American Political Science Association Annual Meeting), http://www.utsc 
.utoronto.ca/~farrell/blogpaperfinal.pdf. 
 397. See id. (observing that [w]eblogs occupy an increasingly important 
place in American politics and studying the distribution of readers across the 
array of blogs, and the interactions between significant blogs and traditional 
media outlets); see also Caio M.S. Pereira Neto, Online Collaboration Media 
and Political Economy of Information: A Case Study, 21 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 511 (studying several collaborative media projects and 
comparing them with traditional media). 
 398. Consider, for example, the recent findings of the Pew Internet and 
American Life Project regarding online content creation and distribution. 
Forty-four percent of Internet users produce and distribute content and inter-
act online. Productive activities range from posting (e.g., photographs) to en-
gaging in interactive products (e.g., blogs). AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW 
INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, CONTENT CREATION ONLINE 1 (2004), 
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Content_Creation_Report 
.pdf. 
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recipients. The productive use and reuse of such information 
creates benefits for the user, the downstream recipients, and 
even people that never consume or use the information. These 
benefits are positive externalities that are not fully appropri-
ated or even appreciated by the initial output producer. 
It is worth noting that welfare can be ratcheted up in in-
credibly small increments and still lead to significant social 
surplus. As participants educate themselves, interact, and so-
cialize, for example, the magnitude of positive externalities 
may be quite small. Diffusion of small-scale positive external-
ities, however, can lead to a significant social surplus when the 
externality-producing activity is widespread, as it is on the 
Internet. This concept seems to reflect in economic terms the 
basic idea underlying Balkins democratic culture theory.399 
This view also complements many of Benklers arguments con-
cerning the social value of diversity in both the types and 
sources of content.400 
Widespread, interactive participation in the creation, mold-
ing, distribution, and preservation of culture,401 in its many dif-
ferent forms and contexts, may be an ideal worth pursuing 
from an economic perspective because of the aggregate social 
welfare gains that accrue to society when its members are ac-
tively and productively engaged.402 Balkin focuses on a theory 
of free speech as the means for pursuing this ideal; I focus on a  
 
 
 399. See Balkin, supra note 332, at 3345; see also Netanel, supra note 42, 
at 34163 (developing a similar theory, although focused on copyright law as 
the relevant infrastructure). 
 400. See generally Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: 
Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (2001). 
 401. The Internet facilitates the archival of culture, history, and other 
types of information that may be quite valuable to future generations. See 
Deirdre K. Mulligan & Jason M. Schultz, Neglecting the National Memory: 
How Copyright Term Extensions Compromise the Development of Digital Ar-
chives, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 451, 46570 (2002). 
 402. Society benefits in a number of ways. First, participation in these 
processes generates outputs (e.g., information) that society consumes. Second, 
participants in these processes benefit by virtue of their participation; they 
appreciate some immediate value (otherwise, why participate?) and they also 
develop communications skills and other knowledge. Third, to the extent that 
participation in these activities develops skills and knowledge, nonpartici-
pants also benefit because of social interdependencies with these participants 
in the offline world. In other words, people that never use the Internet may be 
better off when members of their physical world community are more skilled 
and knowledgeable. I leave further consideration of the various ways in which 
participation in these processes generate externalities for future work. 
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complementary theory of an infrastructure commons as the 
means for pursuing the same. 
4. Reframing the Network Neutrality Debate 
The network neutrality debate is not really about neutral-
ity per se; nor is it about innovation alone. The debate must 
broaden its focus from the merits of sustaining an innovation 
commons to the merits of sustaining an infrastructure com-
monsthat is, of sustaining open, public access to infrastruc-
ture. The debate ought to be about optimizing the Internet for 
society as a whole and it ought to take into account the full 
range of interests at stake. This type of optimization problem 
raises the familiar issues and choices seen in other debates 
over open access or restricted access.403 What type of infrastruc-
ture do we as a society desire? Do we prefer an Internet infra-
structure managed in an openly accessible manner? Or, do we 
prefer an Internet infrastructure managed to maximize the 
profits of property owners? There are benefits and costs to both 
types of management regimes that need to be carefully evalu-
ated and balanced.404 
Presented with this difficult (but properly framed) optimi-
zation problem, the standard economic solution of (1) allowing 
the management of the infrastructure resources to shift to a 
market-driven, pricing-based system to meter traffic and facili-
tate recovery of returns on infrastructure investments, and (2) 
relying on the government to directly subsidize the producers of 
worthwhile public and nonmarket goods seems much less at-
tractive. The prospect of so-called government failure at the 
second step (subsidization) looms large because the transaction 
costs of identifying, evaluating the merits of, and awarding 
subsidies to worthwhile end-user projects are likely tremen-
dous, particularly given the wide range of productive activities 
undertaken on a small-scale basis by many different types of 
end-users. (The misallocation of resources would really be a 
failure of both government and market.) Managing the infra-
structure in an openly accessible manner avoids government  
 
 
 403. Cf. LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 37 (discussing 
neutrality and emphasizing that we must see [end-to-end] design as a 
choice). 
 404. See David, The Evolving Accidental Information Super-Highway, su-
pra note 354. For a visual representation of network neutrality balancing, see 
infra appendix figures 6 and 7. 
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and market failure but, like some traditional infrastructure, 
leaves some issues to be resolved. 
In the context of the Internet, the viability of open access 
may depend (politically) on whether alternative means exist to 
address many of the concerns raised in opposition to open ac-
cess principles. For instance, with respect to congestion, we 
might implement pricing systems based on timing rather than 
on content. Another possible solution is to regulate consump-
tive content from the ends, for example, by taxing or regulating 
spam.405 Another important solution involves expanding capac-
ity. This leads to the issue of incentiveshow will we compen-
sate infrastructure capacity producers? Some viable options in-
clude direct subsidization of infrastructure expansion, tax 
incentives to support the same, cooperative research and devel-
opment projects, and joint ventures. Realization of the eco-
nomic benefits of end-to-end as a sustainable infrastructure 
commons makes researching these alternatives all the more 
necessary.406 
In the end, applying the infrastructure theory to this opti-
mization problem neither solves the problem nor provides a de-
 
 405. This is actually a lesson to be learned from environmental law, where 
polluting uses of a resource are regulated in a manner that sustains open ac-
cess for a wide range of other uses. See supra Part III.A. 
 406. A concrete example of a city recognizing the importance of widespread, 
public access to the Internet is the Philadelphia Wireless Project. See Bob 
Tedeschi, E-Commerce Report, What Would Benjamin Franklin Say? Phila-
delphia Plans Citywide Free Wi-Fi Internet Access for Computer Users, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at C8. The city government plans to deliver wireless 
broadband service to its citizens within the next two years. The wireless net-
work would cover the citys entire 135 square mile area. The initial investment 
of the project would be $10 million dollars. The city hopes to offer this service 
for free. Id. 
Philadelphia likens the Internet to traditional infrastructure such as the 
highway system, and recognizes that creating a city-wide wireless hotspot 
fosters commercial as well as public benefits for the city and its citizens. Spe-
cifically, the city hopes that small businesses and business travelers will 
commercially benefit from city-wide Internet access. In addition, the City of 
Philadelphia has acknowledged the nonappropriable social benefits and posi-
tive externalities attributable to widespread public access to the Internet. 
Such access may facilitate more efficient provision of city government services, 
better educational opportunities within school settings and more generally 
within the community, and the empowerment of disadvantaged individuals. 
See id. While some critics have argued that the market, and not city govern-
ment, should provide Internet access to Philadelphia residents, the citys chief 
information officer, Diana Neff, has stated that [t]he reason we wont just let 
the market do this is that there are societal needs that arent inherently part 
of the capitalist system. We need to be sure no communities in Philadelphia 
are excluded, whether theres [a return on investment] or not. Id. 
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finitive answer to the tough choices that lie ahead. But the the-
ory brings into focus the social value of sustaining an Internet 
infrastructure commons, and strongly suggests that the bene-
fits of open access (costs of restricted access) are significantly 
greater than reflected in the current debate. Most importantly, 
infrastructure theory provides a better theoretical framework 
for understanding and evaluating the character of the [Inter-
net] and how it relates to [us as] a community.407 
CONCLUSION 
We live in an increasingly complex world with overlapping, 
interdependent resource systems that constitute our environ-
ment and affect our lives in significant, although sometimes 
subtle and complex, ways. These overlapping systems include 
not only natural resource systems but also human-made and 
socially constructed resource systems that constitute the world 
we live in and experience. It is critical that we, as a society, 
continually strive to better understand our environment so that 
we can appreciate, construct, and manage it as best we can. Too 
often, unfortunately, we take for granted the fundamental in-
frastructure resources upon which these systems depend. 
The open access (commons) versus private control debate is 
really a battle over our environmenthow it should be consti-
tuted, how it can be experienced, and how it will evolve. As the 
debate continues, it will become increasingly the subject of eco-
nomic, political, and social conflict. Yet we barely understand 
the wide variety of interests at stake in these conflicts, and we 
rarely pause to seek a better understanding. 
This Article devotes much needed attention to understand-
ing how society benefits from infrastructure resources and how 
management decisions affect the wide variety of interests at 
stake. This Article links infrastructure, a particular set of re-
sources defined in terms of the manner in which they create 
value, with commons, a resource management principle by 
which a resource is made openly accessible to all within a 
community regardless of their identity or intended use. As 
noted throughout this Article, the link implies a need to care-
fully evaluate the merits of openly accessible infrastructure in 
a context and with an awareness of the wide variety of inter-
ests at stake. This Article also develops a useful framework for 
evaluating the case for commons management, distinguishing 
 
 407. LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 7, at 21. 
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between commercial, public, and social infrastructures based 
on the manner in which value is created for and realized by so-
ciety. 
In a sense, infrastructure theory itself constitutes an infra-
structure that can facilitate cross-disciplinary analysis of fun-
damental resources in a more comprehensive fashion. Infra-
structure theory is applicable in a wide number of resource-
focused disciplines and should serve as a platform for further 
research. Here are but a few possibilities: 
Demand-side analysis of traditional infrastructure re-
sources and nontraditional infrastructure resources. This Arti-
cle focuses on a few examples of environmental, information, 
and Internet resources, but there is a wide range of resources 
deserving further demand-side analysis. Examples include the 
following: roads; communications networks; legal systems; 
lakes, the atmosphere, and other ecosystems; basic research; 
operating systems; and generic technology; Internet architec-
ture; and the domain name system. These infrastructure re-
sources generate value for society because of their fundamental 
role in complex, dynamic systems. A better understanding of 
these roles is critical to improving decision making regarding 
resource management. 
Comparative analysis of legal and social institutions. Prop-
erty rights, regulation, social norms, and other institutions sus-
tain infrastructure resources in an openly accessible manner. 
There is considerable potential for cross-disciplinary institu-
tional learning with respect to the means by which competing 
interests are reconciled. For example, as briefly noted in this 
Article, environmental law and intellectual property law sus-
tain common resources through institutional means that com-
bine property rights and regulation in very different ways. Fur-
ther analysis of such institutions necessarily requires 
consideration of supply-side issues that have not been ad-
dressed in this Article. 
Analysis of the interplay between infrastructure theory and 
antitrust law. Under certain market conditions, antitrust prin-
ciples, such as the essential facilities doctrine, may require an 
input supplier to make the input openly accessible to output 
producers. Such principles generally involve an incomplete and 
under-theorized version of infrastructure theory. Interestingly, 
the essential facilities doctrine has been adopted in the Euro-
pean Union and elsewhere outside the United States at a time  
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when the U.S. Supreme Court critically questioned its wisdom 
in a recent decision.408 
Analysis of the implications of infrastructure theory to in-
ternational development. Throughout the world, infrastructure 
resources provide the foundation upon which productive 
economies evolve. In the past thirty years, the manner in which 
infrastructures are provided to society has substantially 
changed in developing and developed countries. In the develop-
ing world, loans and aid may be conditioned upon a variety of 
infrastructure market reforms including privatization, industry 
restructuring, and (de)regulation. The theory advanced in this 
Article provides a useful perspective for distinguishing between 
commercial, public, and social infrastructure, and for evaluat-
ing such reform efforts. 
 
 408. See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); SPENCER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST AND 
AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 16.4 (3d ed. 2004) (detailing the European Un-
ions treatment of essential facilities and comparing that treatment to U.S. an-
titrust law).  
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APPENDIX 
The seven stylized figures included in this appendix are 
designed merely to illustrate.  
Figure 1: Commercial Infrastructure 
 
Definition: Nonrival or partially (non)rival input into the production of a 
wide variance of private goods. 
 
Notes: Uses are ranked (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) based on users willingness to pay. Each 
use is either purely consumptive or involves using the infrastructure as an in-
put into producing a private good. For each use, then, the amount that users 
(including direct consumers and output producers) are willing to pay an infra-
structure provider for access to the infrastructure matches the utility or value 
created by obtaining access to the resource. 
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Figure 2: Public Infrastructure 
 
Definition: Nonrival or partially (non)rival input into the production of a 
wide variance of public goods. 
 
Notes: Uses are ranked (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) based on users willingness to pay. Uses 
1 and 2 are either purely consumptive or involve using the infrastructure as 
an input into producing a private good. Uses 3, 4, and 5 involve using the in-
frastructure as an input into producing public goods. For these uses, the 
amount that users (including output producers) are willing to pay an infra-
structure provider for access to the infrastructure matches the utility or value 
that they may enjoy by obtaining access to the resource which in turn depends 
on the appropriation of benefits. Output producers do not fully manifest de-
mand for infrastructure access because they do not fully appropriate the bene-
fits of the public goods. See also infra appendix figure 5 (illustrating basic re-
search as infrastructure). 
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Figure 3: Social Infrastructure 
 
Definition: Nonrival or partially (non)rival input into the production of a 
wide variance of nonmarket goods. 
 
Notes: Uses are ranked (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) based on users willingness to pay. Uses 
1 and 2 are either purely consumptive or involve using the infrastructure as 
an input into producing a private good. Uses 3, 4, and 5 involve using the in-
frastructure as an input into producing nonmarket goods. For these uses, the 
amount that users (output producers) are willing to pay an infrastructure pro-
vider for access to the infrastructure matches the utility or value that they 
may enjoy by obtaining access to the resource which in turn depends on the 
appropriation of benefits. Output producers do not fully manifest demand for 
infrastructure access because they do not fully appropriate the benefits of the 
nonmarket goods. This is a very similar dynamic as seen with public infra-
structure; the basic difference is that the benefits of public good outputs often 
are appropriable to a more significant degree than the benefits of nonmarket 
good outputs. See also infra appendix figure 4 (illustrating a lake as infra-
structure). 
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Figure 4: Lakes as Infrastructure 
 
Notes: Uses are ranked (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) based on users willingness to pay. Some 
uses are fully valued by output producers and consumers while others are not. 
Ecosystem services are not provided by human agents; there is no output 
producer willing to pay for access to the lake. There are some isolated exam-
ples of environmental groups buying up land or environmental resources to 
preserve them. 
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Figure 5: Basic Research as Infrastructure 
 
Notes: Uses are ranked (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) based on users willingness to pay. Ap-
plied commercial research (Use 1) yields appropriable returns and likely some 
positive externalities. This type of research tends to be more predictable, less 
risky, and generally has a short-term focus. Basic commercial research (Use 2) 
has the potential to yield both appropriable returns and a larger degree of 
positive externalities. This type of research tends to be less predictable, more 
risky, and generally has a longer-term focus than applied research. By small 
scale (Use 3), I mean to refer to the small scale production of research results 
that are not necessarily applied or commercial. Individual researchers, educa-
tors, or other members of the public may learn from and extend basic research 
results in directions not focused on by commercially driven entities. Low/no-
commercial uses (Use 4) refers more generally to basic and applied research 
that springs from basic research but is not directed at ends with high commer-
cial value (e.g., vaccine research relevant to developing country populations).* 
Finally, nonmarket uses (Use 5) refers broadly to pure science and other 
nonmarket production processes. With respect to the latter two categories of 
uses, there may not be prospective users that are willing to pay for access to 
basic research results in the absence of government or nonprofit funding. Yet 
such research has the potential to yield substantial positive externalities and 
social surplus. Keep in mind that the stylized figure is illustrative; the relative 
values assigned to uses are arbitrary. 
 
 * See generally Rai, Proprietary Rights and Collective Action, supra note 
219; Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Inno-
vation in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POLY L. 
& ETHICS 193 (2004). 
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 Figure 6: Network Neutrality Balancing:  
An Oversimplified View of the Current Debate 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Network Neutrality Balancing:  
Modified by Infrastructure Theory 
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